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

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A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY

OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF EUROPE

AND ITS COLONIES,

FROM ITS FORMATION AT THE CLOSE OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, TO ITS RE-ESTABLISHMENT UPON THE FALL OF NAPOLEON.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE FIFTH GERMAN EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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

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A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF EUROPE AND ITS COLONIES.

VOL. I.

TO THE READER.

The very satisfactory account which the author himself has given of the plan and execution of his work renders it quite unnecessary for the translator to say any thing upon that head; and the very fact of the work having passed through five editions in Germany, and having been translated into French, Polish, Swedish, and Dutch, is quite a sufficient apology, if indeed any were necessary, for presenting it to the English reader. He has therefore only to notice two matters connected with the translation, which may seem to require some explanation. The first is the use of the word *States-System*, which has been adopted throughout the work, and which, though perhaps not strictly English, seemed to him the only term by which he could adequately express the author's meaning. The second matter refers to the work in general, which, not having been all translated or revised by the same hand, may, it is feared, present a somewhat motley appearance to the nice and critical reader. Should this be found to be the case, the publisher humbly hopes for his indulgence, the more especially as he verily believes the sense of the original is in all cases faithfully given.

Oxford, December, 1833.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST AND SECOND EDITIONS.

Among the remarkable phenomena which the general history of mankind presents to our notice, that of the European States-System, or confederation of states, during the last three centuries, is the greatest, and, at the same time, with reference to ourselves, the most important. The states-systems which were formed in ancient Greece, and in Italy during the middle ages, are far inferior, both as regards their power and their extent; and though the Macedonian system, which arose out of the division of Alexander's universal monarchy, may, perhaps, be compared with it in this respect as well as in some others, it still altogether failed to attain to such an exalted degree of maturity and refinement. But it possesses this superior importance for us, not merely on account of the personal interest we take in its transactions, but also because we have by far the best acquaintance with the mode of its formation, and the various changes and vicissitudes it has undergone.

Whoever undertakes to write the history of any particular states-system (by which we mean the union of several contiguous states, resembling each other in their manners, religion, and

degree of social improvement, and cemented together by a reciprocity of interests,) ought, above all things, to possess a right conception of its general character. In the system of European states, it is obvious this character must be sought for in its internal freedom, or, in other words, the mutual independence of its members, however disproportionate they may otherwise be in regard to physical power. It is this feature which distinguishes such a system from one of an opposite class, that is, where an acknowledged preponderance of one of the members exists.

An historian, therefore, who proposes to exhibit the various changes which have occurred in the reciprocal connections of these states, must consequently regard them as a society of independent individuals, variously related to each other. A peculiar use of modern phrase, indeed, might designate such states by the name of mere machines, (an application of the term, which, in Europe, at least, is contradicted by the variety of the constitutions;) but if it be impossible to discipline an army into a mere machine, (and if this could be done none would ever retreat,) can it be less difficult in the case of civil society?

By adopting these fundamental notions, as the point from which he was to set out, the field of the author's investigations was necessarily very much enlarged. He could not, therefore, limit his range to the mere external working of the machine; but was obliged rather to penetrate

its hidden principles of action, in order to detect the secret springs which supplied a continuous motion to the whole. In every society of moral beings, and consequently, therefore, in every society or union of states, certain general ideas, from which the leading motives of conduct originate, will of necessity prevail, without there being any occasion to assume the fact of a generally adopted system of action. These ideas, however, agreeably to their nature, cannot possibly remain unaltered, for the very reason that the leading minds do not. For the same reason it is absurd to require that any cabinet should always act upon one uniform system, though undoubtedly every judicious government must act upon certain well established principles. To have a correct apprehension, therefore, of the ruling ideas of each age, and to exhibit the particular maxims arising from them, will be the first requisite of the historian. But further, all the members of such a system of states have, each of them, their peculiar character, and their own mode of existence and action, which again are subject to change; how then could a general history of the system be properly executed, without the revolutions in the most powerful of the separate states being noticed?

These remarks will serve to vindicate the plan adopted by the author. It was his intention not merely to furnish a sketch of the various revolutions brought about in the political

relations of modern Europe, together with the several events springing out of them, though this would certainly form the most important part of his undertaking; but also to exhibit, at the same time, their foundation in the prevailing ideas of each age, and as well with regard to the particular leading states, considered as prominent actors in the system, to illustrate the formation of their respective characters and consequent modes of action. With this view the sections relating to the separate states have been introduced, which, however, it would be a total misapplication of the author's plan, to regard as an attempt to furnish a particular and special detail, while he merely proposed a general history of the states in question. The former very well-defined object was the one which he has principally kept in view. That the author, however, has also noticed the colonies, their progressive improvement, and their influence upon Europe itself, can scarcely require any justification. Considering their vast and increasing commercial and political importance, a general sketch like the present, which did not also comprise some account of the colonies, would be extremely limited and imperfect. The sections relating to this portion of the work will, it is apprehended, be the more favourably received, owing to the absence of any other satisfactory treatise on the subject.

From what has been already said, it will be evident that the author has not spared considerable pains in the execution of his design; and a minute examination of each section will, it is hoped, supply additional proofs of his care. It has been his constant endeavour, as well to preserve the general view of the whole, as to represent each individual subject in the light in which, after deliberate study, it appeared to his own mind; in fact, he wished to exhibit on each subject the results of his own reflection, with the greatest brevity consistent with the nature of his work, and thus to supply the lovers of history with a general outline. That this attempt, owing not merely to the great number, but also the great variety of the subjects treated of, required a long and varied course of preliminary study, he may confidently venture to assert. Who indeed, without an intimate acquaintance with the whole circle of political sciences, can engage to write the history of modern Europe? The author is not ignorant of the objections commonly urged against the mere scholar's presuming to decide upon the policy of cabinets; he has himself felt the necessity of preserving a lively sense for practical politics, by keeping entirely remote from all speculation; and while he has not denied himself that proper degree of freedom which a judgment upon past events requires, he at the same time believes that he has not been wanting in that

proper respect, which is due to the memory of those great men who have played the chief parts in this enlarged drama.

While the author was thus employed in elaborating the history of the European states-system, he himself saw it overthrown in its most essential parts. Its history was in fact written upon its ruins. When was such a work ever executed under similar circumstances? While, however, he has confined the range of his history so as to exclude the times immediately past, and not yet ripe for historical narration[a], he yet hopes to have preserved a full view of the whole; in doing which he was perhaps favoured by his personal situation. Having been brought up in a very small, but happy free state, he passed the years of his manhood under a mild monarchical form of government, and was thus enabled to bring to the study of history, some practical ideas, simple in their nature, but the result of his own observation; which, though perhaps dim for others, have served him as loadstars in his voyage through its territory. It only remains for him to say, that while he does not disown a certain degree of respect for the country to which he belongs, yet as he has never been a citizen of any of the principal states of Europe, he could never entertain a partiality for any one of them in particular.

[a] The two first editions, only reach down to the establishment of the French imperial throne, in 1804, see vol. ii. p. 262.

It was therefore the author's endeavour to pass nothing more than a human judgment upon human affairs. He never contemplated raising himself to that more elevated point of view from which our speculative historians, looking down upon the European system of states as constituting merely a link in the great chain of events, affect to measure the progress of mankind by referring to this standard. Those who have looked from this lofty point of view, have assured him that they could discover little more than what might already be seen from below; that their prospect in one direction, that is towards the past, was equally confined; while in the other, that is when they attempted to penetrate the future, they could see nothing but clouds, through which some doubtful forms were with difficulty to be discerned. It was they thought, a place of visions. The author, however, considered it his first duty to remain on the firm ground of history, and owing to the vast extent of his subject, he regarded the possibility of his being able to do so, as a most essential advantage.

A numerous society of states, subsisting together under long and varied forms of relationship, improves and degenerates just as any great mass of individuals would do under similar circumstances. The evils, which brought with them the downfall of the European States-System, chiefly proceeded, as in fact its advan-

tages also did, from the very circumstance of its being a system. To lay before the reader the causes which prepared the final catastrophe, certainly formed a part of the author's design; he has not however the arrogance to pretend that the results, must necessarily have been just as they are here described. No eye indeed, but that of the Eternal, can see through the whole maze of history. But perhaps the modest enquirer, in the representation here given of the past, at the same time that it may serve to illustrate the present, will also be able to discover the prospect of a greater and more glorious future; when, instead of the confined European States-System of the last centuries; he beholds, in consequence of the diffusion of European culture over remote quarters of the globe, and the flourishing colonies beyond the ocean, the elements of a more free and comprehensive system which shall include the states of the whole earth, and is even now rising in its strength.—The fertile theme for the historian of future generations!

Göttingen Feb. 5, 1809.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH EDITIONS.

When the two former editions of the present work appeared, in the years 1809 and 1811, the re-establishment of order in Europe, such as we have now lived to see, was so far beyond the bounds of probability, that the most sanguine could scarcely venture to hope for such an event. In those gloomy days, the remembrance of happier times, and of the principles on which the policy of Europe rested, was not perhaps without advantage; and that to preserve this was the author's aim, his work itself will best show. He would venture to hope that he has not altogether failed in attaining this object; and accordingly, as in the first instance he was obliged to end his labours with the overthrow of the European States-System, so now he is fortunate in being able to subjoin the history of its restoration. In the third and fourth editions, not only was every thing, contained in the two former, thoroughly revised, but also, owing to the disclosure of additional sources of information, certain parts, as for example, those relating to the British East India Company, and the free states of South America, etc. were completely re-written. In what way indeed could the writer earn additional praise, placed as he

is in a situation which the approbation of his contemporaries has conferred upon him, than by endeavouring to perfect his work to the utmost of his ability. His earnest request therefore is, that it may be received in the same sense which he has intended it should be, namely, as a History of the European States-System, founded upon one great principle, that is, its internal freedom, (as is clearly and definitively expressed in the very commencement of the Introduction,) and consequently, notwithstanding all its internal variety, as one intimate, though unconstrained and connected whole, it is only when contemplated in this light, that it can be properly estimated. He makes this remark with particular reference to the continuation, and last period, which can only be appreciated, when read and examined in connection with the earlier parts of the work, and as forming a continuation of them. The author had already, in what had gone before, expressed his own principles and sentiments so plainly that no other mode of treating the subject could have been expected. He believed it to be the most correct way of viewing that extraordinary man, who requires to be so often mentioned in this part of the work, and who in fact now belongs to general history, to consider him simply as an instrument in the hands of Providence, employed for other and higher purposes than his own; and for this reason alone it was incum-

bent upon the author, when speaking of him and the nation which suffered itself to be so abused, not to lose sight of that becoming and dignified tone which, independently of the motive assigned, is also the imperious duty of an historian.

Of the third edition, with the continuation, only one solitary review has come to the author's knowledge[b]. The suggestions there made with respect to certain points in his work, have not been disregarded; two or three others are of a general nature, and in reply to these it will be necessary to enter into some explanation. It is objected, that a sufficient degree of attention has not been paid to the 'domestic life of the people.' The expression here used is somewhat indefinite; it includes constitution, laws, customs, etc. Now in writing a history of the European States-System, these subjects could only so far come under consideration, as they exercised an influence upon it. And, in fact, it is precisely for this reason that the author has inserted occasional sections relating to the individual states, in which he believes he has noticed every thing that was absolutely necessary, without descending into particular details. He is

[b] In the HERMES, part iv, for the year 1819, p. 259—285.—The fact of the author's work having been translated into the several languages of France, Holland, Sweden, Poland, and the United States, would seem to furnish a satisfactory proof that the principles of practical politics set forth by him, are regarded as correct by those nations. He is also informed that a new translation is in progress in England. [The present one.]

fully sensible that in this case the great difficulty consists in knowing how much and how little to say; but still, as the work now stands, he is not without hopes of having succeeded in preserving a just mean between the two. He must leave the reader to decide whether he has not given with sufficient clearness and precision, as far indeed as it was possible to do so in a Manual like the present, the prevailing ideas at the different periods, which determined the character of their practical policy; as well as the great moral causes which co-operated to the same end. He was as little obliged to write a general history of modern times, as to detail that of particular states; on the contrary he has merely fulfilled the engagement implied in the title-page, of giving what he calls a history of the European States-System, of which so few persons seem to have formed any clear and adequate notion.—Another fault which the reviewer finds with the work, respects its division. According to his view of the subject, it should have been divided into two periods only, that is to say, into 'modern, and very recent, history,' the latter period commencing with the French Revolution. In reply to this objection the author might perhaps rest his justification on the bare fact, that it is a matter of perfect indifference whether he divided his work, as he has done, into three, or into two periods; because the last actually does commence with the very point of time sug-

gested by the Reviewer. But he willingly confesses that the proposed alteration is entirely at variance with his plan, and the particular views he has adopted. It is unnecessary to remind the reader that the work must be considered as a whole. The third leading period is as intimately connected with the second, as the second is with the first. To separate the most modern time from that which is less so, appears much too premature; such a distinction may perhaps be allowed to the writers of the twentieth century, but would be just as improper in those of the first quarter of the nineteenth, as it would be to commence the history of modern times with the Reformation. A third objection still remains to be considered, which is, that the last period has not been executed with the same degree of success as the two first. Upon this point, however, it certainly does not become the author to express any opinion; he can only observe that he has anticipated the probability of such an objection being made. That it is impossible to write the history of one's own times as satisfactorily as that of the past, the author has most sensibly felt during the course of his labours; for what reader does not bring to the perusal his own views, his own opinions, his own feelings? and what writer can expect to satisfy them all? The author, therefore, must rest contented with having exhibited the events which came under review, according to the political

principles which he regards as immutable, and which predominate from the first to the last page of his work. This, in fact, is the impartiality he has endeavoured to attain, and no other.

In preparing the present edition, nothing has been overlooked, which, in addition to the continuation, might give it that degree of correctness, as well in regard to the impression, as the determination of the several dates, which legitimate criticism can possibly require. Both indeed have been submitted to the most scrupulous revision. The author considered it to be so much the more incumbent on him, because, as he is now in the seventieth year of his age, the present edition is, in all probability, the last that will ever proceed from his hands.

Let him then express a hope, that the dearly bought experience of recent times may not be without its use for the future! May no possessor of arbitrary power again seek to fetter the liberties of Europe! May the nations show themselves worthy of recovered freedom; and their rulers not be surprised when they see that its enjoyment is not altogether free from abuse!

GÖTTINGEN,
April 10, 1819 *and* 1822, *and Feb.* 5, 1830.

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A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY

OF THE

POLITICAL SYSTEM OF EUROPE AND ITS COLONIES.

INTRODUCTION.

I. Bibliography of sources and authorities.

DE MARTENS *Guide Diplomatique, ou Répertoire des principaux Lois, des Traités, et autres Actes publics jusqu' à la fin du* 18me *siècle;* à Berlin, 1801, tom. I, II: a catalogue raisonné of public documents, with references to the collections in which they may be found. These two volumes form the first two parts of the *Cours Diplomatique;* and are indispensable to the historian.

II. Collections of sources and authorities.

A. *State Papers.* A critical notice of these collections is given in DE MARTENS *Discours sur les Recueils de Traités,* prefixed to *Supplément au Recueil des Traités,* vol. I. The most important general collections, necessary to be mentioned here, are—

Recueil des Traités de Paix, de Trêve, de Neutralité, d'Alliance, de Commerce, etc. depuis la naissance de J. C. jusqu' à présent; à Amsterdam et à la Haye, 1700, tom. I—IV, fol.; commonly called the collection of MOETJENS, the name of one of the booksellers who undertook it.

Corps Universel Diplomatique de Droit des Gens, contenant un Recueil des Traités d'Alliance, de Paix, de Trêve, de Commerce, etc. depuis le règne de l'Empereur Charlemagne jusqu' à present; par J. DU MONT, à Amsterdam et à la Haye, 1726—1731. 8 vols. fol. This is the principal collection.

It contains the state papers from 800—1731. Those for the last three centuries, from 1501, begin with the fourth volume. *Supplémens au Corps universel Diplomatique*, par M. Rousset, à Amsterdam, tom. I—V, 1739, was afterwards published as a supplement and continuation of this collection; so that the whole work consists of thirteen volumes. The first three volumes of this supplement are composed of state papers previous to the year 800, of matter strictly supplementary, and of a continuation to 1738. The last two volumes contain, *Le Cérémonial Politique des Cours de l'Europe;* with the documents connected with it.

A convenient selection, for common use was published by Schmauss, *Corpus Juris Gentium Academicum*, Lips. 1730, 2 vols. 4to. This collection comprises the period from 1100—1730.

The following may be regarded as a continuation of these collections: Ferd. Aug. Wilh. Wenkii *Codex Juris Gentium recentissimi, e tabulariorum examplariumque fide dignorum monumentis compositus;* Lipsiæ, tom. I, 1781; tom. II, 1788; tom. III, 1795, 8vo. This includes the period from 1735—1772.

A collection of those of still more recent date has been compiled by Von Martens.

Recueil des principaux Traités d'Alliance, de Paix, de Tréve, de Neutralité, de Commerce, etc. conclus par les Puissances de l'Europe, tant entre elles qu'avec les Puissances, et les Etats dans d'autres parties du Monde, depuis 1761 *jusqu' à présent*, par M. de Martens, à Gottingue, 1791—1802, 7 vols. 8vo. Seconde édition revue et augmentée, 1818. (This at present has only proceeded as far as vol. I—IV.)

This collection reaches from 1761 to the peace of Luneville, 1801. There has since appeared:

Supplément au Recueil des principaux Traités depuis 1761, *jusqu' à présent, précédé de Traités du* 18me *siècle antérieurs à cette époque, et qui ne se trouvent pas dans le Corps universel Diplomatique de M. Dumont et Rousset et autres Recueils généraux de Traités*, par M. de Martens, vol. I, II, 8vo.

à Gottingue, 1802; vol. III, IV and last, 1808. Beside the supplements the collection was continued to the end of the year 1807. There again followed in addition to this, vol. V, 1808—1814, April, inclusive, 1817; vol. VI, to the end of 1816; vol. VII, 1808—1818 inclusive, with copious indexes; vol. VIII, 1818, 1819 inclusive. The four last parts also under the title of *Nouveau Recueil des principaux Traités d'Alliance, etc.* à Gottingue, 1817—1820, vol. I—IV, 8vo.

B. *Memoirs.* The accounts given by statesmen and generals themselves, of the transactions in which they took a part, unquestionably form one of the most important sources; and it is one of the essential advantages of modern history to be particularly rich in them. We owe the great number we possess, to the fashion which prevailed in certain periods for courtiers to write memoirs of their life and times; particularly in France, where PHILIPPE DE COMINES set the first example, and stands at the head of the series. His *Mémoires* reach from 1464 to 1498. They reveal the secret causes of events, and unfold the nature of their connection, and consequently offer the best school for the formation of statesmen. The critical enquirer, however, must never forget, that their authors always brought to the work their own prejudices, often their own passions; and not unfrequently were bewildered themselves. The chief collections are,

Collection Universelle des Mémoires particuliers relatifs à l' histoire de France; à Londres, et se trouve à Paris, vol. I—LXV, 1785—1791; with a continuation, vol. LXVI—LXX, Paris, 1806. This only comes down to the end of the sixteenth century.

Allgemeine Sammlung historischer Memoirs vom 12 Jahrhundert bis auf die neuesten Zeiten, durch mehrere Verfasser übersetzt, mit den nöthigen Anmerkungen und jedesmal mit einer Universel-historischen, Uebersicht versehen von FR. SCHILLER. I. Abth. B. 1—4. II. Abth. B. 1—26. Jena, 1790—1806. This contains a selection of the more important memoirs, down to the Duke of Orleans' regency.

III. Works on the general history of Modern Europe.

J. J. SCHMAUSS *Einleitung zu der Staatswissenschaft*, I, II Theil, Leipzig, 1741 and 1747. The first part contains The History of the Balance of Power in Europe, or the State Affairs of Western Europe, from 1484—1740. The second, An Account of the Treaties concluded between the Northern Powers, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Prussia. This work is executed in a careful and methodical manner, and will always be found useful.

Le Droit Public de l'Europe, fondé sur les Traités; précédé de Principes des Négociations pour servir d'Introduction, par M. L'ABBE DE MABLY; *nouvelle édition continuée jusqu' à la Paix de* 1763; *avec des Remarques historiques, politiques, et critiques*, par M. ROUSSET; à Amsterdam et Leipsic, 1773, 3 vols. 8vo. From the assertions of Mably, and the refutations of Rousset, a tolerably correct account may be gathered of the views of the French and of their opponents, with regard to the practical politics of Europe at that period.

Tableau des Révolutions de l'Europe, par M. C. W. KOCH, 1790. *Nouvelle édition corrigée et augmentée*, 3 vols. Paris, 1813. Of the three volumes, vol. I extends to 1300; vol. II to 1713; vol. III to 1800. Attached to it are, *Tables généalogiques des Maisons Souveraines de l'Europe.* A useful work, written with much care, and with judicious criticisms upon the authorities made use of, as indeed may be said of all the writings of this diplomatic historian [a].

Tableau des Relations extérieurs des Puissances de l'Europe, tant entre elles qu' avec d'autres Etats dans les diverses parties du Globe, par G. FR. DE MARTENS, à Berlin, 1801. This work forms the third part of the *Cours Diplomatique;* and is particularly valuable on account of the attention it bestows on commerce and the colonies.

Histoire générale et raisonnée de la diplomatie Française,

[a] [A catchpenny translation of KOCH's *Sketch of the Revolutions of Europe* has been published in CONSTABLE's *Miscellany*, wanting all its essential advantages, and with a preface containing one or two palpable falsehoods. TR.]

depuis la fondation de la Monarchie jusqu' à la fin du règne de Louis XVI. par M. DE FLASSAN, à Paris, 1809 ; 2nd edition, 1811, 7 vols. 8vo. A history of French diplomacy is not much less than a history of the European political system. The use of the most important diplomatic authorities, the fidelity and preciseness of the accounts, and a rare impartiality of judgment, give to this work a classic value. Part of modern history is found in the first volume.

Grundriss einer Geschichte der merkwürdigsten Welthändel neuerer Zeit in einem erzählenden Vortrage von JOH. G. BUSCH, third edition, 1796, beginning with 1440, and extending, in the latest edition, to 1795. This is not a regular historical narration, but is useful to beginners, by making them acquainted with the materials of modern history.

Geschichte der drei letzten Jahrhunderte von JOH. GOTTFR. EICHHORN, Göttingen, 6 Th. 8vo., third edition, 1817. The first volume, which gives a view of general history, comes under this head ; and the last two, as containing a history of the colonies.

Tableau des Révolutions du Systéme Politique de l'Europe ; depuis la fin du quinzième siècle, par M. ANCILLON, à Berlin, vol. I, II, 1803 ; vol. III, IV, 1805. This is a valuable work, the completion of which is much desired. The fourth volume comes down to the peace of Utrecht.

Of compendiums, ACHENWALL'S *Entwurf der allgemeinen Europäischen Staatshändel des 17ten und 18ten Jahrhunderts,* Götting. 1756, and frequently reprinted, merits all the reputation it enjoys. It comprises, however, only the period from 1600 to 1748.

Grundriss einer diplomatischen Geschichte der Europäischen Staatshändel und Friedensschlüsse, seit dem Ende des 15ten Jahrhunderts bis zum Frieden von Amiens. Zum Gebrauch academischer Vorlesungen von G. FR. VON MARTENS, Berlin, 1807.

INTRODUCTION.

1. THE history of the Political System of Europe must not be confounded with the history of the separate states of which it is composed. It is rather a history of their mutual relations, and more especially of those of the higher powers, so far as they can be deduced from the peculiar nature of the separate states, the character of the rulers, and the prevailing opinions of the times. But a necessary condition of the interchange of these relations, and therefore an essential property of this states-system, is its *internal freedom;* that is, the stability and mutual independence of its members. To set forth how this was formed, endangered, and preserved, is therefore the great object of the historian. This, however, can only be done by a detail of the whole series of internal relations, and the causes which produced them.

2. The history of this states-system, comprising the last three centuries, forms an important part of modern history, as distinguished from ancient and that of the middle ages. For, notwithstanding there is no striking event here to form a strict boundary line, as there is be-

tween ancient history and that of the middle ages, yet the concurrence of several great events prepared a change sufficient to justify this division.

These events are: 1. The conquest of Constantinople, and the establishment of the Turkish empire in Europe, 1453: 2. The discovery of America by Christopher Columbus, 1492: 3. The discovery of the new passage to the East Indies, by the Cape of Good Hope, made by Vasco de Gama, 1497; and the effects of these two discoveries in changing the great commercial routes: 4. The changes in the art of war in consequence of the invention and use of gunpowder.—To show the effects which these circumstances had upon the politics of Europe, is the purpose of the following work.

3. Europe acquired, during this period, an importance in universal history such as it had never before possessed. Neither Africa nor America contained any state of general importance previous to the independence of the Colonies; and of the three great kingdoms of Asia, that of Persia under the Sophis, India under the Moguls, and China, the latter alone continued to exist, and that only under a foreign dynasty.

The Persian empire of the Sophis was founded by Ishmael Sophi about 1500; attained its greatest power under Shah Abbas 1585—1628; was overthrown by the Afghans 1722; and, on the murder of the succeeding tyrant, Kouli Chan or Nadir Shah, 1747, fell into anarchy.—The Mogul empire in India was established by the Sultan Babour, a descendant of Timour, about 1526. It gradually acquired the countries of the Indus and Ganges, and the peninsula; and attained the

height of its power from the reign of Acbar the Great, 1556—1605, to the death of Aureng Zebe, † 1707, after which it fell to pieces, and was almost entirely annihilated by the conquest of Nadir Shah, 1739, and the policy of the Europeans.—The revolution in China by the conquest of the Mantchew Tartars, whose dominion still continues, took place, in 1644.

4. In Europe, on the contrary, most of the old states still continued to exist; and the Europeans besides, during this period, founded extensive colonies on the other continents, where with their dominion they introduced their religion and civilisation. Notwithstanding, however, all the efforts of the parent states to preserve a strict authority over these establishments, some have already grown to independence, and others appear to be fast ripening towards it. The history of these colonies is of itself an essential part of the history of the European system, and is becoming still more so, by the vast and constantly increasing influence which they have had, not only on the general commerce, but on the practical politics of the leading states of Europe. The historian, therefore, has to set forth, not merely the history of these several establishments, but must explain their various influences upon Europe.

5. Though the ancient states of Europe still continued, closer, more numerous, and more varied relations were formed amongst them than had hitherto existed; and by these the states of Europe became, as it were, one great Political

States-system, whose vicissitudes may be moulded into one general history.

These relations were brought about by the progress of civilisation, which necessarily increases the points of contact between neighbouring states; still they presuppose certain general points in which the common interest was concerned. Of this nature were: *a.* the Italian wars; *b.* the affairs of religion after the reformation; *c.* the necessity of opposing the advances of the Turks; *d.* the commerce of the colonies, which was constantly increasing in value, and the commercial interests to which it gave rise.—As to all this there remains to be added, *e.* the facility of communication which printing and the establishment of posts afford, the Christian nations of Europe became, in a manner, morally united into one community, which was only politically divided.

6. The European political system, notwithstanding its internal variety, was, till within these few years, a system of predominant monarchies; where republics, with the exception of the United Netherlands, which alone attained to any great degree of power, were merely tolerated. This predominance of monarchies had a considerable influence on general politics. It was this, in the first place, that kept back the people from taking a more active part in public affairs. Powerful popular parties, and the disorders to which they give rise, such as are met with in the great republics of antiquity, would have been wholly unknown, if religious dissensions had not produced effects which nearly resembled them. A second consequence of this predominance was, that the

management of public affairs became more and more concentrated in the hands of princes and their ministers, and thus led to that cabinet policy which particularly characterises the European states-system.

7. Notwithstanding this uniformity, which renders modern history so unlike the ancient, it yet displays all the variety of which it is susceptible. Every form of monarchical government—hereditary and elective, unlimited, constitutional, and so on, till the kingly authority dwindles to a mere shadow—existed in Europe. Again, in its few republics, what a wide difference between the severe aristocracy of Venice, and the pure democracy of the shepherd-cantons! It is undoubtedly to this practical variety that Europe is chiefly indebted for her enlightened and enlarged views in general politics; to which must be attributed not only her superior policy, but, in a great measure, her rapid advancement in civilisation.

8. The European states-system also acquired firmer stability, from the fortunate circumstance of having its centre composed of a state, the form of which, imperfect as it was in itself, was nevertheless of the greatest advantage to the whole system. This was the German empire. Without such a central state, important to all but dangerous to none, this system could scarcely have grown up as it has. Enlightened policy soon perceived, that on the preser-

vation of this empire, the welfare of the existing order of things in Europe mainly depended.

9. The principles which held this system together, and guaranteed the security and independence of the weak against the strong, were of various kinds. A just and perfect condition among the several states, such as might be projected in theory, was certainly, at all times, far from being established. Still, however, a law of nations, one of the fruits of advancing civilisation, became gradually developed, resting not merely upon express treaties, but upon general tacit convention. This enjoined the observance of certain usages in peace, but more particularly in war; and though its maxims were often violated, its influence was eminently beneficial. Even the strict, and sometimes excessive ceremonial mutually observed by the states towards one another, will appear by no means a matter of indifference, if considered as a mutual acknowledgement of independence on the part of states often the most unlike in power and constitution[b].

[b] Sam. Puffendorf. Jus Naturæ et Gentium. Lugd. 1672.

Bourlamaqui, Droit de la Nature et des Gens. 1766.

De Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains. Lond. 1758, 4to. à Bâle, 1777, 3 vols. 8vo. This work has obtained the highest authority among practical statesmen.

Précis du Droit des Gens fondé sur les Traités et l'Usage, par M. de Martens, troisième édition, revue et augmentée; à Gottingue, 1821.

10. The first and most important fruit of this law of nations, and at the same time the chief support of the whole system, was the sacredness of a recognised legitimate possession, without which no such system could exist. Its preservation was secured by most of the governments being hereditary. It was by the illegal division of an elective monarchy that this principle was virtually destroyed. The previous usurpations of individuals had only tended to confirm it.

In this respect the influence of the German body politic was highly beneficial, by the example it afforded of the continuance of small states, and even cities, by the side of large ones.

11. Another important support of this system was the adoption and maintenance of the principle of a *balance of power;* that is, the attention paid by the different states to the preservation of their mutual independence, by preventing any particular one from rising to such a degree of power as should seem inconsistent with the general liberty. This explanation will show the great value of this principle. What is necessary to its preservation, has at all times been a question for the highest political wisdom; (and this question has necessarily

The last literary labour of the author, who has done so much for political science.

Grundriss eines Systems des Europäischen Völkerrecht von Fr. Saalfeld. Göttingen, 1809.

been ever varying;) nothing, however, but the most short-sighted policy would ever seek for its final settlement by an equal division of the physical force of the different states. The maintenance of this principle led to the following consequences: *a.* to a vigilant attention of the states to the affairs of each other; and to a multitude of new and various relations between them, by means of alliances and counter-alliances, especially among the more distant ones. *b.* It gave a greater importance in the political system to states of the second and third order. *c.* It promoted a general feeling of respect for independence, and a system of politics of a higher order than that arising from individual gratification.

The idea of a political balance of power has always existed, to a certain extent, in every system of free civilised states, —e. g. in Greece and Italy—for it essentially belongs to all such systems. It is a natural fruit of the advance of political science; and the neglect of it leads to the annihilation or subjugation of the weaker powers. As it may be both abused and destroyed, it cannot afford *perfect* security; but it gives the greatest that it is possible to obtain.

12. The European political system found a third support in the establishment of maritime states, which, more than all others, have contributed to maintain the balance of power. The rise of maritime states, and the peculiar nature of their influence in the political balance of Europe, prevented land forces from alone deciding

every thing, which, as they depend almost entirely upon the number of men which can be got together, are always most easily formed.

13. In a system of states most of which were hereditary, the family connections of the ruling houses obtained an importance which might increase or diminish, but could never wholly cease. The principle generally adopted, that princes could marry none but the daughters of princes, became a security against the evils to which marriages with subjects always lead. The dangers, equally great, which follow the connection of many powerful ruling families, Europe happily escaped from by the fortunate circumstance, that Germany contained many little principalities, which furnished queens to most of the European states. Thus there grew up a relationship between most of the ruling houses, which was neither so near as to exercise a direct controlling influence on politics, nor yet so distant but that its natural force was felt, and it proved an important bond of union when all other ties seemed nearly dissolved.

14. The constitutions of most of the kingdoms of Europe, and particularly those of German origin, were not founded upon written documents, but had grown up out of the feudal system; though perhaps in some of them a few fundamental laws existed. They could not therefore well fail to bear a resemblance to one another in their principal features. At the be-

ginning of this period, the monarchs were everywhere surrounded by a nobility, subdivided into a higher and lower noblesse, who had hitherto yielded little more obedience to their sovereigns than temporary circumstances or personal relations demanded. The clergy also had as generally obtained an important influence in all affairs of state. These two bodies composed the higher or privileged class: they enjoyed great immunities in exemption from taxes, and occupied the first seats in the assemblies of the nation. Besides these, another order, wholly foreign to the strict feudal system, had gradually been formed, a fruit of the institutions of free cities and boroughs which had grown up by commerce: we mean citizens, or freemen. The representatives of this order were likewise summoned to the national assemblies, in order to grant taxes, of which it had to bear the chief burden. The great mass of the peasantry still remained more or less under the yoke of bondage, as villains or serfs; but however modified their servitude, they were entirely destitute of all political rights. In the situation in which these two latter classes stood towards the two first, there seems to have lain the elements of revolutions, which would necessarily take place, either suddenly or by degrees; for, unfortunately, in none of the continental states did the existing assembly form itself into a well-organised representation of

the nation, by which alone the government could have acquired an internal stability, and which would alike have protected it from anarchy and despotism.

15. At first, therefore, the royal authority in these kingdoms was everywhere much limited. Without the aid of the nobility no important war could be carried on; without the consent of the cities no taxes could be levied. Without standing armies (a small beginning excepted), without political economy (for no art was known but that of getting money), there existed, in reality, at this time no power, in the present acceptation of the word. The royal authority, however, was almost everywhere increasing: Ferdinand the Catholic, Louis XI, and Henry VII, laid the foundation of it, which they well understood how to do; and their successors, Philip II, Louis XIV, and others, enlarged it till it became absolute, without dreaming that they were thereby preparing its overthrow.

16. The history of modern Europe is divided into three periods, of which the first two occupy nearly an equal space of time: we stand, as it were, at the commencement of the third. The first extends from the end of the fifteenth century to the accession of Louis XIV, 1492—1661. The second, from 1661 to the death of Frederic the Great and the commencement of the political changes in Europe, 1661—1786. The third from the latter period to the present

times. The principle upon which this division has been made, is the different form which practical politics assumed in each period; and from the various characters of these the first may be called the *political-religious;* the second, the *mercantile-military;* and the third, the *political-revolutionary* and *constitutional.* The first was the period of the *rise;* the second, that of the *establishment;* and the last, that of the *dissolution* of the *balance of power.*

17. The course of affairs requires, that in the two first, and in the early part of the last period, the history of the Northern European system should be separated from that of the Southern. The former of these comprises Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Denmark; the latter, the remaining states. The Prussian monarchy, forming, since its aggrandizement, the connecting link of the two systems, belongs to both. Even earlier, on particular occasions, the north may be found taking an active share in the affairs of the south; but previous to the division of Poland this was always of a transitory nature. Still the constant influence which the two systems had upon one another must not be overlooked.

FIRST PERIOD.

From the end of the Fifteenth Century to the time of Louis XIV. 1492—1661.

PART THE FIRST.

HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM.

Preliminary remarks. 1492-1661.

1. THE peculiar character of this period is determined by the Reformation which broke out at its commencement. For as the religious interests which thus arose acquired the prevailing influence in politics, the disputes and parties of the former became identical with those of the latter. This union doubtless varied in strength at various times, but still to it must be referred the spirit and direction of the age.

2. Although the Southern political system embraces all the states of the south of Europe, yet Spain, France, England, Austria, the German empire, the Papal and Turkish powers, must be considered its most important members. By them its political relations were determined; and they, in comparison with the passiveness of

Preliminary remarks. 1492-1661.

the others, may be said to have been the active limbs of the system.

Of these powers SPAIN, under Ferdinand and Isabella, commanded the most brilliant prospects of the future. The union of Arragon, with its dependencies, Sicily and Sardinia, to Castile, which had been effected by their marriage (1469) laid the foundation of its internal vigour; while the discovery of America had opened for it the most boundless views abroad. The conquest of Grenada was, however, the great event which roused the spirit of the nation, although it at the same time destroyed its liberty by opening the way, principally by the establishment of the inquisition, to the despotic power of the crown; without, however, immediately causing any change, at least in the form of the constitutional assembly (the *Cortes*).

With the exception of the American discoveries, FRANCE possessed equal advantages, although then much more limited in extent. The acquisition of Bretagne by the marriage of Charles VIII. had considerably enlarged it; while the policy of Louis XI. and the fall of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, (1477,) the last of its vassals possessed of any dangerous power, had established the royal authority as firmly as in any other quarter, and had caused the power of the constitutional assembly (*etats généraux*) visibly to decline. The incalculable advantage afforded to France, as a chief member of the European System, by her geographical position, cannot escape notice.

In ENGLAND, as elsewhere, the kingly power was gradually increased in the reign of Henry VII. (1483—1509), after the termination of the wars of the white and red roses. Although the parliament had already received its distinguishing and most important features, it was still, and long continued to be, a body without a soul; but by its organization it was more capable of life than any other national assemblage. Not yet united to Scotland, her authority doubtful in Ireland, without any naval force, England could hardly have shared in the continental disputes, had not the possession of Calais

opened to her a road into France; a road, however, by which she could no longer penetrate far.

The AUSTRIAN MONARCHY was yet in a state of formation; the greater part of its possessions being scattered and of uncertain tenure. To the ancient dominions of Austria, (dating from 1276,) the Netherlands (from the year 1477) were added, by the marriage of Maximilian with Mary of Burgundy; and although the claims of the Hapsburg family to Hungary and Bohemia terminated in 1527 in permanent possession, its power was still weakened, not only by the factions peculiar to elective states, but also, and especially in Hungary, by Turkish wars. The imperial crown added but little to its strength, although largely to its splendour. In fact, without the opening prospect of succession to the Spanish throne (see below) the power of Austria would have been very limited.

The GERMAN EMPIRE appears to have attained a more perfect organization, by the establishment of order and recognition of rights, the election of imperial courts, the provincial divisions, and embodying of police throughout the empire, which it owed to Maximilian I. between the years 1492 and 1519. Unfortunately the foreign disputes, in which he was for ever engaged, checked his course and impeded the career of improvement. Thus the empire remained dead as a whole, though pregnant with life in its separate members, till the Reformation awoke its energies only to waste them upon internal dissension. Still, however, amid all the evils of internal disunion and external defencelessness, this wonderful state bore up and kept its rank among the nations; partly sustained by its own strength, partly by good fortune in some of its connections, and partly, nor that the least, by the general and growing opinion, that upon its maintenance and freedom that of the whole political system of Europe depended.

The POPES appeared in a double capacity, as rulers of the States of the Church (see below), and as heads of the Christian community. Nor did the interests of the one character always agree with those of the other; for what might not the paternal authority of the Popes have wrought for the well

Preliminary remarks. 1492-1661.

being of Europe, had the passions of our nature kept aloof and spared the sanctity of their office! And yet their policy remains a rare example of elasticity and firmness. Haughty of tone, although without arms to support it; resting merely upon public opinion, yet in continual and growing opposition to it; they never resigned any thing, even when virtually lost, but maintained a regular and consistent course, grounded upon the assurance that they were indispensable, and would in the end be recognized as such.

The PORTE (at this time essentially a conquering power) had reached the summit of its greatness under Solyman II. (1520—1566). Its regular infantry (the Janizaries) had already made it formidable by land, while its navy, by which the Mediterranean with its coasts might have been secured, threatened the same superiority by sea. Standing in direct and hostile opposition to the Christian part of Europe, Turkey remained a foreign power: and to the danger which thereby overhung Christendom, the Popes had for a long time looked as a remedy against the disunion of its supporters. This hope was frustrated by an early alliance between France and the Porte, by which the latter became a member, although an incongruous one, of the European political system.

Of the other states of Southern Europe PORTUGAL was wholly occupied by its discoveries and its conquests (see below); SWITZERLAND, at first formidable from its mercenaries, soon sank into a happy inactivity: while VENICE gradually assumed the appearance of a rich commercial establishment, which resigns the chief burden of its affairs in order to enjoy its hard-earned repose.

PERIOD THE FIRST.

I. *History of the Negotiations and Wars respecting Italy, from* 1494 *to* 1515.

Istoria d'Italia di FRANCISCO GUICCIARDINI. 2 vols. fol. Venezia, 1738. (The edition of *Friburgo*, 1775, 4 vols. 4to. although pretending to greater completeness, has only a few unimportant additions.) This is the principal authority, as the writer was both contemporary with, and engaged in, the affairs of which he treats; and at the same time an impartial historian and critic. The work extends from 1490 to 1532.

Mémoires de Philippe de Comines. Paris, 1747. 4 vols. These close with 1498.

The works of MEZERAY, DANIEL, MEUZEL, and others, on French affairs in general. The history of Charles VIII. by GODEFROI, (*Histoire de Charles VIII.* Paris, 1684); that of Louis XII, by VARILLAS, (*Histoire de Louis XII.* Paris, 1688); and the Lives of Louis XII, (*Vies de Louis XII.*) published by GODEFROI, Paris, 1615—1620, embrace an account of these events, although naturally more with reference to France.

Contests respecting Italy. 1494-1515.

3. Italy, towards the end of the fifteenth century, was the general mark of conquest, and therefore the central point of European politics. Its internal condition was such as at once to invite the conqueror, and to delay his progress by plunging him into endless debate. In a country so divided materials were never wanting for internal strife; and thus foreigners, once engaged in the quarrel, never failed of opportunities for interference. Unimportant, therefore, as the

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Italian feuds may at first appear, they are by no means so in reality, since it was upon the action of these meaner wheels that the greater machinery of European politics, at this period, depended for the impulse and continuance of its motion.

4. Modern Italy was now in the Augustan age of arts and knowledge; for more than a century it had formed a world by itself, alike in politics and refinement. In the full enjoyment of independence, the Italian states constituted a system in which the desire of maintaining the balance of power gave rise to a more subtle po-
1492. licy, which, especially after the death of the great Lorenzo de Medici, degenerated into a mere crafty selfishness, and soon wrought its own destruction. The chief members of this system were the duchy of Milan and the republic of Venice in the north; the republic of Florence and the states of the Church in the centre; and the kingdom of Naples in the south.

1. The duchy of MILAN, to which at that time not only Parma and Placentia, but Genoa also belonged, was a German fief, held under the emperor. Upon the failure of male issue in the house of Visconti (1450) it had passed into the family of Sforza; and upon the death of the founder Francis Sforza, (1466,) and the murder of his son Galeazzo Maria, (1476,) the son of the latter, the weak John Galeazzo, succeeded to the government, under the guardianship of his uncle Ludovico Sforza, by whom he was ultimately expelled, (1494.)

2. The republic of VENICE had already acquired all that it was ever to possess upon the continent, yet without renounc-

ing the hope of acquiring more. Its hereditary plans of aggrandizement were directed against Romagna, (the greater portion of which she had gained,) and against Milan. To the entire possession of the latter even the boldest hopes of the senate could hardly aspire; but the projects once adopted were followed up with all the cunning and perseverance which an aristocratical system of policy, such as that of Venice, is alone capable of exhibiting. The republic was in fact considered the diplomatic model of its day.

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3. The PAPAL DOMINIONS had not only a very uncertain frontier in the north, but the power of the great families, in several states as yet unbroken, rendered their government still more unstable. The Popes not unfrequently stood in the way of their own advancement, and the practice of nepotism merged the interests of the holy see in that of their several families. In this the reigning Pope, Alexander VI. (1492—1503) was hardly surpassed by any that came either before or after him.

4. The republic of FLORENCE still adhered to its democratical form, although now, for near a century, under the dominion of the Medici. Pietro was at this time head of the family, having succeeded to the principality of his father, the great Lorenzo, but not to his virtues or ability. Although its territory had been increased by the conquest of Pisa, (1407,) yet the spirit of the Pisanese was far from being subdued; and in this, as well as in the nature of the authority of the Medici, which being wholly built upon superior talent could not be expected to survive its failure, lay those seeds of revolution which bore only too abundant a harvest.

5. The kingdom of NAPLES was subject to a collateral branch of the house of Arragon, without, however, the appendage of Sicily, which was attached to Arragon itself. Alfonso V. of Arragon and first of Naples († 1458,) had bequeathed it to his illegitimate son, Ferdinand I. who was succeeded in 1494, by Alfonso II. elder son of the former; by him it was given up in 1395 to his son Ferdinand II. who, dying in 1496, was succeeded by his uncle Frederic, and he again (in 1501) lost this kingdom to Ferdinand the Catholic.

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The largest state in Italy was the least powerful, from the unpopularity of its kings and the want of character among its people.

1494. 5. Expedition of Charles VIII. from France to Naples, in order to make good the claims of the younger branch of Anjou to that kingdom. These he had inherited from his father, and was more immediately induced to follow up by the urgency of some malcontent emigrants, and the invitation of Ludovico Sforza, who hoped thereby to maintain himself in the duchy of Milan; but with the establishment of these was connected another and much greater project, the overthrow of the Turkish empire. Such a scheme could only have been formed in the infancy of politics, which loves to dwell upon extensive plans, without bestowing a thought upon the difficulties which surround them, or the means by which they may be accomplished.

Italy and Naples were subdued easily and without bloodshed, between Sept. 1494 and May 1495. Ferdinand II. fled to Ischia, and both Rome and Florence opened their gates to the conqueror. On February 22, Charles VIII. made his entry into Naples, and the submission of the whole country followed; but although an array of thirty thousand men and one hundred and forty pieces of cannon had been sufficient to awe Italy into obedience, it did not prove ample enough to maintain it.

6. Nay, during the very progress of this expedition, negotiations were on foot for the formation of a league, whose object should be the expulsion of the foreigners from Italy. Of this

league Venice was the moving power; in it the Pope, and even Ludovico Sforza, were actually associated. Ferdinand of Spain and Maximilian were well inclined to join it, and so determined were its views, that its partizans scrupled not to make overtures to the hereditary foe of Christendom. As early as May, Charles VIII. was obliged to evacuate Naples and fight his way home.

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Retreat of the king from Naples with the one half of his army, 20th of May, 1495. His engagement with, and victory over the Venetians and their allies at Fornua, 6th of July. The half of his force which had been left in Naples was obliged to capitulate, and Ferdinand II. was thus again in possession of his kingdom.

7. Nevertheless this attempt, unsuccessful as it proved, was not without its consequences to Europe. Italy became a fair mark for plans of conquest; a spirit of intrigue was raised; and, more efficient than all, mens' passions were awakened, for Charles VIII. was bent on vengeance. The struggle between Pisa and Florence left Italy no rest, (for both Milan and Venice hoped to profit thereby,) and made it easier for foreigners to find allies among its states. The vengeance which Charles VIII. so much coveted, he did not, however, live to exact; a sudden death snatched him from it.

April 7, 1498.

8. Louis XII. extended and followed up the scheme of his predecessor, for beside the old claim upon Naples which attached to his throne,

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he brought a new one of his own upon Milan, which he derived from his grandmother Valentina, a daughter of the house of Visconti. A share in the booty was promised to Venice and the Pope, and the conquest, thus made easy, was accomplished while the victims of it were yet in treaty for foreign assistance.

Capture of Milan, August 1499. Flight, and after fruitless attempts to reestablish himself, captivity of Ludovico Sforza; a captivity which ends only with his life, April 10, 1500. Cremona and Ghirar d'Adda become the portion of Venice, and Alexander VI. appears to be on the eve of accomplishing his favourite project, of bestowing an independent principality in Romagna, upon his son Cæsar Borgia.

9. The conquest of Milan would have led to an immediate attack upon Naples, had this been possible without some previous intelligence with Spain. Ferdinand the Catholic was ready for the part he had to play, and formed a double alliance with his cousin Frederic of Naples on the one hand, and Louis XII. on the other, a difference of time being the only distinction in his intended betrayal of both. The Pope was prepared to ratify his success.

Secret treaty of partition between Ferdinand and Louis XII. Nov. 11, 1500. Bloodless overthrow of the dupe Frederic, followed by his imprisonment for life and the conquest of his kingdom, July 1501.

10. Angry disputes, followed by a war between the parties, arose on the partition of the spoil. Each would fain have taken the whole

to himself, and thus the inner wheel of Ferdinand's intrigue acquired its motion. More extensive alliances in the country which was the scene of debate; greater cunning, and the services of such a general as Gonsalvo of Cordova, turned the scale for Ferdinand, and put him in undisputed possession of Naples. The conqueror's right was cemented by marriage, and thus did two foreign powers, that of France in Milan, and that of Spain in Naples, acquire a firm footing in Italy.

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The French defeated at Seminara the 21st of April, and on the Garigliano, 27th of Dec. 1508. The truce of the 31st of March, 1504, was followed by a total cessation of hostilities on the marriage of Ferdinand to Germaine de Foix, the niece of Louis XII. with whom, on the receipt of a million of ducats, he gave his claim upon Naples as a dowry, 12th of Oct. 1505.

11. While Italy was thus the common prey of political intrigue, its relations became more complicated than ever by the election of a new Pope. Having bought the papal chair, Julius II. grasped with a bold and practised hand the reins of European politics, and for ten years guided them at will. Weakness has seldom been played against strength with such boldness, such cunning, and with so much success! It was not however a dominion of peace, for with such a pope in Christendom peace was impossible. 1503.

The first project of Julius II. was to attach to the papal see the dominion of Cæsar Borgia, which embraced Romagna, Bo-

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logna, and Ferrara, and which since the death of Alexander, had partly fallen to pieces of itself, and partly been appropriated by Venice. The wars thus set afoot made way for this second and greater project, for the expulsion of the foreigners, more especially the French, from Italy.

12. The contests with Venice respecting Romagna led to the scheme of a more extensive alliance; this could not, however, be immediately arranged, owing chiefly to the internal circumstances of Spain, consequent on the death of Isabella. Their external result was the league of Cambray, which bore the character of a secret alliance against Venice, between Louis XII. Maximilian, Ferdinand the Catholic, and the Pope. This combination, at once unjust and contradictory, found such ready advocates in the passions and interests of the parties, that the Pope almost repented of having set afoot a business, the easy conduct of which yielded no opportunity for taking the direction on himself. At all events it was no fault of his that the Venetians were not better on their guard; but the proud citizens seemed not to know that kings are rarely the friends of a republic.

1504. 1508.

The league as far as regarded Louis XII. and Maximilian I. was concluded Decemb. 10th, 1508. The others subsequently joined it with the common object of humiliating the republic, and taking possession of its continental territory, the allotment of which was previously arranged.

13. Powerful as this league appears, it was not so much by its strength as by the passionate

impetuosity of the mightiest of its members, that the safety of Venice was endangered. Even the breaking up of the alliance could hardly have warded off the assault of Louis XII. Her policy, and not her armies, preserved the republic; for it was no difficult matter to dissolve a connection which had so little internal stability. Contests respecting Italy. 1494-1515.

The Venetians were conquered at Agnadello, April 15, 1509, and obliged to relinquish their possessions on the mainland, under the twofold oppression of the Pope, who in his temporal capacity had seized on Romagna, and in his spiritual had laid the republic under ban. The quarrel of Louis and Maximilian now began, and Venice, after retaking Padua, concluded a treaty and reconciliation with the Pope, Feb. 25, 1510, which left the latter in possession of the cities of Romagna: while Ferdinand retained the ports of Apulia.

14. Julius II. who well knew that there are no such enemies as former friends, arranged from the fragments of the late league a second and still stronger one against France. This was styled the holy league, from its avowed object of protecting the Roman see from the ambition of France; its further design was the total expulsion of the French from Italy, an event in which the Pope and the Venetians took much interest; and the conquest of Spanish Navarre for the advantage of Ferdinand, who won Henry VIII. of England to his purpose. Even Maximilian I. was rendered neutral by a truce with Venice; but the masterstroke of the Pope's policy was, to win over the Swiss, since through their means alone could Milan be torn from France. 1511.

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The Holy League was concluded between the Pope, Ferdinand, and the Venetians, Oct. 5, 1511. The Emperor and Henry VIII. had a free invitation to join it. The Swiss had been gained over in 1510.

15. The contest which ensued (and which from the unsuccessful attempt of Louis to con-
1511. voke a council at Pisa, for the deposition of the Pope, had fairly assumed the character of a struggle with the hierarchy,) might perhaps have terminated in favour of France, had not the battle of Ravenna closed the career of the young and heroic Gaston de Foix. Attacked on every side, driven from Milan by the Swiss, labouring under the papal ban, Louis XII. would have found it a hard matter to draw himself from this difficult posture, had not the death of the Pope come to his relief.

France maintained the advantage as long as Gaston de Foix was with her. His death, at the battle of Ravenna, put a period to his success, which extended from Nov. 1511, to April 11, 1512. The Swiss made an irruption into Milan, May 1512, and restored it to Maximilian Sforza, eldest son of Ludovico Sforza. The attempt of Louis XII. to recover it frustrated by the battle of Novara, June 6, 1513. The expulsion of the French from Italy brought as its consequence the return of the Medici into Florence, from their exile of 1495. This was effected by the power of the league, and by an insurrection, August 31, 1512, and in so violent a manner that the name of Republic was all that remained to Florence. It now became a formal member of the league. About the same time in the year 1512 took place the conquest of Spanish Navarre, under plea of its alliance with France. The invasion of Artois by Henry VIII. and that of Burgundy by the Swiss,

1513. In the midst of these troubles, so congenial to his life, occurred the death of Julius II. Feb. 21, 1513, and to him Leo X. of the family of the Medici, became successor.

16. Dissolution of the holy league upon the reconciliation of the new Pope with France; Louis having consented to give up the council of Pisa. Peace was easily concluded with Ferdinand at the price of his booty, Navarre. His son-in-law Henry VIII. was appeased by money and marriage; and the Swiss were—duped. Thus France retained nothing of all its conquests, but the claims which led to them. These Louis XII. might perhaps have again endeavoured to establish had not death prevented him. 1515.

Treaty with Leo X. concluded Oct. 6, 1513—that with Ferdinand of Arragon, Dec. 1, 1513; with the Swiss, who were meantime deceived by false securities, an engagement was made Sept. 13, 1513; but afterwards revoked by Louis XII.—with Maximilian I. also a truce was agreed on for the benefit of Milan, whose new duke he had acknowledged. The peace purchased of England was ratified by the marriage of Louis XII. with Mary, sister to Henry VIII. Aug. 7, 1514;—but it led to nothing, for as early as Jan. 1, 1515, Louis XII. died.

17. Notwithstanding its busy character, political science remained during the whole of this period still in its infancy. The treachery and craft of Ferdinand, the vague and unconcentrated activity of Maximilian, the blind lust for aggrandizement of Louis, rendered it a web of intricacy and confusion. There was no great interest, no great character to become the moving

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spring in politics. Affairs were determined, not for the lasting benefit of the people, but for the momentary advantage of the ruler. On such principles no permanent alliance could be formed, but all was perpetual change. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, where the contracting parties scarcely attempted to conceal their design of overreaching one another?

18. On political economy, indeed, the good example of Louis XII. and his minister, Cardinal Amboise, appeared to have some effect. But even in France, new and great ideas were not yet awakened; and the good example found no imitators. To procure money for the wars remained the sole object of the science, and it was Louis of France alone who had reached the point (nor was it a small advance) of considering the interests of those on whom it was levied. Even the discovery of the new world, and the prospects thereby revealed, had narrowed rather than expanded the horizon.

19. The art of war, too, made less progress than might have been expected from its frequent employment, nor was there much likelihood of its doing so, as long as good infantry was to be had only of the Swiss, and that for hire; or, as long as the German "Lanzkneckts" supplied the place of native and regular cavalry. Besides, among the princes of this period, there was no one who displayed any great military genius.

II. *Account of the Origin of Colonial Establishments, from* 1492 *till* 1515.

Histoire des Etablissements des Européens dans les deux Indes; par M. L'ABBE RAYNAL. à Geneve, 1781. 10 vols. A work abounding alike in sophistical declamations, in researches at one time superficial, at another deep and erudite, and in statistical documents of the first importance.

Les Trois Ages des Colonies, ou de leur état passé, présent, et à venir: par M. DE PRADT. 1801. 3 vols. This author mars his defence of the freedom of the colonies by clothing it in the visions of a political theorist.

An Enquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers, by HENRY BROUGHAM. Edinburgh, 1803. 2 vols. It gives evidence of much study, but is deficient in practical knowledge.

A. ANDERSON'S *Historical and Chronological Deduction of Commerce from the earliest accounts to the present time.* London, 1789. 4 vols. 4to. It extends to the year of its publication; and forms an incalculably rich collection of materials in chronological order; its chief bearing is upon British commerce.

A copious relation of such parts of colonial history as relate to the East Indies, to the middle of the eighteenth century, may be found in the *Geschichte der Ostindischen Handelsgesellschaften, in der Hallischen Allgemeinen Weltgeschichte,* Bd. 25, 26. 1763. 4to.

The best general historical view of the Colonies of the several nations is contained in EICHHORN'S *Geschichte des neuern Europas:* those of Asia form the 5th, those of Africa and America the 6th Book.

Origin of Colonies. 1492-1515.

1. The term *colony* embraces all the possessions and establishments of Europeans in foreign quarters of the world. They may, however, be

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divided according to their object and nature into four classes. Of these the first is that of *Agricultural Colonies,* whose object is the cultivation of the soil. The colonists, who form them, become landed proprietors, are formally naturalized, and in process of time become a nation, properly so called. The second, that of *Plantation Colonies,* whose end is the supply of certain natural productions for Europe. The colonists in these, although possessors of land, are less permanently fixed than those of the former, nor does the smallness of their number permit any approach to a nation. Slavery belongs peculiarly to this kind of colony. The third consist of *Mining Colonies,* whose object is expressed in their name. The colonists of these become naturalized, but although sometimes extensively spread, they cannot as mere mining colonies ever attain to much population. The fourth, of *Trading Colonies,* whose object is a traffic in the natural productions, whether of the land or of the sea, (as fisheries,) and the native manufactures of the country. These consist at first of nothing more than factories and staples for the convenience of trade; but force or fraud soon enlarge them, and the colonists become conquerors, without, however, losing sight of the original object of their settlement. Though masters of the country, they are too little attached to it to become naturalized.

These are the chief colonial divisions, and al-

though several of these objects may have been embraced by one colony, we shall find that there is always some feature distinct from, and more important than the rest, which determines to which it belongs.

2. Time and experience were required to ascertain the relations in which the colonies might be placed most advantageously for the mother country. Without any consideration of their true value and proper use, the first and prevalent idea was in favour of an absolute possession and total exclusion of strangers. The propagation of Christianity formed a convenient pretext, and none thought of enquiring either into the justice or the utility of their treatment. In truth, we know not how other views could have been acquired, and yet we must needs lament that the European system of colonization should so early have taken a direction as unalterable as it was destructive to the interests both of the colonies and their mother states. In spite, however, of this original error, the different nature of the soils and of their occupiers in the Eastern and Western Indies begot, from the first, an essential distinction in the manner of turning them, severally, to advantage.

3. But, however limited may have been the notions of the colonists, the consequences of the system were of incalculable importance, for they led to a total change in the direction and order of commerce throughout the world. Traffic (for-

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saking its hitherto necessary and essential character) passed from the land to the ocean, and by its change established a very different standard of the geographical importance of countries for the purposes of trade. Its first and natural effect was to transfer the site of universal commerce from the shores of the Mediterranean to the western coasts of Europe. Thus the Spaniards and the Portuguese were the earliest to profit by the change, although at this period Spain had only just laid the foundation, while Portugal had completed the whole system of her colonies. The claims of both rested on the grants of the Pope, who, as supreme and general master, had entrusted to them the conversion of the heathen.

Bull of Pope Alexander VI. 1493; by it a meridian of one hundred leagues west of the Azores was fixed as the line of demarcation between Spain and Portugal. By the treaty of Tordesillas 1494, and a confirmatory bull 1506, this line was extended to the coast of Brazil, and embraced three hundred and seventy-five leagues from those islands. We should observe, that it was the general principle to consider the inland countries, under the same latitude, as possessed in right of the coast.

4. This period is alike famous and infamous by the discoveries and the conquests of Spain. These latter were confined to the islands in the Gulf of Mexico, among which Hispaniola (subsequently St. Domingo, and now, as originally, Hayti) was, in consequence of the gold mines of the Cibao mountains, by far the most important.

As the new world did not immediately present any other produce of value, the discovery of gold and silver became, unfortunately for its inhabitants, the sole object of the colonists.

Origin of Colonies. 1492-1515.

Discovery of America, at least of the island of St. Salvador, (Guanahaini,) by Christopher Columbus, 11th Oct. 1492. He was then on a voyage to discover a western passage to India, that being in the opinion of the men of science of his day the nearest land in that direction; to this mistake we owe the name of West Indies, applied to those islands. His three subsequent voyages produced, besides the discovery of the West Indian maze of islands, that of a part of the coasts of the (southern) continent. Nor was Hispaniola, although the chief, the only settlement, for colonies were attempted in Cuba, Porto Rico, and Jamaica, between the years 1508-10; as for the minor islands, a casual plundering of the natives sufficed. The great ocean discovered and taken possession of by Bilboa, 1513, by whom also some knowledge was gained of Peru. The revenue drawn by the Spanish government from the West Indies still remained inconsiderable, and the principles of their colonial system were far from being developed.

History of America, by ROBERTSON. London, 1777. 2 vols. 4to. The beginning of a third vol. was published by his son, 1796. There have been abundant reprints.

[*A History of the Life and Voyages of Christopher Columbus;* by WASHINGTON IRVING. Abridged by himself and reprinted in vol. xi. of the Family Library.]

5. Discoveries and settlements of the Portuguese in the East Indies. The way in which these were made, and the state of the countries discovered, caused, from the beginning, the colonial affairs of Portugal to differ very widely from those of Spain. As the Portuguese discovery of the East Indies was the result of a long

Origin of Colonies. 1492-1515.

series of hardy adventures, carried on in a uniform manner, and made by slow but sure degrees, experience had in some measure matured their judgment; and as from the nature of these countries the establishment of mining colonies was out of the question, they naturally turned their attention to the founding of settlements for general commerce. For this reason, notwithstanding much ambition and much tyranny, we never find the Portuguese in direct possession of any large extent of country. They were content with fixing themselves firmly in the most eligible sta'ons, around which, by the subjection of the native princes, they managed to collect and monopolise the traffic.

The naval expeditions of the Portuguese date from 1410. They owed their rise to the Moorish wars in Africa, and were much encouraged by Prince Henry, surnamed the Navigator, (†1463). Discovery of Madeira, 1419. Cape Bojador doubled, 1439; and Cape Verd, 1446. Discovery of the Azores, 1448; the Cape Verd islands, 1449; St. Thomas and Annobon, 1471; Congo, 1484. From these discoveries resulted the experimental journey of Covillam over land to India and Ethiopia. The Cape of Good Hope reached by Barth. Diaz, 1486; and finally doubled by Vasco de Gama, 1498, in the reign of Emanuel the Great. This navigator proceeded by Mozambique to India, landed in Calicut, and made the first settlement in Cochin.—All the countries which Portugal might discover beyond Cape Bojador had been made over to the crown by a bull of Sixtus IV. in 1481.

6. The Portuguese dominion in India, comprising the eastern coast of Africa, and extending to the peninsula of Malacca and the Moluccas,

was surrounded and organized by a chain of fortresses and factories; it found, however, a still better protection in the divided state of the country, for the native princes being at once numerous and disunited, it was easy to keep them dependent by embroiling them with each other. But though such advantages were doubtless of importance, it was to the noble spirit and to the immense authority, both military and civil, of the first viceroys—of Almeida, and still more of the great Albuquerque,—that the possibility of founding such an empire must be attributed.

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From 1505 till 1509. † 1515.

The central point of their dominion after the year 1510, was Goa, and there the regency was fixed. The other principal stations were Mozambique, Sofala and Melinda on the coast of Africa, from 1508. Muscat and Ormus in the Persian Gulf, 1515. Diu and Damaun in the Deccan, 1533; Cochin, etc. on the Malabar coasts, which was wholly dependent on them; Negapatam and Meliapur on that of Coromandel; and from 1511 Malacca on the peninsula of that name. In the same year (1511) the Spice (or Molucca) Islands were discovered, and settlements were subsequently effected in Ternate and Tidor.

7. It is true that the Portuguese trade with India was not monopolised by any particular company, but it was not the less although indirectly, a monopoly of the crown. It professed to be open to all Portuguese, but traders were obliged to obtain permission of the government, and to it was entrusted the arrangement as well as the protection of navigation; besides this, certain of the principal branches of commerce were

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reserved to the crown. In this error lay the seeds of ruin, which could not fail ultimately to take place; yet so long as it was possible to bring all Europe to Lisbon, as the chief and only market of Indian produce, the commerce seemed to feel none of its effects.

The East Indian trade of the Portuguese embraced: 1st, the local trade, which was attached to particular marts; Malacca, for the distant parts of India; Muscat for Arabia and Egypt; Ormus for the continent of Asia. This led to important relations between the African countries which produced gold and slaves, and the more fertile lands of India.—The trade was monopolised by the rulers in India. 2ndly, the traffic between Europe and India, conducted by fleets fitted out by the government, having for its principal commodities pepper and other spices, cotton and silken stuffs, together with pearls, and light articles of native manufacture. The mode of commerce adopted by the Portuguese in Europe, did not allow of the transport of goods from port to port in their own vessels. Foreigners were obliged to come to Lisbon and carry them away themselves. This led to consequences injurious to the Portuguese shipping, and awakened competition.

Asia de JOAO DE BARROS, with the continuations of other hands. Lisboa, 1552; and the *Histoire des Conquêtes des Portugais* par LAFITAU, Paris, 1732, etc. contain full accounts of the Portuguese conquests in India; but notwithstanding the exertions of Raynal and the compilers of the 35th vol. of the *Allg. Welthistorie*, the history of their Indian commerce is still very insufficient. The first successful attempt to supply this deficiency was made in—

Geschichte des Portugiesischen Colonialwesens in Ostindien, von FRIEDRICH SAALFELD. Göttingen, 1810. With a careful reference to all the authorities.

D. W. SOLTAU, *Geschichte der Entdeckungen und Eroberungen der Portugiesen im Orient nach* DE BARROS. Th. I. II. 1821. The whole to consist of five parts.

8. Although we have chiefly dwelt upon the East Indian colonies of Portugal, she had others though of less importance. These consisted of settlements: 1st, on the western coast of Africa, which were of little note till a later period, when they became valuable from the slave trade: 2ndly, on the coasts of Brazil, which had been discovered and occupied by Cabral, although the exportation of a few Jews and convicts formed but a sorry foundation of a colony. Origin of Colonies. 1492-1515.

SECOND PERIOD. *From* 1515 *to* 1556.

1. The following period is distinguished from the last by the more mighty rulers and more important events to which it gave birth. In Charles V. modern Europe beheld for the first time a statesman on the throne; and a statesman of a very different cast from that to which the trickster Ferdinand belonged. His activity extended alike to religious and to secular interests, and thus gave a tone of dignity to politics not altogether free from selfishness. The Spaniards and the Germans, the Netherlanders and the Italians, acknowledged for their ruler one in whom the character of all appeared to be happily blended. On the other hand, Francis I. belonged peculiarly to his own nation. In him France saw an epitome of itself; and therein, although he knew it not, lay the secret of his power. Solyman the magnificent, bore his part General remarks. 1515-1556.

General remarks. 1515-1556.

among the rest, although with the sword rather than the pen; the latter, however, was a weapon whose value he soon learnt to appreciate. Under princes of this stamp the relations of the existing states to each other became more clearly ascertained, and the practice of politics acquired some regularity in its forms. The two principal causes of this were: 1st, the growing rivalry of France and Spain; and 2ndly, the Reformation, in its political character. The affairs of each of these must be treated of separately; for although they occurred at the same time, yet as Charles and Francis were both opposed to the Reformation, the transactions to which this gave rise must have had altogether a different origin.

I. *History of the Rivalry between France and Spain during this period.*

History of the Emperor Charles V. by ROBERTSON. 3 vols. London, 1769. In the German translation of REMER, Brunswick, 1792, the first and introductory part is entirely remodeled, and the value of this truly classical work increased.

Histoire de François Premier, roi de France, par M. GAILLARD. 7 vols. Paris, 1769.

Mémoires de Mart. et Guill. Bellay Langley, mis en nouveau style, etc. par M. L'ABBE LAMBERT. 7 vols. Paris, 1753. They extend from 1513—1547. The Paris edition of 1569, fol. is in the original style.

The *Istoria d'Italia* von GUICCIARDINI, from the fifteenth book.

Rivalry of France and Spain. 1515-1556.

2. The rivalry of France and Spain claimed no determinate system of policy for its parent:

it arose from the circumstances and passions of the day. To its consequences, however, we must look for the establishment of political principles, (properly so called,) since from it arose the practical adoption of the theory of a balance of power, and with it the character which this system has since borne. In its immediate origin it was a continuation of the Italian contests; because the desire, then so prevalent, of a doubtful and temporary superiority, was theoretically associated with the sovereignty of these countries. The successful attempt of Francis I. to recover Milan from the Swiss and from Maximilian Sforza, prepared the way even before the accession of Charles V.

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Attack of Francis I. on Milan, after renewing the alliance with Venice, and decisive battle of Marignano, 13th and 14th Sept. 1515. Duke Maximilian resigns his country for a pension; Genoa and the Pope assents. The treaty soon after concluded with the Swiss (a preface to the more durable peace of 29th Nov. 1516) appeared to guarantee the possession of Milan to the French, and give a general security to their influence in Italy.

3. The death of Ferdinand I. wrought a great change in the affairs of Europe. In Charles V. (of the empire, but I. of Spain) his eldest grandson, the present master of the rich Netherlands, and the future joint heir to Austria, the house of Hapsburg obtained possession of the whole Spanish monarchy. Thus the fate of Europe lay in the hands of two young monarchs, of whom one had already shown himself a suc-

Jan. 23, 1516.

Rivalry of France and Spain. 1515-1556.

cessful warrior, while the other was already contriving how he might conquer, though rather by policy than the sword. The treaty of Noyon, however, still maintained peace, but only till a new collision of interests rekindled the war.

Treaty of Noyon, 13th Aug. 1516. It was merely a delay of the war which its provisions, touching Navarre and Naples, made only more certain.

Jan. 12, 1519.

4. Both princes became candidates for the imperial throne on the death of Maximilian I. And as Charles V. was successful, he thus obtained the feudal sovereignty over all those states of Italy that were held as fiefs of the empire, of which Milan was one. Charles' situation, therefore, was exceedingly well calculated to nourish the jealousy and hatred which had already sprung up between the two rivals.

An estimate of the real value which attached in those days to the imperial throne, would show that its importance depended wholly on the character of him who filled it. It might be very small, it might be very great; for in such a country as Germany, and in an age when the whole tendency, if not the regular design, of politics, was in favour of ambitious aggrandizement, the title of emperor was a blank which might be filled up as the owner best chose it. The authority of the "Golden Bull," and the capitulation signed at his election, were in fact the only standard by which the relation of the emperor to his states could be determined.

5. The union of the two crowns, of Spain and of the empire, upon one head, could not but prove dangerous; and that, not only from the extent of territory thus brought together, but from the geographical position of the countries.

Touching on a variety of states, every man's quarrel admitted of Charles' interference; and once being in it, his immense power left no assurance that he would quit it till it best suited himself. The design of universal empire, if by this term we understand, not an immediate dominion over, but the preponderating authority in Europe, which has been attributed to the house of Hapsburg, bore at this time so little of an imaginary character, that it appears rather a necessary consequence of its position. In fact, the struggle made by Francis I., although in detail it may seem the result of petty passions and meaner causes, having for its direct object nothing more momentous than a supremacy in Italy, if considered from a higher point of view, was a struggle for freedom and independence.

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Effective power of the two princes. That of Charles V. much diminished by two causes: 1st, by the variety of his relations towards his different states; in none, not even in Spain, was he wholly unfettered: 2ndly, by the constant difficulties which embarrassed his finance, and the uncertainty which attended the payment of his troops; on this account it often happened that they were so situated as hardly to be called his own. On the other hand, the power of France was: 1st, concentrated, and almost wholly vested in the king; 2ndly, it was formidable from an organized and native infantry, which supplied the place of mercenaries. A third consideration, however, must limit its efficacy, for Francis I. did not pursue the financial policy of his predecessor.

6. The first war between Francis I. and Charles V. was commenced by the former, and

First war, 1521-1526.

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after various fortune, terminated in his defeat and capture, at the battle of Pavia. Nevertheless, Charles' endeavours at a partition of France, whether by the plot concerted with Charles of Bourbon, or by his own claims on Burgundy, were not a whit advanced.

The pretexts for war on either side were as follows:—On the part of Francis: 1st, the restoration of Spanish Navarre; 2ndly, the claims upon Naples; 3rdly, the feud of Robert de la Mark, in which Francis, as his feudal sovereign, had taken an interest. On the side of Charles: his claims on Milan, as a fief of the empire; and on Burgundy, as unjustly taken possession of by Louis XI.—Each strengthened himself by alliances:—Charles, with Henry VIII. of England and the Pope; Francis, with Venice, and with the Swiss, by a renewal of his former treaty, 5th May, 1521, according to which a free right of levy was granted. The battle of Bicocca, April 22, 1522; and the French, under the command of Lautrec, and the court favourite Bonnivet, wholly driven out of Italy, 1523. Milan, as an imperial fief, granted by Charles to Francis Sforza, younger son of Ludovico Sforza, († 1531); but the gift was merely nominal. The imperialists, unsuccessful in their attack on Provence, July—Sept. 1524. Francis I. crosses the Alps in person. Siege and battle of Pavia, Feb. 24, 1525. His defeat, capture, and conveyance to Madrid.

7. The victory at Pavia appeared to constitute Charles V. master of Italy and arbiter of Europe; yet he became neither the one nor the other. The interior organization of his army was of more effect in hindering him from the conduct of any great scheme, than the awakened jealousy of either England or the States of Italy. This

Francis knew, and consequently the treaty of peace at Madrid brought Charles only promises, against which the maker of them had already entered his secret protest. Rivalry of France and Spain. 1515-1556.

Treaty of Madrid, 14th Jan. 1526. Its conditions: 1st, that France should renounce all claims on Italy; as also, 2ndly, on the sovereignty of Flanders and Artois; 3rdly, that the duchy of Burgundy should be ceded to Charles; 4thly, that Francis should give his two sons as hostages, and marry Eleanor, the emperor's sister.

8. A second war between these two princes became thus unavoidable. Its theatre was as before in Italy, but more especially in Naples. This, too, turned against Francis, notwithstanding his English and Italian alliances. The peace of Cambray, in return for the total loss of Italy and a breach of faith with his allies there, brought him nothing but a promise from Charles to delay for awhile the putting in force his claims on Burgundy. Second war, 1527-1529.

Secret treaty between Francis I., the Pope, Venice, and the duke of Milan, concluded at Cognac, May 22, 1526. Henry VIII. induced by great promises to join it. A quarrel between the emperor and the pope, which, to the great scandal of Christendom, leads to the surprisal and sack of Rome, May 6, 1527, by Charles of Bourbon at the head of the imperial troops, although without any such design on the part of the emperor. The pope was besieged in the castle of St. Angelo, and obliged to capitulate. The deliverance of the pope became a good excuse, not only for uniting the allies more strongly, but actually for sending an army into Italy, under Lautrec, to advance the claims of France upon Naples.

Rivalry of France and Spain. 1515-1556.

Siege of the city of Naples from April to August, 1528; but the breaking out of the plague, and the defection of Doria, renders it unsuccessful. Followed by negotiations and a truce, June 15, 1528; and the peace of Cambray, August, 1529. In this peace Henry VIII. was included, Clement VII. having secured his safety by a previous and separate treaty, June 20. This peace threw the emperor's claims upon Burgundy into abeyance, and drew from him the voluntary release of the French princes, on the same terms as those agreed on at Madrid.

9. The consequences of this second war were such as to extend the emperor's power in Italy, while his reconciliation with the Pope and coronation at Bologna also helped to confirm it. To Italy itself, they brought, 1st, the establishment of an hereditary dukedom in Florence; and 2ndly, the constitution of Genoa as it has since stood.

Feb. 24th 1530.

The change at Florence was brought about by the treaty between the pope and the emperor, according to which the Medici (who had been expelled Florence by an insurrection which took place during the Roman wars of 1527) were restored, and Alexander, a blood-relation of the pope, recognized as first hereditary prince.—The revolution in Genoa, 1528, was the work of Andrew Doria, who passed over from the French to the imperial side. Nor was the mere revolution all his work, for he strengthened the liberties and secured the principles then established by the introduction of a powerful family aristocracy.

10. But while the west of Southern Europe was taken up by the contest of its two principal powers, the east also became a partner in the strife. Solyman II. had converted his wild projects for the total subjection of Christendom,

into an alliance with France: a measure to which he was induced by the interests of his empire—threatened as he held them to be by the enforcement of the claims of the house of Hapsburg on Hungary and Bohemia, after the death of Louis II. at Mohatsch. Rivalry of France and Spain. 1515-1556.

The Turkish system of conquest had been much altered by Solyman II. since 1519. Under his predecessor, Selim I. it had been directed against Persia and Egypt, but the present sultan, after the conquest of Belgrade, 1521, brought his whole force against Hungary. King Louis II. was defeated and slain at Mohatsch, Aug. 29, 1526. On his death the crown was disputed by Ferdinand and John Zapolya; and Solyman, on whose protection the latter threw himself, found no difficulty in making himself master of Hungary. This conquest, 1529, led to an unsuccessful attack on Vienna, which was, however, compensated by the subjection of Moldavia. The alliance with France now gradually forming, gives evidence of a more liberal knowledge of policy in the Porte, however just may have been the apprehensions which such 'a scandal in Christendom,' could not but create in those days.

11. Formidable as were the land forces of the Turk, Western Europe appeared to have had more cause of fear in his navy. The conquest of Rhodes had given him the dominion of the Mediterranean, and thus left the shores of Italy and Spain defenceless; while the piratical powers, which under the protection of the Porte were forming on the coast of Africa, threatened, in spite of the feeble opposition of the Knights of Rhodes, now established in Malta, wholly to annihilate their prosperity.

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The island of Rhodes conquered from the Knights of St. John, after a stubborn resistance, 1522. The order transferred to the island rock of Malta, which it received of Charles V. as sovereign of Naples, 1530; and which it held as a feudal dependency of the empire, on condition of war with the infidel. The power of the Porte was established on the north coast of Africa, which had till then belonged in part to the Arabs, and partly to Spain, by the conquests of the two pirates Horuc and Hyradin Barbarossa. The former possessed himself of Algiers, 1517; and was succeeded by his brother Hyradin, who submitted voluntarily to the Porte, was appointed captain general of its navy, and took Tunis, 1531. The reconquest of Tunis by Charles V. in 1535, was so far from annihilating the power of the pirates that it did not even diminish it to any extent; and for this the capture of Tripoli, (which with Malta had been entrusted to the Knights of St. John,) by another pirate, named Dragut, in 1551, and the recapture of Tunis, gave sufficient evidence. Add to this that Egypt had been subject to the Porte, 1517, and it will be seen that nearly the whole northern coast of Africa belonged to that power.

Third war, 1535-1538.

12. The causes of the third war between Charles and Francis, were furnished by the articles of the peace of Cambray. Francis could not bear the loss of Italy, more particularly Milan, and he determined on war, although his efforts to gain allies were generally ineffectual. The execution of Maraviglia in Milan, furnished a pretext, and the death of the last Sforza, which occurred soon after, new claims and new expectations.

Ineffectual endeavours of the king to gain over Henry VIII. and the protestants of Germany. Alliance with Clement VII. by the marriage of his second son, the duke of Or-

leans, to Catharine de Medici, niece of the former. This union, though it did not lead to the results expected, in consequence of the death of Clement, (Sept. 25, 1534,) proved afterwards of much importance. But the alliance with the Porte, first effected by Laforest, 1535, in Feb. of that year, under the form of a commercial treaty, was now openly avowed.

13. Italy as before, was the chief, although not the only theatre of the war. The seizure of Savoy and Piedmont by Francis, did not prevent an irruption of the emperor upon the south of France; although his precautions rendered it unavailing. Neither of the subsequent contests in Piedmont or Picardy were decisive, but the formidable advances of Solyman in Hungary hastened the truce of Nice, which was concluded by the mediation of pope Paul III., although without the knowledge or consent of Solyman.

The conquest of Savoy, 1535, just as Charles was returning from the conquest of Tunis, must have been doubly disagreeable to him, as the duke of that country was his brother-in-law and ally.—The death of Francis Sforza, the last prince of this house, which threw Milan open again as a fief of the empire, and an object of ambition to Francis for his son the duke of Orleans, took place Oct. 24, 1535. The emperor's attack upon Savoy rendered ineffectual by the defensive warfare of Francis and Montmorency, Aug. 1536. Solyman invades Hungary and gains a battle at Esseg, 1537, while his fleet ravages the coasts of Italy. Congress between the emperor, the king, and the pope, effected at Nice, and a ten years' truce agreed to, June 18, 1538. The conditions: each to hold what he had got, (this gave Francis well nigh all

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Savoy and Piedmont,) and their respective claims to undergo the further investigation of the pope.—Therefore the feudal investment of Milan remained undetermined, although the king had some hopes of it for his younger son.

14. We cannot wonder that the truce concluded under such circumstances, should be shortened from ten to four years' duration, although the apparent confidence of the two monarchs gave a better promise. The train once lighted could not be stayed; and the hatred of Francis acquired new force from the long suspense and final disappointment of his hopes. Neither party, however, was prepared for immediate action; Francis had broken off his alliance both with England and the Porte; and Charles, involved in religious disputes, (see below,) and at war with the Turk, had enough business on his hands to make a few years' truce desirable, even had he not been forced to it by the state of his finances.

The contest with the Turk touched two points, 1st. Hungary; to half of which the emperor laid claim on the ground of an agreement between archduke Ferdinand, and the then (Feb. 24, 1538) childless John Zapolya, by which the former was declared heir to that portion of Hungary possessed by the latter. A few days, however, before his death (July 27, 1540,) Zapolya had a son born, whom he named his successor; and Solyman, as guardian of this child, had gained a victory over the Germans, and taken possession of Offen the capital, and the greater part of Hungary. 2ndly, the Pirate states of Africa, especially Algiers.—The emperor's second African expedition, 1541, rendered wholly unavailing by a dreadful storm shortly after his landing.

15. The refusal of the fief of Milan determined the king to a fourth war, and the murder of his ambassadors in their passage through that state, furnished the pretext This war was of a more extensive nature than any of the preceding, for the king succeeded not only in renewing his alliance with the sultan and with Venice, but in joining to them the duke of Cleve and the states of Denmark, and even Sweden, although the two latter alliances led to no results. On the other hand, the emperor induced Henry of England to a league and a common assault on France; and yet the peace of Crespy was concluded without any one party having attained the object for which it had engaged in the war.

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Fourth war, 1542-1544.

Murder of Francis' two plenipotentiaries to Venice and the Porte, in the territory of Milan, July 3rd, 1541. The French, changing their plan of warfare, confine it to defensive measures in Italy, while they invade the Netherlands and Roussillon with several armies in 1542 and 1543, but without any permanent advantage. Alliance of Charles with Henry VIII., (who had been offended by the marriage of James V. of Scotland, to Mary of Guise,) 11th Feb. 1543: its object the attack and partition of France, the duke of Cleve being mean time forced to submit.—Francis renews his league with Solyman, 1543; which is followed up by the conquest of what remained of Hungary, and an irruption into Austria, while the Turkish fleet united with the French besieges Nice. Contemporary invasion of France by the emperor (notwithstanding the French victory at Cerisoles, 14th April, 1544) by Lorraine, and of the king of England by Calais, (June to Sept. 1544.) Their whole plan, however, was frustrated,

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partly by discord among themselves, partly by the judicious position of the French force, and partly by the court intrigues and private relations of the emperor in Germany, which led to a separate peace between him and Francis, concluded at Crespy the 18th Sept. 1544. Its conditions: 1st, that the duke of Orleans should receive Milan as a dowry with one of the imperial princesses, (this article became null by the death of the young prince, 8th Sept. 1545, on which Charles V. conferred the fief on his own son Philip;) 2ndly, that Francis should resign his claims on Naples, and his feudal sovereignty over Flanders and Artois, and Charles do the same by Burgundy. The war with England was carried on till 1546, owing to the angry feelings of Henry, but after the taking of Boulogne, 1546, it never produced any event of consequence.

16. The peace of Crespy put a period to the wars between the two rivals. Charles was too busy with plans of ambition in Germany; and the enterprises of Francis I. and Henry VIII. were soon put an end to by death. Under Henry II. the son and successor of Francis, hostilities were continued with Charles V. notwithstanding the internal disturbances of his reign. The war, however, which he waged with the Emperor, arose from the transactions in Germany, and, therefore, properly belong to the following section.

Death of Henry VIII. 28th Jan. of Francis I. 21st March, 1547.

17. The consequences of this struggle were alike important to France itself, and to the European political system in general: 1st, the prac-

tical application of the principles of a balance of power was established by the counterpoise and opposition of the two principal states of the continent. Rivalry of France and Spain. 1515-1556.

2ndly, the alliance of France with the Turks, the state of affairs in Hungary, and the participation, however slight, of England in these wars, brought the whole of Southern Europe into a closer connection than had before existed between them.

3rdly, although France had failed in its attempt at the sovereignty of Italy, it had prevented its own dismemberment, and secured its independence.

And 4thly, the projects of Charles V. were but half accomplished, for though he obtained a predominance over Italy and Germany, he never did over France.

Was the loss of the predominance in Italy really a loss to France? True it is that she had great need of influence in that quarter; 1st, on account of her ecclesiastical relations with the Pope, and 2ndly, for the protection of her south-east frontiers from the duke of Savoy. But we may fairly ask, whether possessions in the country, whether a fixed dominion was necessary? Indeed we may further ask, whether any foreign nation possessing these advantages, ever drew any profit from them, however convenient they may have been to its rulers?

II. *Political view of the Reformation, from its origin, 1517, to the religious peace of 1555.*

JOANNIS SLEIDANI *de statu religionis et reipublicæ Carolo V. Cæsare commentarii*, 1555. The latest edition (enriched with notes) of this work; equally classical in form and material, is that of Frankfort, 1785, 3 vols. 8vo.

[There is a French translation, with notes by LECOURAYER. 3 vols. 4to. La Hague, 1767.]

Geschichte des protestantischen Lehrbegriffs vom Anfange der Reformation bis zur Einführung der Concordienformel, von D. G. J. PLANCK. Leipzig, 1781—1800. 6 vols. 8vo. To this branch of the subject belong the three first volumes, which comprehend also the political history down to the religious peace.

Christliche Kirchengeschichte seit der Reformation, von J. M. SCHRÖCKH. 1804. 10 parts. The two first parts contain more particularly the political history, the first, that of the Reformation in Germany, down to the religious peace; the second, that of other countries.

Geschichte der Reformation in Deutschland, von C. L. WOLTMANN. Altona, 1801. 3 vols. 8vo. The history is brought down to 1553.

Essai sur l'Esprit, et l'Influence de la Réformation de Luther, par CH. VILLERS. 3eme ed. Paris, 1808, 8vo. No explanation of this important subject is more eloquent or comprehensive than that of M. VILLERS.

Entwickelung der politischen Folgen der Reformation für Europa; contained in the first part of HEEREN's Miscellaneous Historical Writings, (HISTORISCHE WERKE, vol. I.) and joined to this translation.

The Reformation. 1517-1555.

1. The immense influence of the Reformation arose, generally speaking, from the nature of the interests affected by it, for these were of as much importance to the people as to the rulers. Had

such not been the case the commotion it raised could never have been so general or so lasting. The intermixture of religion and politics was unavoidable, because the attacks of its authors were directed not only against errors of doctrine, but against the usurpation of an hierarchy, which had deeply interwoven itself with the administration and constitution of every state of Europe.

The Reformation, as an immediate attack upon the power of the Pope, was directed against a structure already tottering and undermined, but not overthrown: undermined by the loss of its chief support—public opinion; tottering from the effect of the Italian wars, and by the recognition, at an earlier period, of the supreme authority of general councils. The question, whether the authority of the Popes would have been overthrown without the aid of the Reformation, is not within the province of our history; but allowing that it would, we must still look to the Reformation for that mighty impulse which it gave to the human intellect, and which was at the same time one of its greatest and most beneficial consequences.

2. The Reformation first broke out in Germany, and in Germany it first assumed its political character, through the interest taking in it by the different governments of that country. The points, then, on which its political history turns, are the following, 1st, which of the princes espoused it, why did they do so, and in what manner? 2ndly, in what manner and to what extent did they unite in forming the party which was opposed to the emperor? 3rdly, what were the views, and what were the measures, adopted by the emperor in his opposition to it? 4thly,

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and lastly, how came the parties engaged to a formal rupture, and how was the matter finally arranged?—A glance will show that these questions can not be answered without general acquaintance with the political state of Germany at that period.

The great distinction between the internal relations of Germany, then and now, consisted in the very different proportion which the power of the cities bore to that of the princes: for 1st, the cities in the south and north of Germany, which enjoyed either total or partial freedom, were by far most numerous. 2ndly, their internal wealth, and consequently their political influence, was much more considerable. 3rdly, their power was increased and concentrated by the Hanseatic league in the north, and more particularly by the Suabian confederacy in the south. 4thly, their city militia and mercenaries were naturally of more importance in the general absence of standing armies. On the other hand, the power of the princes was not only actually diminished, but stood every chance of further diminution from the system still in force, of internal subdivisions.

The more important electoral and royal houses at the commencement of the Reformation, were:—

1. The SAXON; divided into the elder and electoral branch of Ernest, and the younger and ducal of Albert. The former, represented by the elector, Frederic the Wise, (†1525,) possessed the electoral circle, with Wittenburg as its capital, almost the whole landgraviate of Thuringia, and some other domains. The latter, under duke George, († 1539,) the opponent of Luther, held the landgraviate of Meissen, with a portion of Thuringia.

2. That of BRANDENBURG. The electoral line under the elector Joachim I. († 1535,) was in possession of the margraviate of Brandenburg, (a new and electoral district,) and some smaller principalities. The margraviate of Franconia was divided between the families of Culmbach and Anspach.

3. The PALATINE, (or elder of Wittelsbach,) which was divided into the electoral line under Lewis V. († 1544); to which belonged the electorate on the Rhine; and the Simmern, which was again divided into those of Simmern and Zweibrüch, and the latter again into those of Zweibrüch and Veldenz.

4. The BAVARIAN, (or younger of the Wittelsbach line). Notwithstanding the right of primogeniture, introduced 1508, Bavaria was divided between duke William VI. († 1550) and his brother Lewis; but was reunited after the death of the latter, 1545, and has remained so ever since.

5. That of BRUNSWICK. It was at that period divided between the two principal branches: 1st, that of the lower line of Lunenburg, which possessed Lunenburg and Celle, and which from 1520 had been under duke Ernest, (the founder of the two younger families († 1546). This embraced the two collateral branches of Harburg and Gifhorn. 2ndly, that of the lower branch of Brunswick, or Wolfenbüttell, which was again divided into two, of which the one under duke Henry the younger, the opponent of the Reformation, held Wolfenbüttel, the other under duke Erich I. Calenburg and Göttingen. Besides these there was still a branch of the ancient Brunswick family in Grubenhagen.

6. The HESSIAN. This house was undivided under Philip Magnanimus, († 1567) and therefore one of the most powerful.

7. That of MECKLENBURG, was likewise at first undivided under Henry the Peaceable († 1552), and Albert († 1547).

8. That of WIRTEMBURG, which was raised in 1495 from the dignity of a county to that of a dukedom. It was indeed undivided; but its restless duke, Ulrich, having been driven from his territories by the Suabian league, 1519, was only restored in 1534 by the compact of Cadan.

9. That of BADEN, united while under the margrave Christopher; was in 1527 divided into the lines of Baden and Durlach.

10. Among the more powerful houses, which have since become totally extinct, were the ducal house of POMERANIA, undivided under Bogislaus the Great, till 1523, when it was

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divided into Wolgast and Stettin; and the house of CLEVE, to which belonged Julius, Berg, and Ravensberg, remained undivided under John III. († 1539.) But even in the principalities which remained entire, much depended upon the existence of brothers or near kinsmen, whose relations to the ruling prince were not so clearly defined then as they have been in later times.

April 8, 1521.

3. The summons of Luther, and his appearance before the diet of Worms, gave his cause, already a matter of interest to the people and to the church, its new character of an affair of state. Here, too, his proscription by the emperor, and the undisguised partiality shown to him by the princes of his own and other countries, laid the foundation of future divisions in the empire.

The causes which induced Charles to declare against Luther, were doubtless more connected with politics than with religion. They formed no part of any extensive plan, but arose merely from his position as Defender of the Church, and from a sense, then very common, of the need he had of the Pope's friendship. From the first, however, the political part of the Reformation had the most important interests for him, although the two wars with France, which followed close upon its commencement, joined with other causes in making his plans of profiting by it gradual.

Proscription of Luther and his followers by the edict of Worms, May 26, which pledges the emperor as to his future conduct.

1526.

4. The next following years, while they spread the new doctrines with signal success in many parts of Germany, especially Hesse and Saxony, and thus created a ferment of ideas such as had never before been known, and which the inven-

tion of printing served materially to keep alive, produced two events, the war of the peasants, and the secularization of Prussia, which opened the eyes of the European powers to its political tendency.

The war of the peasants originated in Suabia, 1524; and spread into Thuringia, where it was kindled by Thomas Münzer, but the battle of Frankenhausen put an end to it May 15, 1525.

The question of, how far this insurrection was really caused by the Reformation, is not nearly of so much importance to history, as that of, how far it appeared to have done so. For on this apparent connection between them, many consequences depended, and lead us to the other question of, how far it might have been avoided.

Versuch einer Geschichte des Deutschen Bauernkriegs, von G. SARTORIUS. Berlin, 1795.

5. The secularization of Prussia, which had belonged to the Teutonic order from the middle of the thirteenth century, gave an example by which other ecclesiastical princes might readily profit. Indeed when we consider the anxiety which had been already awakened by the sequestration of church property; a measure by the way from which the German princes in general drew little personal profit, for they applied its proceeds to more noble purposes; we may understand what a sensation the loss of a whole country must of necessity have caused at Rome.

The Grand master of the order, Albert of Brandenburg, raises himself to the hereditary dukedom of Prussia, but as a vassal of Poland, 1525.

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6. These events, joined to the threatening attitude which the battle of Pavia enabled the emperor to assume, led to the first alliances distinguished by a difference of faith; several Catholic states leagued themseves at Dessau, while the most prominent of the Protestants united at Torgau. These leagues were at first entered into merely for protection, and had no aggressive measures in contemplation. Peace, however, could not have been long preserved in spite of all these securities, had not the plan of a general council afforded some hopes of composing the quarrel. This method proved only of partial success, as a palliative rather than a cure; but even thus produced much benefit.

The emperor's determination to carry the edict of Worms into effect was well calculated to keep alive dissension. The Catholic electors of Mentz, Brandenburgh, etc. formed their alliance at Dessau, May 1525, the Protestant party, following the example of Hesse and electoral Saxony, did the same at Torgau, May 12, 1526.

A very poor acquaintance with the progress of human affairs will restrain our astonishment at the uncertain character of these alliances. Of the two parties, however, that of the holders of the new belief received a powerful impulse from the impetuosity of Philip of Hesse; and even as early as 1528, on the occasion of an alarm, perhaps an idle one, raised by Dr. Pack, chancellor of Saxony under duke George, showed its readiness to act. It appears very doubtful, however, in what way matters could have been arranged with the emperor at the meetings of the diet, had not men's minds been amused by the idea of a free council after the diet of Spires, 1526.

7. The two next diets were of importance to

the protestants, that of Spires gave them their name, and that of Augsburg, by the establishment of their articles of belief, showed that no ingenuity of explanation could reconcile doctrines so opposed as those of the two parties. And yet, in spite of the emperor's threats, and of the new alliance of the protestants at Smalcald, the proposed remedy of delay was, by the further inducement of frequent alarms from the Turks, so adhered to, as to secure the maintenance of peace and of the present state of affairs till a general council could be summoned.

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Diet held at Spires 1529,—where, as the evangelical party protested against the decree which would have stemmed the torrent of the new doctrines, 19th April, they acquired their name of protestants. The diet of Augsburg and the confession so called, date June 25th, 1530. The terms prescribed by the emperor naturally led to the league of Smalcald, Feb. 27th, 1531; and the election of Ferdinand as king of Rome gave the protestants an additional motive for forming it. Nevertheless negotiations were renewed and the temporary peace of Nuremberg concluded, July 23d, 1532. By it, however, only the present members of the league of Smalcald were secure, all future partisans being excluded till the meeting of the council.

8. This peace would have done little for the prevention of bloodshed had not the internal condition of the parties and a series of intermediate events conspired to give it effect. In truth, the peace itself contained abundant materials for future war; and it was only a question who should be the first to employ them by an attack on the allies. This question, however,

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was not easily answered, for it appeared doubtful whether it was the duty of the emperor, or of the catholic states, or of both. The emperor's hands were scarcely free of the Turks, (see p. 54,) when he became engaged in the restoration of Ulrich duke of Wirtemberg, and the anabaptist war of Münster, besides the expedition against Tunis, (see p. 52,) all which conspired to keep him employed, till his third war with 1535-1538. Francis, when the efforts of the latter, although ineffectual, to gain over the allies of Smalcald to his interests, made it as dangerous as it had previously been inconvenient to attack them.

If the forcible restoration of duke Ulrich of Wirtemberg, by Philip of Hesse, 1534, rendered the animosity more intense, it, on the other hand, not only strengthened the protestant party, to which Ulrich belonged, but increased its respectability. The power of the anabaptists in Münster, 1534, under John of Leiden, which lasted till the conquest of that city, June 24, 1535, presents a phenomenon equally curious to the philosopher and politician.—League of Smalcald enlarged and renewed for ten years, July 10, 1536, when, by the institution of a fixed contingent of men and arms from each of the members, it assumed a firmer shape and a more threatening character.

9. Even after the restoration of peace with 1538. France, the emperor had abundant apology for not declaring himself more decidedly, even had he wished it, in the various difficulties and pursuits which either hampered or engaged him. The protestants, on the other hand, had united merely for defence, and were anxious to remain

quiet as long as their enemies would allow them. This state of things, however, could not last; for independently of several minor events, the temporary expedient of a peace appeared to become daily more doubtful from the efforts now really made for the assembling of a council;—a measure, the accomplishment of which was not likely to satisfy either Charles or his protestant opponents. Meantime, the complaints from the reformed states, of the partiality of the imperial chamber of justice, furnished an inexhaustible source of discontent.

Attempts of pope Paul III. from 1536 to convoke a general council after his own mind, in some city of Italy. He managed also, (in the person of the vice-chancellor Held, the ambassador of the emperor, and the first mover of the sacred league at Nuremberg, June 10, 1538,) that a man should be sent to Germany, who would cordially assist in keeping alive the flame.—Henry duke of Brunswick was attacked by the allies, 1540, and expelled from his country, 1542.—The attempts of the elector Herman at Cologne, to introduce the Reformation, terminated in his deposition, 1543.

10. Thus, if we except an occasional disturbance, a variety of circumstances combined at once to maintain a general peace, and to keep alive the inducements to a general war. The question: What political advantages did Charles seek to draw from the religious differences now they presented themselves to him, and by what method did he propose to attain them? has been proved to be of great difficulty by the various modes of solution adopted by the best histo-

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rians. This uncertainty leads to the conclusion that the emperor was either the deepest politician of that or any other day, or that, and this is perhaps the more probable, he had himself no settled plan. The German policy of Charles was founded upon his notions of the imperial power; these were very vague, and his plans necessarily corresponded with them. We should form a very erroneous judgment, then, if we were to allow any occasional intimations, whether of his private conduct, or even of his official acts, as evidence of a settled scheme. The league of Smalcald was the first event which gave his ideas any determinate form; he saw in it an armed opposition, and as such, a downright rebellion against the sovereignty of the empire. But then again, it was only at a later period that the league assumed this character.

As for the total overthrow of the German constitution, the idea was then so foreign to the spirit of the age that it could hardly have been seriously formed. Such acts belong to the times of written, not of prescriptional constitutions: and had such an idea been formed, how, and by what means, was it to be executed? Never was the German nation less disposed for subjection; her burghers had not yet laid aside the sword, and there were no standing armies to rivet the fetters on her limbs.

Peace still preserved by several intervening events: the campaign of Charles against Algiers, 1541, and the fourth war

with Francis I. which immediately ensued, 1542—1544; again, by the decision of the diet of Ratisbon, July 29, 1541, and by the threatened Turkish invasion.

11. The peace of Crespy left the allies unprotected, and gave the signal for war. This was in truth unavoidable, after the refusal of that party to acknowledge the council of Trent: but then it was not directed (as the pope wished, and thought he had persuaded Charles to direct it,) against the states which had been guilty of heresy, but against the confederates of Smalcald, who had impugned the imperial authority. Unfortunately this league was oppressed by all those evils which a league alone can bring together, and even before the battle of Mühlberg had thrown one chief into captivity, and treachery at Halle the other, there were too many evidences of approaching disunion. 1546.

The council of Trent, which had been convoked in 1542, finally opened Dec. 13, 1545: its very form and its first decision renders it impossible for the protestants to take any part in it.—The war had broken out after the diet of Ratisbon, July, 1546. The two leaders were outlawed, July 20. The campaign this year was altogether destitute of plan; and the league was eventually dissolved. John Frederic, elector of Saxony, taken prisoner at the battle of Mühlberg, April 24, 1547. The electorate is bestowed on duke Maurice of Saxony. Philip, landgrave of Hesse, treacherously made prisoner at Halle, June 19.

12. The total dissolution of the league left the emperor at liberty to make whatever use of

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it he chose; but he was not, however, so intent upon conquest as upon reconciliation, his schemes for which were founded, according to the spirit of the day, upon the authority of general councils. Indeed it may be a question whether the *interim*, by which the theologians ruined his cause, was not on his part a necessary measure. One only scheme, the fruit of approaching age, appears to have been formed by him at this period: it was to unite the two crowns, which he himself bore, upon the head of his son. The prospect of entailing the imperial power was one of so wide and uncertain a range that it can hardly be reckoned among his motives to this plan; it arose more probably from the conviction that the strength of his house depended upon the union. Fortune kindly frustrated this impolitic design, and averted Philip II. from Germany: but Charles paid for the failure as he never did for any other, since it hastened the most awful crisis to which his reign was exposed.

Diet at Augsburg, and the publication of the *interim* as the form to be observed until the future decision of the council, May 15, 1548; whereby great commotions were excited, which showed, perhaps more than any others, the resolute spirit of the nation.—The times were not yet passed away, when a single city like Magdeburg could brave the whole power of the emperor.

13. However little Charles may have desired the overthrow of the Germanic constitution, it

must be confessed that the states held a somewhat different opinion of the imperial authority from what he had himself formed: and yet they would have acquiesced without any great demur, but for one person among them, whom Charles had long known, without however turning his knowledge to much account; for although skilled in all the quirks of policy, he was but poorly acquainted with the force of individual character. The bold scheme of Maurice, founded as it was upon the events at Halle, took its origin from the latter impulse; but although it sprang from the heart, it was well seconded by the head. Even had the result been less glorious, history could never have failed to mark him as a man who far outstripped his age. Maurice cut the knot, and with one stroke of his sword did that for Germany which no council would ever have accomplished. On the other hand, however, his alliance with France showed that power the secret of turning to its own advantage the dissensions which set the members against the head of the empire; and although the freedom of Germany may have been held much at heart by France, yet there appeared no contradiction in her making the maintenance of it subservient to her own aggrandizement.

Plan of the elector to compel the emperor, by a sudden attack, to establish the condition of religion on a secure basis, and to restore his father-in-law Philip to liberty. This he found an opportunity of doing by means of the commission

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given him, to enforce the law pronounced against the proud city of Magdeburg. Siege and capitulation of this city, Nov. 5, 1551.—Secret treaty concluded with Henry II. of France, at Friedewalde, Oct. 5, 1551. The war breaks out and is carried on with spirit, from March till July, 1552, by which also the council of Trent is broken up. The emperor finds himself bound to concede to the treaty of Passau, Aug. 2, 1552, under the following conditions: 1st, that the captive princes should be restored to liberty, and Philip of Hesse reinstated; 2ndly, that perfect religious freedom should be granted to the protestants, both on the part of the emperor and the catholic states; 3rdly, that a diet should be held within six months to confirm these conditions, without the power, however, of making any material alteration in them. Thus, though the treaty of Passau contained nothing but the preliminaries, a definite peace was secured by it beforehand; its author, however, was not destined to see its accomplishment. He died the following year, 1553, at the battle of Silvershausen, July 9, contending against Margrave Albert of Culmbach, the disturber of the peace.

14. The treaty of Passau having been concluded by Maurice without the concurrence of his ally Henry II., (who in the meantime invaded Lorraine,) France still maintained the war; and as Charles, in the conduct of it, gave scope to his feelings rather than his judgment, it was concluded at the expense of the German empire, although for the benefit of one who had declared himself the protector of those he spoiled.

Henry II.'s invasion of Lorraine and investment of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, April, 1552. Campaign of Charles in the autumn of 1552, and siege of Metz, which is successfully defended by Francis of Guise. The war raged during the two next years both on the frontiers of the Low Countries and in Italy, (where Sienna put itself under the protection of the

French, but was at last compelled to surrender to the emperor, April 21, 1555). It was conducted without any great battles, though on the whole successfully for France, till the five years' truce of Vaucelles, Feb. 5, 1555, insured to France its conquests in Lorraine and Piedmont.

15. This war, and other impediments, delayed for some time the assembling of the diet, which was to be held for the ratification of the religious peace. It met at last in Augsburg, and after a discussion of six months, which plainly showed that Maurice was no longer alive, the religious peace was established. By it both parties had an interval of quiet secured to them, and the ecclesiastical property which had been confiscated up to the treaty of Passau, was confirmed to its possessors; but as it was limited in its benefits to those who embraced the confession of Augsburg, this limitation, together with the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*, became the seeds of future discord.

Sept. 21, 1555.

The *reservatum ecclesiasticum* respected the question, Whether the future freedom of religion should be extended only to the secular orders, or also to the ecclesiastical? The protestants, to a man, were bent on the latter; but the catholics neither would nor could grant it.

16. At the conclusion of this peace Charles V. carried into effect the resolution he had long formed, and which was now matured by a sense of the instability of fortune and by his own weak health, of abdicating his double authority. His favourite object of a lasting union between the

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two crowns he was obliged to resign, and they were henceforth divided between Philip II. his only son, and heir to Spain and the Netherlands, and his brother Ferdinand I. king of Rome, and now successor to the empire.

Resignation of the Netherlands and the Spanish monarchy to Philip II. at Brussels, the former Oct. 25, 1555, the latter Jan. 16, 1556. He did not resign the imperial crown, till Aug. 27, 1556.—Charles died at St. Justus in Valladolid, whither he had retired, Sept. 21, 1558.

17. At the close of this period the Reformation had, upon the whole, made as much progress as could be expected. Its doctrines, directed to the reason and not to the imagination, naturally obtained a more easy introduction among the northern than the southern nations. The difference of governments exerted little influence compared to the difference of character among the governed. Hence its religious doctrines and its political influence were no longer confined to Germany, but extended over a great portion of Europe. Still, however, important as it was, both from its present and its future influence, to the internal condition of each individual state, it was not yet become the mainspring of general politics, since the two chief and rival powers on the continent were agreed in its suppression. Its only immediate and necessary effects were, 1st, that religion became, both in the protestant and catholic states, more fundamentally connected with government; and 2ndly,

that in the protestant governments, the princes, by breaking with Rome, and in some instances by actual seizure of church property, acquired a considerable accession of power. But what was this, compared with the more distant, though not less certain, consequences which this new impulse to the human mind might be expected to produce? The Reformation. 1517-1555.

18. In Germany, it is true, the Reformation brought and continued to bring new principles of dissension, but with these came also the principles of political life. Not that it is here meant that it produced any political revolution, properly so called,—this, so long as religion occupied the first place in men's minds, was not to be dreaded,—but that the princes were forced by it into exertions which first taught them to feel as princes should; nor did the continuance of the strife allow this spirit to subside till it had become essential to their character. From this time forth the Reformation became the mainspring of all political movements, and in consequence of this an increased interest attached to the German empire, which has been at all times the true point of balance in the European system, and particularly when the fate of the protestant religion in other lands depended upon its being established there.

At the end of this period the protestant doctrines prevailed throughout Saxony, Brandenburg, Brunswick, Hesse, Mecklenburg, Holstein, and some smaller states in the north; in

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the Palatinate, in Baden and Wirtemberg, in the south; as well as in most of the important cities of the empire.—The melancholy schism that had arisen in 1525, respecting the Lord's supper, between the protestants themselves, could be of no great political importance, so long as none of the more powerful states of the empire acknowledged the reformed tenets.

19. Besides Germany the northern powers (see below) and a considerable portion of Switzerland and Geneva, admitted the new doctrines without delay. In England the struggle was still going on; and in France and the Netherlands, as well as in Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland, the Reformation obtained a footing, but not such as to determine its future consequences. Wherever it gained admittance, however, it occasioned considerable modifications in points of belief, as well as in church discipline and forms.

In England a rupture with the Roman see, unaccompanied however by a change of doctrine, took place under Henry VIII.; by an act of Parliament, Nov. 1534, the king was declared supreme head of the church. Under Edward VI. 1547—1553, the protestant doctrines were advanced, though the episcopal hierarchy was retained, as dependent on the king. The restoration of the papal dominion under Mary, 1553—1558, was speedily frustrated by Elizabeth.

In Scotland, the reformed doctrines had been disseminated as early as 1525, especially at a later period, by the instrumentality of John Knox, the disciple of Calvin, but was opposed by the regent and Roman hierarchy.

Life of the Scottish reformer, John Knox, with a sketch of the Reformation in Scotland, by S. THOMAS M'CRIE. Translated into German and abridged by D. J. G. PLANCK, 1817.

In Switzerland, the Reformation arose, independently of Lu-

ther, by the exertions of Zwinglius, in Zurich, (who fell Oct. 11, 1531, at Cappel, in a battle with the catholics.) It spread rapidly; in 1528, it had either been adopted altogether, or partially, by the cantons of Zurich, Bern, Basle, Appenzel, Glarus, and Schaffhausen. A separation from those who followed the confession of Augsburg, grew in 1525, out of the unhappy difference of opinion respecting the sacrament of the Lord's supper; and thus originated the reformed party, which was first fully developed in Geneva, through Calvin, 1535—1564.

This city acquired a great, lasting, and even increasing importance in Europe, as the focus of religious, political, and scientific ideas; and likewise, since its emancipation from Savoy and the expulsion of its bishop, 1533, of practical republicanism. The forms and discipline of the reformed church were here fully developed. By means of the university, founded 1539, under the direction of Calvin, and supported by his exertions and those of Beza, Geneva became the principal school of theology to the professors of these opinions, and in those days the only one where the French language prevailed.

20. To the Reformation, the society of Jesuits, which arose during its progress, owed, if not its origin, at least its practical influence. The object continually held in view by this association, was the supreme control of public opinion; and by this power it hoped to oppose protestantism, or, in other words, the freedom of the intellect, and support the highest and most unyielding assumptions of papal authority. The period at which it was established offered a fair prospect of success, by the adoption of an extensive and organised system of association. Proper means it might have, and doubtless had, in such abundance as to leave no flaw in the theory of its institution, but then it remained for the cir-

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cumstances of the time to decide how many of these means could ever obtain practical importance. Thus far, then, the society was dependent on the age, and forced to vary according to its dictates; but having one main principle, which controlled all its actions, a complete adaptation was impossible. Its very essence demanded, what a time-serving policy would have been careful to avoid, either a total supremacy, or utter annihilation; if it could succeed in the overthrow of protestantism, the former was of sure attainment; if protestantism, as we have before defined it, should win the day, then no delay, no truce or concession, could arrest the latter. A long career, however, lay between it and either of these events; a career which required all its activity, manifold and extensive and lasting as that was, for its accomplishment. Even the part the society played in politics was but one of many in the same; it was a necessary but a dangerous means of advancing the common end. It was necessary because princes themselves are amenable to public opinion, it was dangerous because the loss of that opinion promised a certain conflict with the princes, who had by it been kept in subjection. Spreading itself through all Christian countries, sometimes openly, sometimes secretly, it became a bond which encirled the whole European system. Its influence extended alike over the body and the several members, and although it is difficult, often impossible, to

determine the amount and nature of its working in detail, its organisation will supply abundant evidence of the general plan which it pursued.

Foundation of the society by the chivalrous enthusiasm of Ignatius Loyola, at first as a private fraternity, 1534; it was sanctioned by pope Paul III. 1540; and very much enlarged 1543—1549. The spirit of the age was in favour of its rapid advance, notwithstanding the many checks which it experienced. At the death of its founder, 1556, it already embraced nine provinces of western Europe; viz: one in Portugal, three in Spain, one in France, two in Germany and the Netherlands, and two in Italy; and in the other parts of the globe it influenced by means of missions, three provinces (Brazil, Ethiopia, and India.) With respect to its peculiar external forms, it was not separated from the world as an order, but attached itself to it as a society, so much so as to be partly amalgamated with it, without, however, losing its own distinct character. There were colleges and seminaries, but no cloisters. There was a dress peculiar to the order, but not a monastic one.

Outline of its internal organisation:—

1. In respect to the government, a principle of the most absolute despotism, and thence of blind and patient obedience, flowed immediately from the design of the institution. The general head of the society *(præpositus generalis)* was dependent on no one but the pope; he resided in Rome. From the time of Lainez (1558—1564), his jurisdiction was unlimited, it embraced the whole executive; and soon after, notwithstanding the general and provincial congregations, it usurped the legislative also; and thus became the source of all power in the community. It was supported by councillors, governors, and vice-governors, who severally held the titles of assistants, provincials, and rectors. Even his dependence on the pope could not be oppressive, for the two interests were the same; and the manner of acting was always left to the general. 2. In respect to the classes of members,

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there were novices, scholars, and coadjutors, (the former gave instruction, to the latter were committed the care of souls,) and professed members. Among their chief maxims we may mention the great limitation of the number of professed members, or Jesuits, in the most proper sense of the word; who had taken the fourth vow of obedience to the pope, and by whom all the higher offices were filled. Besides these there was another class of adjuncts, or secret Jesuits, without uniform, but not unfrequently distinguished by stars, or bishops' mitres. 3. The principal means of disseminating their principles, were missions, confessionals, especially at court, and the instruction of youth in lower and higher seminaries. Thus they embraced the future with the present generation. An institution, the aim of which is the suppression of all free development of the mind, is intrinsically bad. The good it has done for the propagation of religion and single branches of science, is not, however, on that account to be depreciated; but unfortunately the political historian has little good to tell of it.

The history of the order, as it ought to be written, that is, delineated from its *own* point of view, offers a field for a future historian. Some excellent preliminary matter on the subject may be found in the article, *Jesuiten, Allg. Deutsche Encyclopædie*, B. xvii. in the Appendix, (by SPITTLER.) It has also been printed separately. Liepzig, 1817.

Geschichte der Jesuiten in Baiern, von CARL. HIENRICH RITTER von LANG. Nürnberg, 1819. This work is drawn altogether from original records. It is preceded by a general introductory part, exhibiting the internal organisation of the society, and is critical and impartial.

Among the larger works we ought to mention:

Allgemeine Geschichte der Jesuiten von dem Ursprunge ihres Ordens bis auf gegenwärtige Zeit; von P. PH. WOLFF, Leipzig, 1803; 4 vols. second edition. Also SCHROEKH *Kirchengeschichte seit der Reformation*, B. iii. the last section. Very valuable.

21. This period on the whole, presents a nobler view of politics, however paltry many of its details may appear. The age had greater and more fixed objects in view, it pursued them from higher motives, and was led on to them, if not by wiser, at least by greater men. The powerful influence of theology, more powerful even among the protestants than the catholics, brought some evils in its train; but among these can not be reckoned excitement to war and bloodshed; the smouldering flames of which it often damped. The Reformation. 1517-1555.

22. Political economy, notwithstanding the growing necessity for its improvement, made no considerable progress. New exactions, grudgingly submitted to by the states, and expensive loans from the rich commercial towns, remained, as before, the means of raising immediate supplies. Neither princes nor their councillors bestowed a thought on it beyond the moment of need; nor, indeed, could they be expected to do so at a time when their whole attention and care was drawn to religion. Besides, the treasure, which at this period poured into Spain from her new colonies in America, served to strengthen the error, that a country's wealth depends upon the gold and silver it contains. Yet Spain itself might have undeceived them, for it was not rich; nay, Charles V. was even poor, if poverty means greater wants than sources of supply.

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23. The art of war made some progress, for although neither Charles nor Francis were great generals, yet the continued hostilities in which they were engaged, led of necessity to new modes of organisation. Among these the establishment of regular infantry, the true prop and principle of warfare, must be considered the most important. Yet the legions of Francis still bore more resemblance to militia than to a standing force; and the dreaded imperial infantry consisted of mercenaries engaged for no definite period. The difference between these and modern troops, both in equipment and discipline, was immense, while of the higher branches of tactics they were totally ignorant; nor indeed could they hope to attain them, while the unwieldy depth of their ranks prevented all the lighter evolutions.

III. *History of the Colonies during this period.*

In addition to the works before cited are the following, which have particular reference to Spanish America:

ANTON DE HERRERA, *Decadas o historia general de los hechos de los Castellanos en las Islas y tierra firma nel mar Oceano, en quatro decadas desde el anno* 1492 *hasta èl de* 1531. Madrid, 1601—15.—The best edition, with continuation, Madrid, 1728—30, 5 vols. fol.

Historia del nuevo Mundo da JUAN BATTISTA MUNOS, *en Madrid.* 1793, 4to. The first volume only has appeared.

Saggio di storia Americana naturale, civile e sacra, de Regni e delle provincie Spagnole di terra firma nella America meridionale, dell' ABBATE FILIPPO SALVADORE GILII.

Roma, 1780, 4 vols. 8vo.—The political portion is the least satisfactory. Colonial affairs. 1517-1555

ANTONIA DE ULLOA, *Relacion historica del Viage a la Americo meridional.* Madrid, 1748, 2 vols. 4to. In French, 1751. The best description of these provinces.

The principal sources respecting the internal administration of these countries, are the laws and ordinances of the kings, which the Spanish government itself caused to be collected and published:

Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias; mandadas imprimir y publicar por la Magestad Católica del Rey D. Carlos II. *nuestro Sennor.* Tercera edicion, Madrid, 1774, 4 vols. fol. This collection, very well arranged, according to the subject-matter, begins with 1509, and comes down to the beginning of the reign of Charles II. The fourth volume contains a very complete index.

1. In this as in the former period of our history, the Spaniards and Portuguese remained sole masters of the countries beyond the ocean. And this very absence of rivals promised a prescriptive right, which would confirm their claims of exclusive possession. The progress which the two nations made, was, however, very dissimilar, for the Portuguese colonial system had attained its full growth during the last period; that of Spain only assumed its enormous dimensions and full organisation during the present.

2. The Spanish empire in America counted as its provinces, Mexico, or New Spain, Peru, Terra Firma, and new Grenada: but then there was a wide difference between its actual and its nominal possessions. The inhabitants of Mexico and Spanish America.

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Peru, who were already in some degree civilised, and collected in towns and villages, offered comparatively easy conquest; but what dominion could be exercised over the countless tribes who wandered in pursuit of game over the vast forests and plains of America, until civilisation, or as then understood, "conversion", had prepared them for allegiance? Accordingly, the Spanish authority over the interior depended on their missionaries; and the cross, although more slow in its effects, was here at least preferred to the sword.

Conquest of Mexico, and capture of the principal city, 1519—1521, by Francis Cortes, was not achieved without violent resistance. Attempts to subdue Peru, Quito, and Chili from 1525; accomplished 1529—1535 by Francis Pizarro and his companions and brothers. Terra Firma was conquered 1532, and New Grenada, 1536. Several other countries were discovered in this period, but not yet subdued.

3. The conquered countries became and remained colonies of Spain. This was mainly brought about by the constitution which they received;—as difficult a problem as ever political science had to solve;—but even this might have proved unavailing, had it not been supported by the character of the people. This constitution, although gradual in its development, was in all its parts fundamentally established during the present period. It was fashioned, as is commonly the case, upon that of the mother country, although the interposition of the Atlantic

prevented an exact imitation. The supreme authority was vested in a council resident in Madrid, and dependent solely on the king; this was termed *Consejo real y supremo de Indias*, and had under it a board for the regulation of commerce, entitled *Audienzia real de la Contratacion*, which was held in Seville; and thus a more settled system of colonial policy was established than any other nation had ever founded. In the new world, itself, viceroys (*virreyes*) were appointed to represent the monarch; but the distribution of justice was confined to the *audiencias*, which acted as supreme local tribunals, and at the same time as state council to the viceroys. The towns elected their own *cabildos*, or municipal officers.

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The principal foundation of the whole constitution was laid by the ordinances of Charles V. (*leyes nuevas*) of the year 1542. Institution of the council of the Indies, 1511, but its formation was not completed till 1542. Appointment of two viceroys, first in Mexico, 1540, and afterwards in Peru, 1542, as heads of the whole civil and military administration, to whom many *gobernadores* and *capitanes* were gradually subordinate. Institution of two *audiencias*, at Mexico and Lima, 1542, the viceroys presiding, but without a voice in judicial affairs. The number of these courts was afterwards increased to ten, as that of the viceroys to four. From the *audiencias*, as courts of justice, there was an appeal to the council of the Indies.

4. These political institutions presuppose the establishment of towns, (*ciudades, villas*, and *lugares.*) These were already to be found in

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Mexico and Peru, but not in the other countries, and even in the former, not always where they were needed by the new rulers. The places first colonised were the harbours and seaports on the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico; and shortly after those on the Pacific ocean. Settlements in the interior were made more slowly and gradually.

The towns on the coasts, at first consisting for the most part of a church and a few houses, were at the same time harbours and garrisons. The first was Cumana, founded 1520, followed by the important harbours of Porto Bello and Carthagena, 1532, Valencia, 1555, Caraccas, 1567, and at an earlier period Vera Cruz, the first settlement in Mexico. On the coasts of the Pacific there were, in Mexico, Acapulco; in Darien, Panama; in Peru, Lima, 1535; and in Chili, Conception, 1550; and the first, though unsuccessful, attempt was made to settle Buenos Ayres, on the Rio de la Plata, in 1535. The towns of the interior generally sprang up in the vicinity of the places where mines had been previously opened.—The missions, which were afterwards formed, consisted of small villages, inhabited by converted Indians, under the superintendence of priests, settled along the banks of the principal and secondary rivers, and on the immense plains of the interior.

5. But however strong the political ties which connected the colonies to the mother country, those of religion were far more powerful. All the external apparatus of Christianity, her hierarchy, her cloisters, nay, very shortly, her inquisition, were transported across the Atlantic. With these went her learning and science, and the institutions necessary for their propagation, and

thus, an ecclesiastical constitution was formed coeval and interwoven with the state, but like the state dependent on the Spanish king, not on the pope. This naturally led to the overthrow of the civilisation of the native American nations, and with it to the extinction of their national spirit.

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By the privileges granted by Alexander VI. and Julius II. (*patronazgo real,*) the papal power was limited to the ratification of the king's appointments to ecclesiastical offices.—Mexico and Lima were first erected into archbishoprics (to which Caraccas, Santa Fe di Bogota, and Guatimala were afterwards added) and bishoprics, each provided with a chapter.—The lower ecclesiastical clergy were divided into *curas* in the Spanish settlements, *doctrineras* in the Indian, and *missioneras* among the savages.—The establishment of cloisters followed from the original purpose of converting the Indians; they were at first confined to the mendicant orders, and only at a later period shared by the Jesuits. These institutions, so necessary to the object proposed, could not but have ample success in so rich a country, protected as they were by the inquisition, (established by Philip II. in 1570,) and which, owing to its distance from the sphere of thought, possessed an unlimited authority over the mind of the people. Universities were founded in Mexico and Lima, 1551.

6. Thus the forms of European states were universally imitated in those countries. But the mass of the people had in the difference of their origin, an inseparable bar to an entire and national union. This physical distinction led to important political results. The white colonists, by their superior authority, appeared to hold all

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who partook of colour (*pardoz*) in marked subjection. Among these we are not to reckon the Indians alone, (who like the others were under the protection of the law, and secure of personal freedom,) but all the half-castes (*mestizos, tercerones,* and *cuarterones* or *quadroons,*) who sprang from a union with them. To these the slave-trade brought the addition of the negroes, from whom another and numerous intermediate class, the *mulattos,* arose. These different classes pursued almost exclusively different occupations, and thus a system of castes, properly so called, was formed; the nobility or highest rank, which consisted of the resident Europeans (*creoles*), and the occasional visitors (or *chapetones*). Among the creoles no distinction was observed, they were all equal, and all excluded from the government, which was entrusted only to Spaniards, who were not permitted to settle in the colonies. This regulation was the groundwork of future revolt. Happily for Spain, the necessity was early felt of subjecting her own emigrations, (those from other countries were wholly forbidden,) to a severe but wholesome police. And it is to this precaution that she is mainly indebted for the secure dependence of her colonies.

Repeated ordinances of the Spanish government, for the improvement of the Indians. (But these laws could do but little towards curbing the cruelty of the first conquerors.) The principal were those made after the year 1542, by which the

system of feudal service, which had been introduced, (*Encomiendas, Repartimientos*) was circumscribed. Personal freedom was insured to the Indians; the amount of service (*mitas*) and tributes fixed; and they were allowed to reside in separate villages under their own officers (*caciques*) chosen from among themselves. Colonial affairs. 1517-1555.

B. DE LAS CASAS *Relacion de la Destruycion de las Indias*, Sevilla, 1552, 4to. The well known account of the cruelties of the first conquerors.—The ordinances for the improvement of the condition of the Indians fill almost a whole book in the *Leyes*, (L. VI.) No other government did so much for the aborigines as the Spanish: would it had been effective across the Atlantic.

7. Little advantage was derived from these countries as yet beyond the supply of precious metals, and the abundance of these, especially of silver, exceeded the most extravagant expectation. They nevertheless possessed other and not less considerable riches, in their various productions. These, however, as long as the use of cochineal and indigo as dyes, of cocoa, of tobacco, and Peruvian bark, remained either wholly unknown, or had been but partially introduced into Europe, could not form staple commodities of trade. The search after precious metals was left to individual enterprise, with the reservation of a tenth to the crown; and thus numerous inland settlements were formed, but it was long before mining was put upon a regular and scientific footing.

Discovery of the rich mines of Zacotecas, in Mexico, 1532, and of Potosi in Peru, 1545; since which time the annual proceeds have on an average been estimated at thirty

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millions of piastres, about half of which has been exported to Europe. Before this time, under Charles V. scarcely half a million of piastres found their way into the royal coffers. The proportion paid to the king it was found necessary to diminish by degrees from twenty to five per cent.; notwithstanding this, in the richest regions of the earth, the mining was so hazardous a game that by far the greater number of speculations ended in ruin.

Fürsten und Völker von Süd-Europa im 16ten *und* 17ten *Jahrhundert. Vornehmlich aus ungedruckten Gesandtschafts-Berichten;* von LEOPOLDE RANKE. vol. i. Hamburg, 1827, 8vo. With new and important disclosures respecting the condition of Spain at this period.

8. These mining operations, and the culture of what few plantations were then established, gave rise to the importation of slaves from Africa. This dreadful traffic sprung from a good principle, namely, that of relieving the Indians, who from their nature were unfit for the labour. It was proposed by their advocate, Las Casas. The Spaniards, it is true, never engaged in it themselves, but the government contracted with foreigners, who engaged for a certain profit to supply the requisite number of slaves.

The slave-trade of the Europeans proceeded from the discoveries and conquests of the Portuguese on the coasts of Africa, and was carried on by them before the discovery of America. Negroes had been also carried to the West Indies before the proposal of Las Casas, (but through him this traffic was first regularly established, 1517,) as is proved by the fact that Charles V. conferred on his favourite La Bresa the monopoly of four thousand slaves annually, which he sold to the Genoese. The latter, however, obtained them of the Portuguese, in whose hands the traffic really lay, although the

English began to participate in it towards the end of this period. Colonial affairs. 1517-1555.

M. C. SPRENGEL *vom Ursprunge des Negerhandels.* Halle, 1779, 8vo.

Vollstandige Historisch-philosophische Darstellung aller Veränderungen des Negersclavenhandels, von dessen Ursprunge an bis zu seiner gänzlchen Aufhebung, von ALL. HUNE. 2 Theile, Göttingen, 1820, 8vo. The first part contains the history of the origin and increase, the second of the abolition of the slave trade. This is the best work on the subject, and is written with industry and method.

9. The original character of the Spanish colonies, namely, that of mining settlements, led naturally to commercial restrictions. A free admittance of foreigners under such circumstances would have been absurd. The advantages of general trade, if at all considered, held a very inferior rank; the main object was to import into Spain, and to Spain alone, the immediate treasure of America. Even to the Spaniards it might have been evident that the prosperity of the colonies was not likely to be advanced by these means,—but the prosperity of their colonies, as usually understood, was no design of theirs. Nay, more, as Spain alone, of all Europe, enjoyed their wealth, Spain determined that she alone would supply their wants.

Regulations of trade:—In Spain, the commerce was confined to the single port of Seville. Two squadrons were annually despatched, the *galeones* of about twelve, the fleet of about fifteen, large vessels. The former, destined to South America, proceeded to Porto Bello; the latter, destined for Mexico, to Vera Cruz. Great fairs were held in those cities. Spain did

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not indeed commit its colonial trade to a company; but must not the monopoly of a few rich houses have necessarily sprung from these restrictions?

Portuguese Colonies.

10. The Portuguese not only retained but encreased their dominions in the east during this period, under their kings Emanuel the Great († 1521) and John III. († 1557). The range of their commerce received even a greater extension than their dominion. It was the policy of these princes to change the viceroys at least every three years, whether to the advantage or injury of their colonies it is difficult to say. What might not have been expected if peace could have been preserved in India itself! But this was impossible; for the Moors, (Mohammedans, and chiefly of the Arabian stock,) were as much bent upon retaining the coasting trade as the Portuguese were upon acquiring it.

Establishment of the Portuguese in Ceylon from 1518, especially at Columbo and Point Gales, and monopoly of the cinnamon trade.—They were in actual possession, however, of the coasts alone. Capture of Diu, 1535; settlements made in Camboja and others, from the Moluccas to Sumatra, Java, Celebes, and Borneo. Even where they had no settlements they did not fail to frequent the markets.

11. What mainly contributed to extend the Portuguese commerce was the connection which they early formed with China, and the entrance which they obtained into Japan. The Jesuits, who had been admitted into these realms by John III., immediately after the foundation of their order, were of great assistance by means

of their Asiatic missionaries. Among these, Xavier, the apostle of the Indians, deserves mention even from the general historian. Colonial affairs. 1517-1555.

Attempts made to form a connection with China as early as 1517, through the envoy, Th. Pereira. A settlement was probably made at Liampo, (Ningpo?) without any permanent result.—Japan had been known since 1542; the mission of Xavier was followed by great consequences, the establishment of a regular and highly lucrative commerce for Portugal.

12. This period, then, witnessed the proud structure of the Portuguese power in India in full perfection. A few bold and congenial spirits had raised it; its maintenance, however, required not merely physical force, but the moral support of heroic courage and patriotism, which fortunately was not wanting. Such virtues do not pass suddenly away, and therefore no sudden downfal of the fabric which they supported was to be feared; though their insensible diminution promised a gradual and sure decay. This the following period, fraught as it was with foreign convulsions, tended fearfully to accelerate.

13. During this period, too, the possessions of the Portuguese were widely extended in Brazil. A kindly fate had as yet prevented the discovery of the precious metals in that country, and had thus directed the attention of the settlers in some degree to agricultural pursuits. The new regulations of the crown contributed partially to extend this branch of industry, but it still remained confined to particular portions of

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the coast, and those more especially in the north. The progress, however, which was made here caused a reaction on their African settlements of Congo and Guinea, by the increased demand for slaves; since the natives of Brazil, although not yet accounted positively free, were both difficult to subdue, and, when subdued, useless for the purposes of labour.

A new system introduced in the year 1525, by John III.; large strips of land along the coast, to fifty leagues into the interior, being granted to single families or individuals, as male fiefs, with almost absolute jurisdiction even over the natives, whom the proprietors accordingly obliged to till the ground. In this way, 1539—1549, the *capitanes* of St. Vicente, Esperito Santo, dos Ilheos, Maranham, Fortoseguro, and Pernambuco, arose with their several cities, and more especially Bahia, with its capital St. Salvador, as the centre of the whole, 1549. In the same year, the first governor, Thomas of Susa, was sent out, accompanied by six Jesuits as missionaries. The power of the proprietors was limited in favour of the crown; and a more regular plan of colonisation introduced. Besides the natural productions, consisting principally of dye-wood, the sugar cane, transplanted thither from Madeira, was even then in cultivation. Like Spain, Portugal retained the exclusive trade, which was carried on by a fleet sent out every March. The Indians were cruelly treated and enslaved wherever it was possible, whence arose continual wars with them.

History of Brazil, by ROB. SOUTHEY. 1810, P. I. II. A work written with profound knowledge of the subject, and great impartiality.

Histoire du Brazil, depuis sa découverte en 1500, *jusqu' en* 1810, par M. ALPHONSE DE BEAUCHAMP. 3 vols. Paris, 1815. Useful as a general historical sketch.

14. Although the Spaniards and Portuguese

had no rivals of importance among the other nations of Europe, the few attempts at discovery made by France and England having led to no results, they became engaged in a quarrel between themselves respecting the Molucca islands, whose position, according to the papal line of demarcation, was not accurately determined. This led to the first voyage round the world, from which, it is true, the contested point received no solution, but which was of great consequence to geography and navigation.

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Voyage of Ferd. Magellan, (a Portuguese, who, on account of some grievance, entered the Spanish service,) 1519—1522. Discovery of the straits into the Pacific ocean, called after him, and consequently of a new passage to the East Indies. Discovery of the Philippine islands, where Magellan himself lost his life, 1521. But his principal ship (the Victoria) returned to Seville.—The contest respecting the Molucca islands was terminated by a treaty, 1529, Charles V. selling his claims to Portugal, for three hundred and fifty thousand ducats.

PIGAFETTA (who accompanied Magellan) *Primo viaggio intorno al globo terracqueo.* The first perfect edition was published by C. AMORETTI. Milano, 1800.

THIRD PERIOD. *From* 1556 *to* 1618.

The best general works are:

J. A. THUANI *Historiarum sui Temporis L. CXXXVIII.* ab A. D. 1543, usque ad A. 1607. The best edition is Londini, 1704, 7 vols. fol. The author expressly announces this, his master-work as a general history.

FR. CH. KHEVENHÜLLER *Annales Ferdinandei, von* 1578 *bis* 1637. Leipzig, 1716—1726, 12 vols. fol. This work is

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without method, but is alike important from the richness of the materials, and the office of the author, who was imperial ambassador at Madrid. An abridgement was published by Runde; Leipzig, 1778, 4 Theile, 8vo. It reaches down to 1594.

1. The age of Elizabeth and Philip, of William of Orange and Henry IV., awakens by these very names a tide of recollections amply sufficient to determine its peculiar character. The Reformation was the mainspring of its whole political machinery; nor, indeed, could it be otherwise, at a time when the first flush of victory on the side of the protestants was met by the inquisition openly arrayed against them by Philip; and by the secret, but not less determined, influence exerted to their prejudice by the Jesuits in every cabinet in Europe.

The great influence of the Jesuits on the cabinets, especially in their character of confessors, pervaded during this period most of the countries of Europe. They ruled in Portugal under Sebastian; found powerful protectors in Spain in Philip II.; in France, after a long and violent resistance, in Catharine of Medici and the Guises; in Germany, in Albert V. of Bavaria, etc. Nor were they, as we shall see, less active in the north.

2. Besides this, the old and dreamy hopes entertained of a reconciliation by means of the council of Trent, melted away at its dissolution, which soon took place. Nor were its decrees felt only in the bitterness which it added to the religious schism, by it rendered irremediable; they were of such a nature, that many of the catholic

states rejected them, like France, altogether, or received them only under certain restrictions, as being subversive, not only of secular, but even of episcopal authority.

The council of Trent was finally dissolved, Dec. 4, 1563, it had been convened again (after its violent separation) in Jan. 1562. Its decrees: 1. pronounced anathemas against all those who refused to subscribe to the distinguishing doctrines of the Romish church; 2. they conceded much to the power of the church, to the disadvantage of the civil power; 3. they declared, that the episcopal dignity did not emanate from God, but that it was entirely subordinate to the papal.—Thus the Roman see thought that it had averted every danger by which it was threatened, and yet the deadliest blow it ever sustained was from the history of that very council, written by a monk, long after its dissolution.

Historja del Concilio Tridentino di PIETRO SOAVE, Polano. (Paolo Sarpi) 1619, 4to. This work has passed through many editions, among which we may mention the French translation by FRANCOIS DE COURAYER. Londr. 1736, 2 vols. fol. [Reprinted in 4to.: and valuable for the notes of the translator.]

3. Unfortunately the course which the Reformation had of necessity followed, gave rise to an opinion in politics of the highest practical importance. Its opponents saw enemies of the state in its supporters: rebel and heretic became synonymous terms. Its supporters again saw champions of tyranny in its opponents, and thus the idea became prevalent that "the old religion was a buttress and defence of absolute despotism; the new doctrine, the banner of liberty." This was an idle error, as far as the doc-

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trines themselves were concerned, and has been abundantly refuted since; but so long as religious partisans were obliged to support themselves by political faction it had probably some foundation. But then, why were men so obliged, and who obliged them?

4. These ideas owed their origin and confirmation mainly to the fact, that during this period it was no longer, as in the previous one, between Spain and France, (the latter being disabled by internal disorders,) but between Spain and England that the rivalry of Europe lay. These two powers were not merely of a different religion, but the political existence of either was interwoven with that of the faith which it supported; Spain with the catholic, England with the protestant cause. Moreover both were under rulers who felt an equal and inordinate desire of meddling in the affairs of other nations. The foreign policy of Elizabeth excelled that of Philip in little save caution.

5. Another important distinction between this and the previous period is to be found in the separation of the Spanish from the imperial crown. The house of Hapsburg was of course much weakened thereby, but it acquired a new species of strength from the personal character of the princes of the Austrian line: by them it was led to adopt a different course of politics from that pursued by Philip II.; and as their object was the maintenance of peace in Germany, in se-

curing that they were the means of preventing a general war. Preliminary remarks. 1556-1618.

The internal relations of the house of Austria to the Spanish line; very much weakened since the death of Ferdinand, 1564, by a division into the Austrian and Stirian branches.

6. The recent insurrection of the Netherlands became the actual centre of political interests; for beside Spain, England and France were gradually engaged in it. But besides that insurrection, the great ferment produced by the Reformation during this period in most of the other countries of Europe, and its consequences, which exercised for the most part a decisive influence on the future aspect of the leading European states, require to be cursorily noticed.

I. *History of the rise of the republic of the United Netherlands, and its immediate influence on the affairs of Europe; from its beginning till the twelve years' truce*, 1609.

The historians of the revolution of the Netherlands are divided into two classes; the catholic, or those who are inclined to the Spanish side, and the protestant. At the head of the former, stand:

Historia della guerra di Fiandra, descritta del CARDINAL BENTIVOGLIO; in tre parti. 4to. 1670, in Venezia. This still holds its rank as the best work on this subject. It reaches down to the twelve years' truce.

FABIANI STRADÆ *de bello Belgico decades duae ab excessu Carol. V. usque ad initium præfecturæ Alexandri Farnes.*

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

principis, Francofurti. 1651, 4to, Little more than a detail of the wars.

Among writers on the other side, besides the general history of the republic of the United Provinces by WAGENAAR, and the abridgement of it by TOTZE, (*Hallische Allg. Welth.* B. 34, 35.) we may mention:

EM. METEREN, *Niederländische Historien vom Anfang des Kriegs bis* 1611. Arnheim, 1611, fol.

VAN DER VYNKT, *Geschichte der vereinigten Niederlande von ihrem Ursprunge im Jahr* 1560 *an bis zum Westphalischen Frieden;* Zürich, 1793, 3 vols. 8vo. But six copies of the French original, *Troubles des Pays-bas*, are said to have been printed. The author was member of the council of state of Flanders, and had access to the archives: and consequently more that was new might have been expected; although we can readily pardon his not being a great historian.

Geschichte des Abfalls der vereinigten Niederlande von der Spanischen Regierung, von FR. SCHILLER. Leipzig, 1788, 8vo. It reaches only to the arrival of Alva. (Continued till 1609, by C. CURTH, 3 vols. 1809.) Great minds are themselves first conscious, in what department they are at home.

1. A republic was the result of the revolution in the Netherlands; but we should be much mistaken in our view of the subject were we to imagine its establishment to have been the object originally proposed. The insurgents had no other motive than to resist the encroachments of arbitrary, and according to all their previous ideas, unconstitutional innovations. And they at last became republicans merely because they could find no one fit to direct a more monarchical government.

2. Since we must be careful, then, how we bring the ideas of our own day to the examina-

tion of that event, we shall be the better prepared to acknowledge that it could tend to the propagation of no new ideas, and most certainly of no republican enthusiasm in the rest of Europe. Its political results were on this account of very gradual development; but hence also of more universal and lasting influence. 1556-1 8. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

3. The greater part of the Netherlands had come into the possession of the house of Hapsburg by the marriage of Maximilian of Austria to Mary, the daughter and sole heiress of duke Charles the Bold; but they received such an extension under Charles V. as to embrace the whole of the Belgian and Batavian provinces, seventeen in number. These countries, although they formed but one state under a common superior, had each of them a separate constitution and assembly of states, nay, several their own stadtholder.—General assemblies of the states of all the provinces were not unusual; and during the absence of the prince, who, after the union of the crowns, resided chiefly in Spain, his power was delegated to a chief stadtholder, or regent, who was assisted by three colleges, which were severally called, the council of state, the privy council, (or council of justice,) and the council of finance. The supreme council at Mechlin formed a general court of appeals. 1477.

The seventeen provinces consisted of four duchies: Brabant, Limburg, Luxemburg, and Gelderland; seven counties: Flanders, Artois, Hainault, Holland, Zealand, Namur, and Zut-

14,474

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phen; one margraviate: Antwerp; five lordships: Mechlin, Friesland, Utrecht, Groningen and Overyssel.—Cambray and Franche Comté were considered as separate.

4. The power of the princes was much circumscribed by the privileges of these assemblies of the states, but still more so by the spirit of the people. These were aware that their happiness depended on their constitution, and this conviction formed their strength. The proud feelings of prosperity and wealth, the fruit of the ancient commerce of Belgium, which had arisen under the protection of the constitution, gave additional force to their attachment; and thus, though there could not be a people more easy to govern than the Netherlanders while their rights were left untouched, yet, on the other hand, there was no opposition likely to be more determined than that with which they were prepared to resist any invasion of their sanctuary—the constitution.

5. At the accession of Philip II. the Reformation had already been at work in the provinces. It had everywhere spread rapidly, as might be expected in a country where there were so many men who needed religious independence alone to complete that of wealth and birth; but in the Batavian provinces its progress was the most decided, and to us the most worthy of remark, because in them its consequences first assumed their true character. The breaking out of the war anew with France, which pro-

longed Philip's residence in the Low Countries, was probably the only thing that preserved tranquillity: the peace of Chateau Cambresis, which terminated it, was the harbinger of the storm. 1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

The truce of Vaucelles broken (see p. 73) at the instigation of pope Paul IV., and the war renewed; it acquired a still greater extent from the implication of England by Philip II., and was prosecuted, generally unsuccessfully for France, both in Italy and on the frontiers of the Netherlands. The French defeated at St. Quentin, Aug. 10, 1557, and that fortress they lost. On the other hand Calais was captured by the duke of Guise, Jan. 8, 1558. Another defeat at Grevelingen, July 13, 1558. The peace of Chateau Cambresis concluded April 3, 1559. A mutual restitution was made; and although France retained Calais, it lost considerably by the restoration of Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, Philip's victorious general. A double treaty of marriage contracted, uniting the houses of France, Spain, and Savoy; and secret projects concerted for exterminating the heresy by the influence of the Guises in France and Granvellas in Spain.

6. Even before Philip left the Netherlands for Spain, there were continual complaints, partly respecting the Spanish garrisons, partly on account of the penal edicts against heresy. But neither the personal conduct of the king, nor his scheme of government (by which Margaret of Parma his half sister, was, with the assistance of Granvella, to assume the regency) gave any hope of redress; while the additional severity of the edicts after his return to Spain, and the changes effected in the hierarchy, gave just grounds for apprehending, not only the subversion of the constitution, but even that last badge

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of tyranny, the establishment of the Spanish inquisition in the Netherlands.

The states-general convened before his departure (autumn, 1559.)—Whether the dreaded inquisition was to be. *that* introduced by Charles V. for enforcing his edicts, or *the* Spanish inquisition in all its forms, was of little consequence. It excited equal terror in the professors of the old and the new faith, and the fermentation therefore spread through all the provinces.

7. In paying our due tribute of abhorrence to the tyranny of Philip II. we are bound as impartial historians, to consider the opinions upon which he founded it. According to his belief unity of religious faith was the only warrant of civil quiet, and as such it became his immediate object. Educated in these opinions, he thought the history of his own time offered ample confirmation of them. While his active but narrow mind could not comprehend that the remedy was much worse than the imagined evil, and must moreover finally prove ineffectual.

Government of Margaret of Parma (as stadtholdress) from 1559—Sept. 1567. The recall of the detested Granvella, 1562, could produce no essential change, since the measures adopted were not merely his, but rather Philip's.

8. The troubles broke out as soon after the signing of the compromise as a rallying point could be established; but the insurrection was so ill concerted that the plan of suppressing it by an armed force, upon which the Spanish cabinet had secretly resolved, promised an easy success. The affair might have been still more

readily settled, had Philip known how to unite concession with authority. All here now depended upon his choice of a leader; and by the appointment of the duke of Alva he put an end to all hope. 1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

The compromise signed at Brussels, Nov. 1565, and formally delivered to Margaret, April 5, 1566. Those who signed it were tauntingly called beggars, *gueux*. Philip's plan was, to send the Spanish troops in Italy to the Netherlands, under Alva, who arrived there at their head in August, 1567, with such authority that the duchess of Parma, the former regent, took her departure.

9. Alva's reign of terror ensued. The principal persons who still remained were arrested, especially the counts Egmont and Horne, and a tribunal with power of life and death, entitled *A Council for the suppression of Disturbances*, was established as a mean of quelling rebellion and rooting out the heresy. Tyranny in this as in other cases felt the recoil of a blow which it had aimed at others; for although quiet was restored, it was at the expense of so much violence as to threaten the emigration of many thousands of all classes; an evil as much beyond the power of the despots as the confiscation of their property was within it. Alva's reign of terror. 1567-1573.

General act of outlawry promulgated against the Netherlanders, as rebels against the royal authority.—Numerous executions, especially of Egmont and Horne, Jan. 5, 1568.—And yet the exaction of the tenth penny, 1569, operated far more powerfully than the erection of the council of blood!

10. The last hope of freedom, then, rested on

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

a band of emigrants, who could have done little for their country, had they not reckoned among their number a man formed expressly for the occasion. As a general, William of Orange has been surpassed by many; as the head and leader of an insurrection, he has never been equalled. Who, but he, could have kept together elements so adverse? Who ever achieved so much with such small means? And who ever understood, as he did, the union of honest efforts for his country with sure advancement for himself. Success could not be reasonably hoped for the first attempts at liberty; the insurgents were too inferior in the field to risk a decisive action, and too ill supplied with money to keep an army long afoot. The only course for the Water-Gueux, was to observe the Spaniards closely, and discover their weakest point. At length the taking of Briel gave the insurrection a determinate character, and by making the northern provinces its principal theatre, gave an assurance of its issue. The states of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht, named William of Orange royal stadtholder.

Unsuccessful attack of Louis count of Nassau upon Friesland, and of his brother, the prince of Wilhelm, on Brabant, 1568. Rise and increase of the Water-Gueux from 1570, the prince granting letters of marque and reprisals. Capture of Briel, April 1, 1572, when the insurrection breaks out in most of the cities of Holland and Zealand. Alva was able with what few troops he had, to suppress it in single cases, but not generally.

11. Weak as were the resources of the insurgents, they had no reason to despair of foreign aid. Their cause became more and more the cause of the protestant religion, and therefore more and more connected with general politics. The protestant princes of Germany, the Huguenots in France, at that very time battling for their rights, and above all Elizabeth of England, the rival of Philip, seemed to regard the cause of the insurgents as their own. The first, however, could afford but little assistance, the others none at all, and thus Elizabeth became the only effective ally. It required all the activity and prudence of the prince to improve these relations, whilst at the same time he had to contend with the yet greater internal obstacles thrown in his way by religious and family jealousies. 1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

The assistance of the German princes and the German empire was first solicited by the prince; but although he was not wholly unsuccessful in single cases, yet the family connection of Austria and Spain prevented an universal espousal of his interest. Of much greater importance was the influence of the disturbances of the Huguenots; both by the hopes which they encouraged, and the personal connections of the prince in France. But after the horrible massacre of St. Bartholomew, (Aug. 24, 1572,) what assistance could they afford to strangers? The participation of Elizabeth, alone, (that of Denmark and Sweden was solicited in vain,) led to any great results. But it was soon felt, perhaps more strongly than was justifiable, that a friend may be even more dangerous than an enemy. Not till an open quarrel arose between her and Spain, (1587,) was an honest friendship possible. And would it

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609

under any circumstances have been possible, could Elizabeth have then foreseen that the navy and commerce of the rising republic, would in twenty years outstrip those of England?

12. After Alva's departure the cause was threatened by new and even greater perils from Zuniga y Reguesens, his successor. This ruler possessed greater moderation which was seconded by a defeat of the rebels on Mooker moor, and by repeated attacks on Holland and Zealand; he was thus a very formidable antagonist, and the prince himself had began to despair, when mutinies among the ill-paid troops of Spain, and the opportune death of Reguesens came to his aid. The project of establishing a fixed point as head quarters of the insurgents, was effected by a closer union of Zealand and Holland; while the atrocious sack of Antwerp was mainly instrumental in drawing five of the Batavian and six of the Belgic provinces into the league of Ghent; their professed object being common protection, without, however, any declared resistance to Philip.

Departure of Alva, Dec. 1573. His successor, Reguesens, stadtholder till March 5, 1576. Louis, count of Nassau, and Henry his brother, defeated and slain at Mooker-moor, near Nimuegen, April 14, 1574. During the interregnum of the council of state, after the death of Reguesens, Antwerp was pillaged by the Spanish soldiers, Nov. 4. Pacification of Ghent, Nov. 8, 1576.

13. The new stadtholder, Don Juan, by becoming a party to the league of Ghent, appeared

determined on obtaining peace at any price, and it required all the vigilance of prince William to render his artifices ineffectual. In this he fortunately succeeded by raising the hopes and courage of Holland and Zealand. Meantime the league of Ghent fell to pieces of itself, and thus confirmed the belief that it was only by a closer union among the northern provinces, and by a rupture with the Spaniards, that freedom could be attained. To effect this the prince organised the confederacy of Utrecht, and thus laid the actual foundation of the future republic; as far, however, as the confederacy itself was concerned, it formed the basis neither of a pure republic, (i. e. without any princely authority in its constitution,) nor yet of one strictly Batavian. The main object, it is true, was to unite the northern provinces, but that accomplished, any of the southern states were at liberty to join it.

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

The union of Utrecht concluded, Jan. 23, 1579, between Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Groningen. Friesland and Overyssel acceded, June 11, as also Ghent, Antwerp, Breda, and other Belgic cities.

14. But notwithstanding these precautions the nomination of Alexander of Parma as regent, on the death of Don Juan, appeared to throw every former crisis into shade. Philip could have selected no one more fitted to cope with the prince; and his choice was approved by the re-

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

conquest of the Belgian provinces, which was accomplished by this officer. The entire separation, however, of these provinces from those of the north was perhaps the most fortunate thing that could happen. The need of foreign assistance, which in those days implied foreign supremacy, was never more needed than now; and as it was at length effectually given, the political sphere over which the insurrection exerted its influence, became much enlarged; still, however, it required a new blow to give rise to new wants, before a republic could be formed from its materials.

Regency of Alexander of Parma from Oct. 1, 1578, to Dec. 2, 1592. The Walloons returned to their allegiance by the treaty of May 21, 1579. The others were gradually subjected by the conquest of their cities, till the capture of Antwerp, Aug. 17, 1585. On the other hand, the constituted sovereignty of the United Provinces was conferred on Francis duke of Anjou, 1581—1583, and now, for the first time, all fealty to Spain was laid aside, July 26, 1581. But no one, who was not greater than the prince of Orange himself, could, by the side of that prince, sustain the station of sovereign. The duke of Anjou retired, June, 1583.

15. Assassination of the prince, just as he appears on the point of attaining to his long planned object of being elected by the states to the rank of count (or constitutional sovereign) of Holland and Zealand. Nothing but the weight of his personal character could have effected this: and although his son Maurice succeeded to the trust of his father, yet in his very nomi-

nation, the states of Holland and Zealand exercised an act of sovereignty. Still, however, the difficulty of their situation was such as to make them eager to put themselves under Elizabeth. And notwithstanding her refusal of the supreme power, great things might have been effected had the conduct of her affairs been in more able hands than those of Leicester. Meantime, however, the accession of Olden Barneveld to the post of grand pensionary, and his undaunted championship of the constitutional rights of the states, decided the future form of the republic.

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

After the murder of William I. July 10, 1584, Maurice is appointed stadtholder of Holland and Zealand, and afterwards recognised by four of the other provinces; a council of state, however, was placed around him. A treaty is concluded with Elizabeth, who sends a body of auxiliary troops, upon receiving as pledges, three harbours; but she secures to the earl such influence, that she cherished hopes of being able to rule by him. The earl becomes involved in continual quarrels with the states, down to his resignation, Dec. 1587.

16. But by far the most important consequence of these relations with England, not for the infant republic only, but for all Europe, was the open war with Spain in which Elizabeth thus designedly engaged. From that time forward the interests of both states became inseparably allied: while the defeat of the invincible armada not only gave the best charter of independence which the republic could desire, but opened to either country that noble field of un-

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

restricted navigation in which they severally attained their chief greatness and renown.

The causes of the rancour between Philip II. and Elizabeth, were founded in their religious and political relations, both in Europe and foreign countries, (see below, history of colonies). The injuries done to Spanish commerce by privateering, and the support, at first secretly but afterwards openly, extended to the Netherlands, created the project of conquering England, in pursuance of the pope's donation, and as a sure mean of quelling the insurrection of the Netherlands, 1587. Expedition of the invincible armada, and its fate between July and Oct. 1588. The Spanish war was continued by Elizabeth till her death, April 3, 1603.

17. Many other circumstances concurred with their naval superiority to render the States independent; but each step towards it led them deeper into general politics. The support afforded by Philip to the party of the league against Henry IV., induced him to send the duke of Parma with a large portion of his troops into France. The death of this general and the accession of Henry IV. were two new supports of her independence, since Henry found it advisable to enter into an alliance with her, when he declared war in form against Spain. Thus recognised by France and England, victorious under Maurice in his battles and sieges, and mistress of the sea, what hopes could Philip yet harbour of subjecting the republic. He appeared himself convinced of this, since a short time before his death, he settled his portion of the Netherlands as a dowry on his daughter Isabella

Eugenia. The contest was, however, prolonged under his successor Philip III. till the year 1609, when, after the peace of Spain with France at Vervins, and that with James I. after the death of Elizabeth, the Netherlands were compelled to prosecute it alone; and even then (for Spain was unwilling to make too large concessions) it was suspended not by a peace but by a truce of twelve years, by which the independence of the republic was tacitly acknowledged.

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

Campaigns of the duke of Parma in France, 1590—1592. He died Dec. 2, 1592.—Henry IV. entered into an alliance with England and the Netherlands, Oct. 31, 1596, after the declaration of war against Spain, Jan. 16, 1595.—Amiens lost and reconquered, 1597.—Separate peace was concluded at Vervins, May 2, 1598. The Spanish Netherlands conferred by Philip II. on his daughter Clara Isabella Eugenia, as a dowry, on occasion of her marriage with archduke Albert of Austria, 1598.—Death of Philip II. Nov. 13, 1598.—The war feebly carried on by land under his successor Philip III., but on the ocean prosecuted with much spirit, and a successful expedition accomplished under James Heemskerk against the coast of Spain, 1607. Negotiations commenced the same year, and continued by the mediation of Henry IV. through the president Jeannin, (to sustain the influence of France); they are rendered however very difficult, by the controversies respecting the religious freedom of the catholics, and the East Indian navigation. The truce of twelve years, between the archduke and Spain, signed April 9, 1609.

18. Thus in the midst of the monarchical system of Europe, a republic became formed, which even during her rise had become so deeply in-

1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

volved in the relations of this system, that she could not avoid taking an active participation in all that concerned it. She had obtained an object to which she had not aspired; her internal constitution, therefore, had not been wholly changed, but occasionally altered according to the exigencies of the moment: Is it strange then that it should have been imperfectly formed? The preponderance of the province of Holland, however, caused the want of a federation to be less felt; the origin of the states-general, 1592, created a point of union for foreign affairs; and for her internal stability she was indebted to the happy circumstance, that the dignities of stadtholder, and of grand pensionary of Holland, constituted two situations in which great men could act with effect. The Arminian controversies which soon ensued, causing a rupture between the house of Orange and the States, and bringing Olden Barneveld to the scaffold, demonstrated that the republic already contained within her bosom the seeds of dissolution.

19. Little as the origin of such a republic changed the general character of the monarchial system of Europe, it nevertheless exercised a very strong influence upon it. Such a commercial state, and such a naval force, Europe had never before beheld. It was a new kind of weight that this state threw into the political scale; and ships, colonies, and commerce, acquired a wholly different value in practical poli-

tics, from what they had ever before possessed. The seeds of good and evil had brought forth plentifully; but as yet men were scarcely able to distinguish which was the good, and which the evil in so luxuriant a growth. Even in later times, how little have they learnt to make the distinction! 1556-1618. Rise of the Dutch republic; till 1609.

II. *A view of the changes which took place during this period in the other leading states of the West of Europe, and of their results.*

1. Although the revolution of the Netherlands excited the interest of the neighbouring states, it did not exclusively occupy their attention. They had their own particular changes, which affected their domestic and foreign relations, and therefore their political character. These, then, require to be considered, before we pursue further the history of the political system of Europe. Changes in other states.

2. They originated, directly or indirectly, in the Reformation. The causes of excitement, which it spread, operated differently in the several states. France, Spain, England, and Germany, will here especially claim attention.

I. FRANCE.

3. The present period was to France, for thirty years, the period of religious and civil France. 1556-1618.

France. 1556-1618. Religious wars. 1562-1594.

wars, which threatened to overthrow the throne itself. A great prince not only rescued it from the horrors of anarchy, but in fifteen years raised it to an elevation of power, which enabled him to meditate a politcal transformation of Europe: but his fall again made it the sport of faction, till Richelieu, after a lapse of fourteen years, grasped the helm of state with his vigorous hand. Still, notwithstanding all the confusion and vicissitudes of the period, its history turns on a few leading personages, and gives a further proof, that in times of important revolutions, it is the character of great men, rather than the intellect of shrewd ones, which directs the course of events.

DAVILA, *Istoria delle guerre civili in Francia.* Venezia, 1630, 4to, Numerous other editions have been published. The best French translation is by M. L'ABBÉ M. (MALLET). Amsterdam, 1757, 2 vols. 4to. The author, who was in the service of France and Venice, was contemporary with, and in several instances a witness of, the events he describes.

[The best English translation is that of ELLIS FARNEWORTH, Lond. 1757, 2 vols. 4to.]

(L. P. ANQUETIL) *Esprit de la ligue, ou histoire politique des troubles de France, pendant le* 16 *et* 17 *siècle.* Paris, 1771, 3 vols. 8vo. From 1559 to 1599. Very useful for self-instruction.

The contemporary memoirs that belong here, are:

Mémoires de MICHAEL DE CASTELNAU, *servans à donner la vérité de l'histoire des regnes de François II., Charles IX., et Henri III.*, (from 1559 to 1570,) *augmentés*, par J. G. LABOUREUR. Bruxelles, 1731, fol. In the *Collect. Gén.* T. xli—xlvi. The observations of Laboureur have added thus much to its bulk.

Mémoires de GASPAR DE SAULX S. DE TAVANNES, *depuis*

1530 *jusqu' à sa mort* 1573, *dressés par son fils*, à Paris, 1574, fol. In the *Collect. Gén.* T. xxvi, xxvii. Important for the latter years. France. 1556-1618. Religious wars. 1562-1594.

Mémoires de PIERRE DE BOURDEILLE S. DE BRANTOME, à Leyde, 1666, 6 vols. 12mo. A lively delineation of the luxury and dissoluteness of the age, particularly among the higher classes; drawn from his own experience.

4. The general appearance of the French civil war, is that of a war of religion, but at the same time it was promoted by the respective attempts of the two chiefs to take advantage of the king's weakness, and acquire the government. The domestic relations of the court, therefore, are as important as the relations of the religious parties; for the elements of the war lay even more in the jealousy of the Bourbons, as princes of the blood, towards the powerful families of the nobility, especially the Guises, than in any religious intolerance.

5. But when the flame had once burst forth, and the Bourbons had become the chiefs of the Huguenot faction, no speedy suppression of it could be expected, because it was not only fed by fanaticism, but by the personal passions of the leaders. The three first religious wars were properly but one, each interrupted by a truce, called a peace; they were without any definite result, because the opposite party was always forced to concede to the Huguenots what the edict of the noble chancellor L'Hôpital would have conceded to them before the war. But Jan. 18, 1562.

France. 1556-1618. Religious wars. 1562-1694. Aug. 24, 1572.

fanaticism, which must always rage for its full time, retained the ascendancy; and aided by the discontents of the time, produced the dreadful massacre of St. Bartholomew's eve, which deferred all approximation of religious parties, even out of France, for almost a century.

The first war, March 1562, terminated by the edict of Amboise, March 19, 1563.—The second war, Sept. 1567, and was terminated by the peace at Longjumeau, March 23, 1568.—The third war, Sept. 1568, ended by the peace of St. Germain en Laye, Aug. 8, 1570. The massacre of St. Bartholomew caused the fourth war, which was terminated by the peace of Rochelle, June 24, 1573.

6. These first wars had already occasioned the interference of foreign powers, since both Elizabeth and some of the German princes had given assistance to the Huguenots. But the convulsion did not become actually important to general politics, till the weakness of the miserable Henry III. at the close of the fifth war of religion, gave rise to the league—an association of jacobins, disguised under the fashion of the age. For a chief, like Henry of Guise, the throne itself was the only object: and why did he not take possession of it, when by the flight of the king it stood actually vacant within his grasp? He soon fell the victim of an assassin; and the question respecting the future succession now engrossed the attention, not only of France, but also of foreign countries, since Henry of Bourbon was a Huguenot, and by the murder of the last Valois, the rightful heir to

League, May, 1576. May, 1588. Dec. 23.

the throne. This prince had to make good his rights by the sword; and though he received some assistance from Elizabeth, it was the interference of foreign powers which rendered the conflict arduous and long. Not even his abjuration could induce either Philip II. or the pope to give up their plans. But the Bourbons retained the throne, for a great man stood at their head.

Though the league existed as early as 1576, and had led to repeated commotions, 1577 and 1579, (sixth and seventh wars,) its full operation began from the time when the extinction of the Valois with Henry III. was certain, after the death of Francis duke of Alençon, (Anjou,) June 10, 1584. Hence its renewal, its central point in Paris under the sixteen, and the edict of Nemours forcibly obtained against the Huguenots, July 7, 1585, of which the eighth war, 1585—1595, that terminated with the capture of Paris, March 22, 1594, was the consequence. The negotiations with the pope could only have been successfully terminated by the great diplomatist the Cardinal d'Ossat.

7. Though France was thus saved from anarchy, the source of these disturbances was not yet closed. Neither of the two parties was wholly annihilated, while the Huguenots still held their political existence by a very doubtful tenure. But fanaticism was in some measure cooled; and, thanks to the compacts concluded since the time of L'Hôpital, the idea of toleration was not altogether lost, even in the midst of these troubles. A prince, who like Henry IV. possessed the confidence of his people, was in a situation to effect much; and thus the edict of

France. 1556-1618. April 13, 1598.

Nantes, and consequent security of the Huguenots, were the more easily brought about. Still, however, the partisans on either side remained armed, and the peaceable preservation of their rights depended more on the personal character of the monarch and the circumstances of the times, than on the edict. Beneficial as was the influence of the Huguenots in almost every branch of civilisation, the internal constitution could hardly acquire a stable character, so long as the government had to fear an opposition, which could so easily be abused by the ambition of its leaders.

8. Greater stability, however, was given to the forms of foreign policy; and the uninterrupted influence of France on the political system of Europe, was perceptible immediately on its regeneration. The hatred to Spain, whose excessive power was the dread of Europe, took deeper root than ever, on account of Philip's intrigues during these troubles. Scarcely was quiet restored in France, when open war was somewhat prematurely declared against Philip II. and to support it England was, with difficulty, and Holland more easily, induced to an alliance. To rise above religious differences was ever the constant merit of French policy.

War with Spain, 1595, terminated by a separate peace at Vervins, May 2, 1598. A mutual restitution made of conquests (see above page 112). An end thereby put to Philip's ambitious views on France.

France. 1556-1618.

Sully. European republic.

9. With the consciousness of power, increased as it was under Sully's administration, new projects were formed, which concerned not France merely, but were intended to change the whole system of Europe. The idea of what was termed an European-republic, or a union of states, the members of which should be equal in power though dissimilar in form, and submit their controversies to the decision of a senate, seems to have been an idea long and deeply meditated; nay, it had even been actually proposed to Elizabeth. A prince, who had grown up in the midst of a revolution, which he had himself terminated victoriously, would be highly susceptible of revolutionary projects, and with him all his contemporaries. But did the project spring immediately and solely from his hatred of Spain and Austria, or did it result from the reflections of a master mind, which, foreboding the certain approach of a general crisis, such as the thirty years' war soon produced, was anxious to become in time the director of its course, and able to turn it to the advantage of Europe? However this may be, the humiliation of the house of Hapsburg was certainly the first object attempted; and the republic, so called, was kept in the background, as a favourite idea. The whole project was ripe for execution, when it was frustrated by the dagger of the assassin Ravaillac.

May 14. 1610.

Estimate of the project and its practicability, according to

France. 1556-1618.

Sully's accounts. Preparations made in England, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. The general hatred against Spain was the impelling motive, and the vacant succession of Cleves and Juliers was to supply a pretext. The five elective kingdoms, and the concession of the two Indies to Spain, may furnish later politicians with matter for sarcasm; but the moderation of Henry offers in return a weighty lesson.

10. However unfortunate for France might be the murder of Henry, it is difficult to say how far it was so for Europe. It saved her from an immediate great war, the issue of which must have been the more uncertain, in proportion to the remoteness of its aim. But France lost with him, and with the removal of Sully by the fury of the court factions, which were rekindled by the civil wars under Mary of Medici, almost all
1621. foreign influence. What was it to other countries, whether a marshal d'Ancre or a Luynes guided the helm of state? Happy was it, that other countries knew not how to take advantage of their imbecility. When, however, it was delivered into the firm and steady hand of Richelieu, a new and vigorous influence was again obtained in the affairs of the political system of Europe.

Histoire de la mère et du fils, c'est à dire de Marie de Medicis femme du grand Henry; et mère de Louis XIII. par L. F. MEZERAY, (or rather by RICHELIEU,) 2 vols. 12mo. à Amsterdam, 1730. It comes down to 1620.

Vie de Marie de Medicis, Reine de France et de Navarre, 3 vols. 8vo. à Paris, 1774.

II. SPAIN.

Spain. 1556-1618.

11. Spain, yet more than France, acquired during this period a fixed character from its king, Philip II. Catholicism and its maintenance was made, more than ever, the basis of politics, and so in fact it still remains. The consequence with respect to foreign relations, was wars with half of Europe, France, the Netherlands, England; all to no purpose! Nay, even for the nation itself it was an unhappy chance, that prevented the entrance of the great revolution of ideas then abroad. The loss of all share in those advantages, which it so liberally produced elsewhere, threw Spain into the background, while it advanced the nations around her.

12. The treasures of America, then, were not the chief cause of the decay of Spain. The intellect of her people was fettered; she aimed at a fruitless dominion of the sea; she mingled without success in all the disputes of her neighbours; and even her one success, the conquest of Portugal, turned to her disadvantage.

Portugal and its colonies were usurped after the extinction of the male line there, 1580. If the powers of a state increased in proportion to the square miles it contain, and the number of its inhabitants, the splendid period of Spain must now have begun.

Spain. 1556-1618.

LUIS CABRERA DE CORDOUA, *Istoria del Rey Felipe II.*; en Madrid, 1719, folio.

The history of Philip II. king of Spain, by ROB. WATSON. 2 vols. 4to. London, 1777. Unhappily little else than an account of external wars.

13. It was Philip II., therefore, that made 1610. Spain what it has since remained. The expulsion of the Moors, gave it a new blow; and the mode of government by ministers, which under 1598-1621. Philip III. became a maxim of state, tended to accelerate its downfal, as the ruling favourites were never very successfully chosen.

History of the reign of Philip III. by WATSON. 4to. London, 1783.

III. ENGLAND.

England. 1556-1618.

14. England, no less than Spain, acquired its character as a state during this period; and to have given it this character, is the great merit of Elizabeth. Here, too, religion was the basis, but then *this* was the protestant religion; it preserved, however, the hierarchical forms as a support of the throne, while the king was declared the supreme head of the church. Religion thus became a fundamental part of the constitution; and the conviction, that both must stand or fall together, became more and more deeply impressed on the national mind.

15. These circumstances naturally established the relations of England with the continent.

Elizabeth became the opponent of Philip II. and it was this conflict with Spain that called out all the energies of the nation, and laid the foundation of its greatness by directing these energies to the attainment of maritime superiority. Thus the protestant religion was the foundation of British power. The interests of the government and nation were the same; and Elizabeth's successor, though apparently more powerful in the possession of Scotland, by attempting to separate these, prepared the ruin of the former. England. 1556-1618.

Besides the chapters in the general works of Hume and Rapin, we mention:

CAMDENI *Annales rerum Anglicarum et Hibernicarum, regnante Elizabetha;* Lond. 1675, folio.

DE KERALIO, *Histoire d'Elizabeth, reine d'Angleterre.* Paris, 1786, 5 vols. 8vo.

IV. GERMANY.

16. Germany, during the present period, gave rise to few occurrences of general interest to the rest of Europe; but as religion had become the mainspring of all politics, the country which had been its cradle, could never become wholly unimportant. While the two parties after the peace were watching each other with a distrust, which petty occurrences helped to increase, it was felt in foreign countries, that a war, breaking out here, must almost necessarily become universal. The personal character of the em- Germany. 1556-1618.

Germany. 1556-1618.
† 1564.
† 1576.
† 1612.

perors, both Ferdinand I. and his milder son Maximilian II. contributed much towards preserving the peace; and Rudolph II. was willing to leave the world undisturbed, if the world would but leave him in quiet.

17. This was nevertheless the period during which the great storm gathered. While continual collisions could not fail to give rise to small causes of controversy, the Jesuits, who had established themselves in Austria from the time of Rudolph II. contributed essentially towards inflaming the hatred. The consequences were, associations on both sides; the evangelical union under the electorate of the Palatinate, and the catholic league under Bavaria; both in themselves weak, although both capable of becoming dangerous: the latter, indeed, was already in some degree become so from the character of its leader, duke Maximilian. In this unsettled state of affairs, the competition for a small German country, like Juliers, Cleves, and Berg, was sufficient to expose, not Germany merely, but Europe, to the dangers of a general war, which was only suppressed by the murder of Henry IV. and the internal dissensions in the house of Austria, during which the indolent Rudolph II. was gradually driven from the possession of his whole dominion by his brother Mathias. The further development, however, of the relations of this house, since the succession had already been secured by Mathias, to the bigoted Ferdi-

May 4th. 1608.
Aug. 30th. 1609.
1611.

land of Stiria, and a closer connection formed with the Spanish line, opened nothing but the most melancholy prospect. Germany. 1556-1618.

The vacancy of Juliers, Cleves, and Berg, in March, 1609, caused at first only a contest between Saxony, Brandenburg, and the Palatinate of Neuburg, the two last of which put themselves in possession, and remained so after the treaty at Xanten, Nov. 12, 1614. But it was the interference of foreign powers that made the quarrel so important, since 1. the emperor sequestrated the country, 2. Henry IV. joined the union against it, and after his murder, 3. the contest arising between the princes who were in possession, involved Holland and Spain.

18. Happily for the west of Europe, the relations in the east during this period were less menacing, though not much more peaceful. The wild spirit of conquest of the Porte perished with Solyman II. His successors, educated in the seraglio, were hardly ever to be seen at the head of their armies; and the nation itself underwent those changes, which no nomadic people, that has hitherto existed, has escaped; although no immediate weakness ensued. Thus Austria attained by slow but progressive steps to the full possession of Hungary; but the position of Transylvania, which insisted on having its own princes, was a source of strife; and yet greater might be foreseen from the introduction of the new religion, although liberty of worship was as early as 1606 allowed to its professors. Turkey, etc. 1556-1618.

Solyman II. died during his campaign in Hungary, Sept. 4, 1566.—A truce was concluded for eight years, and repeat-

1556-1618. edly prolonged till 1593. The Turks still retained a great part of southern Hungary.—The grand victory over their fleet, after the conquest of Cyprus by the Venetians and Spaniards, at Lepanto, Oct. 7, 1572, deprived them of the preponderance at sea.—The Hungarian war was renewed 1593—1606; most of the fortresses fell into the hands of the Austrians; although in the truce of twenty years, 1606, the Turks retained some of them.

General Remarks.

19. Politics appear, in this period, by no means under an improved aspect. Subject to the controlling influence of fanaticism, they too often sanctioned the adoption of any measures which that fanaticism pronounced good. Although some distinguished individuals, as Henry, Orange, and Elizabeth, rose above the age, they were for ever surrounded by the conspiracies of assassins, to which some of them fell victims. The influence of the priesthood was unfortunately greater than it had ever been before; and the Jesuits were not the only ones who abused it. What the spirit of intolerance could do, even among protestants, was but too clearly shown in Holland and Saxony.

20. Political-economy attracted more attention in this period than in the former, because necessity demanded it. In France it was promoted by Sully, and Elizabeth felt its importance; but the finance system of the Dutch had the greatest influence on foreign countries.

Sully's system was no other than that of order and frugality. He was a great reformer, because great abuses were prevalent; and an elevated strength of character supported his correct in-

sight into affairs. Modern schools should not refer to him; he knew nothing of their sublime speculations. His rule did not depend upon general positions, but upon what was expedient for France. And happy it was for his fame, that the direction of private activity on the part of governments, was then so much less the fashion. 1556-1618 General Remarks.

Mémoires des royales Œconomies d'état par MAX. DE BETHUNE, DUC DE SULLY. First edition, 1650—1662, 4 vols. fol. The last perfect one is Londres, 1778, 10 vols. 12mo. (The edition par M. D. L. D. L. (DE L'ECLUSE DE LOGES) Londres, 1745, 3 vols. 4to. is not merely reduced to a modern style, but remodeled in a totally different form).—A treasure for posterity!

Eloges de Sully et des Œconomies royales, par MIRABEAU, 2 vols. 8vo. 1789.

The system of indirect taxation was first perfected in Holland. The exigencies of the last war were met by the excise, which other states afterwards introduced, and which became so much the more important to modern Europe, as its revenues increased in the same proportion as luxury.

21. Many circumstances combined to promote the advancement of the art of war. The system of standing armies was further matured in France and Holland; by Henry IV. on account of his situation, and the great designs he had in view; in the Netherlands, by necessity during the long war. France, nevertheless, had not in peace more than fourteen thousand, the republic scarcely twenty thousand men. The talents of Henry, Maurice, and Alexander of Parma, and other great generals, could not but improve the system of military tactics; the art of conducting sieges, especially, was carried to the highest perfection. Nothing like the naval power of Eng-

1556-1618. General Remarks.

land and Holland had ever been seen before. The royal navy of Britain, founded by Henry VIII., first grew into importance under Elizabeth; and the Dutch force at sea soon became formidable. both from the fleet of the States themselves and those of the great trading companies.

III. *History of the Colonies, from* 1556 *to* 1618.

Colonial affairs.

1. The colonial affairs of the Europeans, and the general commerce founded on them, underwent the most important changes during this period. These were principally caused by the monopolising pretensions of the Spaniards, which excited the jealousy of other nations, and gave rise to wars. It was during this period, that 1. the establishments of the Portuguese in the East Indies fell to pieces; while, on the other hand, 2. the Dutch reared theirs and usurped the commerce of the world; and 3. the English entered upon the field and became the rivals of the latter. But 4. a different form was given both to commerce and colonial politics, by the establishment of great chartered companies.

Portuguese.

2. The Portuguese dominion in the East Indies had been declining a long time, from the corruption which had entered into its internal government; its ruin was accelerated by exterior events. The former are to be traced in the de-

cline of morality, with which the spirit of heroism and patriotism among the higher classes had perished, and in the avarice and sensuality which in the Indies were carried to such a shameless extent, that the Portuguese name excited horror. As the sole desire of each was to enrich merely himself, the Indies soon cost the crown more than they yielded. But in the organisation of the administration, there were also defects which hastened its downfal.

Colonial affairs. 1556-1618. Portuguese.

The principal defects of the Portuguese administration in India seem to have been the following: 1. The very frequent (at least triennial,) changes of viceroys, which were usually attended by a change of most of the other officers. The offices were therefore triennial benefices. 2. The restrictions, which gradually became greater and greater, of the power of the viceroys; partly by the council placed at their side, partly by the division into three independent governments, Monomotapa, (Ceylon,) India, and Malacca, by king Sebastian. 3. The state of commerce, which, left open to the civil and military officers, degenerated into monopolies, which were often very oppressive. 4. The defective administration of justice, modeled strictly after that of the mother country. From the decisions of the highest tribunal (*relaçaon*) there was, with few exceptions, no appeal. 5. The overwhelming influence of the clergy, who, by their wealth, made themselves masters of every thing; and the tyranny of the inquisition, which was nowhere more severe than in Goa.

Observaçones sobre las principaes causas da decadencia dos Portuguezes na Asia, escritas por DIOGO DO COUTO, *en forma de dialogo como titulo de* Soldado pratico, *publicadas de ordem da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa*, por ANTONIO CAETANO *do Amaral*, Lisboa, 1790.—The author, himself a commander in India, wrote his work in the form of a dialogue, between a soldier who had returned and one who had been

Colonial affairs. 1556-1618.

appointed governor in Goa, 1606. It remained in manuscript till the academy purchased and printed it. This is a source, hitherto unknown, for acquiring an exact knowledge of this miserable administration.

3. To these internal causes, some foreign ones are to be added, even before the rivalry of the Dutch. It was with difficulty that the Portuguese
1571. sustained the attacks of the native princes; and
1581. the union with Spain was in itself an evil for its eastern possessions, since they were subsequently not only neglected, but also exposed to the attacks of the enemies of Spain.

Macao in China obtained 1585, in consideration of services rendered against the pirates. As a station for the China trade, and more especially the Japan, the settlement was of great importance.

4. Brazil soon felt the consequences of this union, for it became the mark of English freebooters. French bucaniers, too, had attempted a settlement on the charming island of Maranham, but being soon driven away by the Portuguese,
1612. they made themselves masters of the northern regions, round the mouths of the river Maragnon;
1614. from whence arose the governments of Gram Para and Maranham. The exertions of the Jesuits to convert the natives were unhappily rendered of no avail by the iniquitous attempts made by the colonists to enslave them.

Belem, the capital of Gram Para, founded, and the mouths of the river Maragnon explored, 1618.

5. The possessions in Africa and those in

Brazil mutually influenced each other, since the former only furnished slaves for the latter. The animosities which were thus caused led to the establishment of St. Paolo di Loanda, and thence to the subjugation of Congo and Angola, which it was intended to secure by missions. Colonial affairs. 1556-1618. 1578.

6. Spain made an important addition to her colonial system, not only by the acquisition of the Portuguese possessions, but also by the usurpation of the Philippine islands in the East Indies. What might not these islands have become, through the communication with India and China on the one side, and Mexico and Peru on the other, had not the severe restrictions imposed upon them rendered it impossible? Spanish.

Possession taken of the Philippines, 1564, for founding missions. Luçon, the principal island, occupied 1572, and a settlement made at Manilla. The administration committed to a viceroy; but the priests were the principal landed proprietors.—A regular trade was established in 1572 between Acapulco and Manilla, by means of only one or two ships, (the galleons of the South-sea,) despatched once a year. Great losses occasioned by this to the government, and complaints made respecting the silver exported from Mexico. Religion only prevented the total abandonment of the islands.

The regulations respecting the Philippines, made by Philip II., and afterwards those by Philip III., are to be found in the *Leyes*, especially L. IX. No other king ever made so many regulations in the colonies as Philip II., and yet the only new institution he introduced there was the inquisition. (See p. 87). The regulations on this subject may be found in the *Leyes*, L. I. tit. 19.

7. While the Spaniards, now masters of the

Colonial affairs. 1556-1618.

Portuguese colonies, claimed the sole dominion of both Indies and their seas, two new nations, the Dutch and the English, entered the field as their rivals, and tore from them that which, from its very nature, they could never have maintained. During their conflict for liberty, the Dutch. Dutch had already succeeded in obtaining possession of the commerce of the world; their activity was unfettered by restrictions, and they soon became aware that the Indian branch was best worth possessing, while Philip's interdict only excited their desire to obtain it. The 1595. first voyage, successfully accomplished by Cornelius Hautman, roused an universal emulation to participate in this trade, and several free companies were formed for the purpose.

To account for the prosperity of the Dutch trade during the war, we must remark, 1. that the states of Holland had for a long time carried on a considerable commercial intercourse both with the east and west of Europe, and possessed very important fisheries; 2. that a spirit of adventure was awakened by the privateerings of the exiles on the water; and it was found out how weak the Spaniards were on the sea; 3. that when the port of Lisbon was closed against the Netherlands in 1594, they saw themselves forced to the alternative, to lose their carrying trade in Indian goods, or import for themselves from India. Finally 4. many capitalists removed from Belgium to the Dutch cities.

Besides the works mentioned, p. 35:

Geschichte des Hollandischen Handels, nach LUZAK's *Hollands Rykdom bearbeitet*, von A. F. LÜDER. Leipzig, 1788, 8vo.

8. Rise of the Dutch East India company,

and its organisation. Circumstances show that the dominion of this powerful corporation could only be gradually formed; but the leading features of its constitution were immediately developed. According to its first charter, afterwards constantly renewed, it was a political as well as mercantile body; in the latter respect wholly independent, in the former little more than nominally subordinate to the states-general.

Colonial affairs. 1556-1618.

Dutch East India Company.

Its first charter was granted March 29, 1602, by which it acquired, 1. the monopoly of the Dutch trade beyond the Cape and the straits of Magellan; 2. the right of transacting political matters and of making settlements in India, always, however, in the name of the states-general. The funds of the company consisted in stock, to the amount of about six millions and a-half of guilders; it was divided into six chambers, of which the one at Amsterdam alone had half, the one at Zealand one fourth of the whole. The company in Holland was governed by a board of seventeen directors or managers, (selected from the greater board of the sixty directors of the separate chambers,) who had the chief direction of its affairs. Each chamber took care of its own concerns, the fitting out of its ships, its own purchases and sales. In India, in 1610, a governor-general was appointed, or supreme civil and military magistrate, who was, however, assisted by the council of the Indies, out of the members of which were chosen the governors and the governors-general. The number of governors naturally increased with the enlargement of territory.

History of the D. E. I. Company, in the *Hallischen Allg. Welt-Historie*, B. 26.—The materials of its history are scattered, partly in the works on the commerce of Holland, partly in travels in and descriptions of the East Indies.

Geschichte des Holländischen Colonialwesens in Ostindien; von F. SAALFELD. Götting. 1813, 2 vols. 8vo.—The writer

Colonial affairs. 1556-1618.

enjoyed the use of hitherto unknown but official accounts respecting financial affairs.

Dutch.

9. So far as settlements and possessions in India itself were necessary for the prosecution of the Indian trade, the establishment of this company seems justified; these could not then be effected either by private persons or by the state. And who at that time knew the evils inseparable from monopolies? Though the company did at last sink under them, it nevertheless remains,—less on account of the extent than the permanency of its prosperity,—an unparalleled phenomenon, which could nowhere exist except among a people who could become exceedingly rich without becoming luxurious.

10. The ruling maxims of the company were soon developed. The strict maintenance of its monopoly, a strict watch over its officers, an entire prohibition of any trade on their part, promotion according to merit, but never except regularly, as well as the most punctual payment, —these were the means by which it soon rose so high, that Holland derived a great portion of its riches through this channel. In its settlements in India, it at first employed the Molucca and Sunda islands, where Batavia on Java was already fixed upon as the seat of its Indian sovereignty. By confining itself afterwards chiefly to the islands, it escaped the various revolutions of the continent of India, where at that time the Mongolian empire was so powerful, that the

thought of making conquests could not be entertained. Colonial affairs. 1556-1618.

Though the Dutch could only obtain settlements in India by force of arms, they were aided by the general hatred of the Portuguese.—Establishments were made at Amboyna, Banda, Ternate, and Tidor, from the year 1607.—Intercourse opened with Japan, 1611.—A settlement had existed on Java from 1618, and Jacatra was taken and destroyed, when Batavia was founded there in its stead by Koen, 1619.

11. The rapid prosperity of this company created everywhere a prejudice in favour of such institutions, so that by degrees several of the most important branches of the commerce of the republic were committed to privileged associations. And if these monopolies were injurious, the extraordinary variety of means of gain caused the injury to be less felt. The whole proud structure of the manufacturing, commercial, and colonial system of the Netherlands, was then displayed in all its parts, although not completed till the ensuing period.

12. The English, too, under Elizabeth, became active and successful competitors in the great branches of general commerce. Having been trained by a long and considerable traffic with their neighbours, they were naturally prepared for bolder speculation and enterprise, and soon extended their views to the most distant regions of the world. The intercourse they already had with Persia, by way of Russia, was soon followed by a connection with the two English.

Colonial affairs. 1556-1618. English.

Indies. But the pretensions and resistance of the Spaniards in those seas, necessarily excited continued hostilities. For a long time, however, (till the war of 1588,) it advanced no further than piracy and privateering, which was excited by the rich homeward-bound cargoes of the Spanish; but although petty in its nature, it extended over the whole seas, even to the circumnavigation of the globe.

A commerce had been commenced in 1553 with Russia, by way of Archangel, favoured by Czar Ivan Vasilevitch; and over the Caspian sea to Persia, and even to India.—Vain attempts made to discover a North-East or North-West passage, especially by Forbisher, Davis, Hudson, etc. 1576 to 1610. Drake's voyage round the world, 1577—1580. The first English voyage to India, round the Cape, 1591.

A. ANDERSON's *Historical Deduction*, etc. see page 35.

13. With the progress of this remote foreign commerce, the spirit of monopoly revived in England; and no one made more liberal use of it than Elizabeth. The principal branches of foreign commerce were conferred on chartered companies; thus were formed the Rus-
1554-1581. sian, the African, the Turkish (Levant) companies, that of adventurers on the continent, and others. It was in entire accordance with the spirit of this system, that the commerce with the East Indies should be committed exclusively to a company, who, however, like the rest, were confined to mercantile and had nothing to do with political measures.

Colonial affairs. 1556-1618. English.

The old East India Company received its charter, Dec. 31, 1600. It received, as the Dutch did shortly after, the exclusive right of trading to all the countries and places situated beyond the Cape and the straits of Magellan, not yet occupied by any European power. The first voyage was made under Lancaster to Achem on Sumatra, and Bantam on Java, 1601; and commercial treaties were concluded with the native princes.—But possessing nothing but factories at Bantam, Achem, etc. (and especially at Surat, since 1612, on account of the Persian trade,) and no forts, it could not compete with the Dutch, especially on the Moluccas, the object of both; and its traffic remained very limited.

Annals of the Honourable East India Company, from their establishment by the charter of queen Elizabeth, 1600, *to the union of the London and English East India Companies*, 1707—1708, by JOHN BRUCE, esq. *keeper of his Majesty's state papers, and historiographer to the honourable East India Company*, London, 1810, 3 vols. 4to. A simple narrative, in the form of annals, entirely drawn from public documents, and therefore the leading work for the history of the first, or London Company.

14. During this period, also, the British founded settlements on the coast of North America, whose prospects of success as agricultural colonies depended upon very different grounds from those of the others. The great obstacles which the savage nature of the country and natives threw in the way, could only be overcome by the most persevering industry; but was it not this very circumstance that laid the foundation of a structure which was to endure for ages?

First, though unsuccessful, attempts made under Elizabeth from 1578, in the hopes of finding countries rich in gold, espe-

Colonial affairs. 1556-1618. English.

cially under Raleigh in 1583 and 1587. But the first chartered society for this purpose was formed under James I., after the peace with Spain. The London and Plymouth companies chartered, 1606. The former for the southern part of the coast (Virginia, 34°—41° N. lat.), the latter for the northern, (New England 42°—45° N. lat.). Only Virginia flourished to any extent. Foundation of Jamestown, the first town on the Chesapeake bay, 1607.—Cultivation of tobacco in Virginia, and negroes introduced, 1616. The Bermuda islands occupied by the London company, 1612, but the colonies could not prosper under the restrictions of the company. The colonists, however, brought with them a taste for free government. In 1619 the first general assembly was convened, and a constitution modeled after that of the mother country.—Dispute of the king with the company, and its abolishment, 1624. The prosperity of the Newfoundland fishery was connected with these undertakings. The whale fishery of Greenland was pursued with great success by the English, as early as the year 1600.

W. ROBERTSON, *History of America*, books IX and X, *containing the history of Virginia to the year* 1688; *and of New England to the year* 1652, Lond. 1796. The best account of the rise of the British settlements.

[*A history of the Colonies planted by the English on the continent of North America, from their settlement to the commencement of that war which terminated in their Independence.* By JOHN MARSHALL. 8vo.]

15. Though these attempts were but a weak beginning, they necessarily led, in connection with the pretensions of the Portuguese and Spaniards, to the maintenance of the freedom of the sea, which England and Holland defended with the sword, and Grotius with the pen. A wide field was now opened for practical politics; but the immediate influence of the colonies upon

them could not yet be great, because the enterprises we have mentioned were all private adventures, which government permitted, without affording them any further encouragement. It was yet some time ere privateering and hostilities in the colonies were followed by wars between the mother states. Colonial affairs. 1556-1618.

HUG. GROTIUS, *mare liberum, sive de jure quod Batavis competit ad Indiæ commercia, Dissertatio*, Lugd. Bat. 1618.

16. France, also, made some attempts to found colonies, but the few which did not altogether fail, were rather important for the future than the present. They were confined to North America, where, from the commencement of the seventeenth century, the settlements in Canada and Acadia acquired greater stability by the foundation of Quebec. But the culture of the soil was less the real object, than the trade in peltry and the fisheries. French.

FOURTH PERIOD. *From* 1618 *to* 1660.

As a general leading work down to 1637, KHEVENULLER, see above page 95.

1. The important general wars which distinguish this period were the necessary cause of a closer connection of interests among the European states; England alone stood aloof, being sufficiently embarrassed by her own civil broils. Preliminary observations. 1618-1660.

1518-1660. Preliminary observations.

The causes of this lay 1st, in the much nearer alliance which again took place, on Ferdinand's accession to the throne, between the Spanish and Austrian families, and which was further cemented by the influence of the Jesuits at the two courts; 2dly, in the policy of cardinal Richelieu, (directed against the house of Hapsburg,) and his extensive influence in Europe; 3dly, in the effect which these circumstances produced by bringing the northern powers, especially Sweden, to take part in the disputes of southern Europe.

2. Politics and religion remained during this period as closely interwoven as before; the latter was still the spring which set the former in motion. The Reformation was the source of most of the storms which arose: but these, which in the former period had been almost confined to single states, now shook the whole political system of Europe, and were followed by more general consequences.

1. *History of the thirty years' war and its results, down to the peace of Westphalia and the Pyrenees.*

The history of the thirty years' war constitutes an interesting section of the history of the German empire; but is most important for its bearings on the law of nations. A treatise upon it by an historian who shall regard it in its most interesting light, that is, as it effected Europe and the whole age, is still a disideratum. The works deserving of mention are:

Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

Histoire des guerres et négociations qui précédèrent le traité de Westphalie, composée sur les mémoires du Compte d'Avaux par GUIL. HIACYNTHE BOUGEANT. Paris, 1751, 3 vols. 4to. The compiler was a Jesuit. The two last parts contain the history of the conclusion of peace.

J. C. KRAUSE, *Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Kriegs und Westphälischen Friedens.* Halle, 1782, 8vo.

Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Kriegs, von FR. SCHILLER. Liepzig, 1802, 2 Thle. 8vo.

Geschichte des driessigjährigen Kriegs, von LORENZ WESTENRIEDER, in the *Münchner historischen Cdlèndar*, 1804 to 1806. By no means devoid of original enquiries and views.

3. The thirty years' war made Germany the centre-point of European politics. It was not, however, a war carried on from beginning to end with one plan and for one object. No one at its commencement could have foreseen its duration and extent. But the train of war was everywhere laid, and required only the match to set it going; more than one war was joined to it, and swallowed up in it; and the melancholy truth, that war feeds itself, was never more clearly displayed.

The general causes of the spread and duration of this war, consisted, 1. in the participation which the German league took in it; 2. in the renewal in 1621 of the war between Holland and Spain, which became interwoven with the German; 3. in the implication of the northern powers, especially Sweden, since 1635; 4. in the share taken in it by France from 1635. —These, however, were only the external causes. It would not have continued so long without the internal,—the spirit of religious faction, the consequent dissolution of the constitution of the empire, (no diet having been convened

Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

since 1613,) and the projects and hopes, which were gradually formed in various quarters.

4. Though the war, which first broke out in Bohemia, concerned only the house of Austria, yet by its originating in religious disputes, by its peculiar character as a religious war, and by the measures adopted both by the insurgents and the emperor, it acquired such an extent, that even the quelling of the insurrection was insufficient to put a stop to it.

Spread of the protestant party (*utraquistes*) throughout Bohemia, as well as Austria and Hungary, where Bethlem Gabor, Vaivode of Transylvania, seized the throne through their co-operation. First disturbances break out in Prague, caused by the abuses of the imperial governor, May 23, 1618, and the war begun under Mathias, († 20th of March, 1619.) Revolt of his successor Ferdinand II., and the crown of Bohemia bestowed on the elector Ferdinand V. of the Palatinate, Aug. 26, 1619.—As the head of the protestant union, as the son-in-law of James I., and as the ally of Bethlem Gabor, he had sufficient resources both within and without Germany if he had but known how to use them.—The counter-movements of Ferdinand II. were highly judicious, for being already in alliance with Spain, he gained over the league also by the compact with Maximilian of Bavaria, (Oct. 8,) made Saxony his own, and rendered the Union impotent. Even before the defeat on the White mountain near Prague Nov. 8, 1620, the fate of Frederic V. might be considered as decided.—Subjugation of Bohemia, annihilation of its privileges, and horrible revenge.

Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Kriegs nach ungedruckten Papieren, von C. W. BREYER. Munich, 1811. The first volume, and unhappily the last, reaches from 1615 to 1621. It is in reality a history of Maximilian of Bavaria, and the part he took in the war, compiled from original documents in

his own hand writing, and private correspondence; with much secret information respecting the internal and particularly the psychological relations. Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

5. Though the Bohemian war was apparently terminated, yet the flame had communicated to Germany and Hungary, and new fuel was added by the act of proscription promulgated against the elector Frederic and his adherents. From this the war derived that revolutionary character, which was henceforward peculiar to it; it was a step that could not but lead to further results, for the question of the relations between the emperor and his states, was in a fair way of being practically considered. New and bolder projects were also formed in Vienna and Madrid, where it was resolved to renew the war with the Netherlands. Under the present circumstances, the suppression of the protestant religion and the overthrow of German and Dutch liberty appeared inseparable; while the success of the imperial arms, supported as they were by the league and the co-operation of the Spaniards, gave just grounds for hope.

An edict of proscription published against elector Frederic, Jan. 22, 1621, and the electorate conferred on Bavaria, Feb. 25, 1623.—Dissolution of the Union, and the war transferred to the Palatinate, the hereditary dominion of Frederic, by the aid of Spanish troops from the United Provinces, under Spinola. Tilly, though at first defeated by Ernest of Mansfield at Wisloch, April 29, 1622, achieves a victory over the margrave of Baden at Wimpfen, May 6, and over Christian of Brunswick at Hochst, June 20: capture of the whole Palatinate. But Ernest and Christian remained

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undaunted, as long as there were any hopes of aid from England, and Lower Germany continued to offer them support.

6. By the carrying of the war into Lower Saxony, the principal seat of the protestant religion in Germany, (the states of which had appointed Christian IV. of Denmark, as duke of Holstein, head of their confederacy,) the northern states had already, though without any beneficial result, been involved in the strife, and the Danish war had broken out. But the elevation

Wallenstein

of Albert of Wallenstein to the dignity of duke of Friedland and imperial general over the army raised by himself, was of considerable more importance, as it affected the whole course and character of the war. From this time the war was completely and truly revolutionary. The peculiar situation of the general, the manner of the formation as well as the maintenance of his army, could not fail to make it such. What place was there for him and his plans, whatever these might be, in the old order of things?

Danish war from 1625—1629.—Defeat of Christian IV. at Lutter, near Wolfenbuttel, Aug. 27, 1626, while Wallenstein drives the count of Mansfield from the Elbe to Hungary, where he died, Nov. 30.—Prosecution of the war against Christian IV. principally by Wallenstein, who recovers the countries on the Baltic as far as Stralsund, 1628.—Peace with Christian IV. at Lubeck, in consideration of the restitution of his lands, and the renunciation of all right of interference in the affairs of Germany as king of Denmark, and the sacrifice of his allies, especially the dukes of Mecklenburg, May 12, 1629.

7. The distinguished success of the imperial arms in the north of Germany unveiled the daring schemes of Wallenstein. He did not come forward as conqueror alone, but, by the investiture of Mecklenburg as a state of the empire, as a ruling prince. The age was already accustomed to changes in the legal state of possession. Coronets had been already siezed; why not crowns?

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The dukes of Mecklenburg put under the ban of the empire, Jan. 19, 1628, and Wallenstein immediately invested with their territories.—He held possession of Pomerania also, and was created generalissimo of the fleets in the ocean and Baltic. The dominion of the Baltic, which he hoped to obtain through the Hanseatic towns, was to be directed against Denmark and Sweden, and who could say what were his ulterior projects?

[*Albrechts von Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland and Mecklenburg's unprinted confidential autograph Letters, and Official papers, from* 1627 *to* 1634, *to Arnheim, Aldringer, Gallas, Piccolomini and other princes and generals of his time. With a Life and Character of Wallenstein.* Published by FRED. FORSTER. Part I. Berlin, 1828, 8vo. (in German). The first part of this collection, so important for the real and accurate information it gives us respecting this remarkable man, only comprises the years 1627-28, and leaves us highly desirous of the remainder.]

8. But the elevation and conduct of this *novas homo*, exasperated and annoyed the catholic no less than the protestant states, especially the league and its chief; all implored peace, and Wallenstein's discharge. Thus, at the diet of the electors at Augsburg, the emperor was reduced to the alternative of resigning him or his

July, 1630.

Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

allies. He chose the former. Wallenstein was dismissed, the majority of his army disbanded, and Tilly nominated commander in chief of the forces of the emperor and the league.

(AND. SEB. STUMPF.) *Diplomatische Geschichte der Deutschen Ligue, im 17ten Jahrhundert.* Mit Urkunden. Erfurt, 1800, 8vo. One of the most important contributions to the critical history of this war.

9. On the side of the emperor sufficient care was taken to prolong the war. The refusal to restore the unfortunate Frederic, and even the sale of his upper Palatine to Bavaria, must with justice have excited the apprehensions of the other princes. But when the Jesuits finally succeeded, not only in extorting the edict of restitution, but also in causing it to be enforced in the most odious manner, the catholic states themselves saw with regret that peace could no longer exist.

March 9, 1629.

The edict of restitution contained the two principal points, that, 1st, according to the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* (see p. 73), the property confiscated since the treaty of Passau should be restored; and 2ndly, the religious peace, (all appearance of opposing which was assiduously avoided,) should only extend to such as had approved of the confession of Augsburg, but not to the whole reforming party. What, then, may be asked, was left to the protestants? But the mode of enforcing the edict, by means of imperial troops, produced almost more bitterness than the edict itself.

10. The greater the success that attended the house of Austria, the more actively foreign policy laboured to counteract it. England had

taken an interest in the fate of Frederic V. from the first, though this interest was evinced by little beyond fruitless negotiations. Denmark became engaged in the quarrel mostly through the influence of this power and Holland. Richelieu, from the time he became prime minister of France, had exerted himself in opposing Austria and Spain. He found employment for Spain in the contests respecting Veltelin, and for Austria soon after, by the war of Mantua. Willingly would he have detached the German league from the interest of the emperor; and though he failed in this, he procured the fall of Wallenstein.

Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

1624.

1626.

1627 to 1630.

Interference of France in the disputes between Spain and the Grisons respecting Veltelin, important on account of its situation, 1620, terminated advantageously for France and the Grisons, by the treaty at Monçon, March 5, 1626.—Mantuan war of succession, in favour of the duke of Nevers, with Austria, 1627—1630, who remains in possession, by the treaty of Chierasco, April 6, 1631. Thus the supremacy of Spain in Italy was again broken, and French influence re-established; which also remained in possession of the frontier fortresses.

11. Much more important, however, was Richelieu's influence on the war, by the essential share he had in gaining Gustavus Adolphus' active participation in it; though he neither expected nor wished, that he, whom he desired to use only as a tool, should seem half inclined to reverse the relation. The nineteen years of his reign which had already elapsed, together with the Polish war, which lasted nearly that time, had taught the world but little of the real worth

Gustavus Adolphus. 1630.

Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

of this great and talented hero. The decisive superiority of protestantism in Germany, under his guidance, soon created a more just knowledge, and at the same time showed the advantages which must result to a victorious supporter of that cause.

Gustavus Adolphus lands in Germany, June 24, 1630, and an alliance, almost forced, formed between the leading states of Upper Saxony; Pomerania, July 20, Brandenburg, May 4, 1631, and Saxony, (which endeavoured in vain to maintain its independence by a league of neutrality at Leipzig, March, 1631,) while measures were taken for the future acquisition of Pomerania. Subsidiary treaty with France, Jan. 13, 1631, at Bärenwalde; and, previously, a voluntary alliance with William, landgrave of Hesse, Nov. 8, 1630.—After the horrible fate of Magdeburg, May 10, 1631, he still needed a great victory to repair his injured credit.

12. The battle at Leipzig was decisive for Gustavus Adolphus and his party, almost beyond expectation. The league fell asunder; and in a short time he was master of the countries from the Baltic to Bavaria, and from the Rhine to Bohemia. What hopes, what plans, must such success have given rise to, both in him and many of his followers! But the misfortunes and death of Tilly, brought Wallenstein again on the stage as absolute commander in chief, bent on plans not a whit less extensive than those he had before formed. No period of the war gave promise of such great and rapid successes or reverses as the present, for both leaders were de-
1632. termined to effect them; but the victory of

Lützen, while it cost Gustavus his life, prepared the fall of Wallenstein.

The victory of the king, in connection with Saxony, near Leipzig, Sept. 7, 1631.—Conquest of Bohemia by the Saxons; advance of the king into the territory of the leaguers, and after the battle of Lech, April 5, 1632, (at which Tilly was killed), into Bavaria as far as Munich, May 7.—The king and Wallenstein opposed to each other at Nuremberg, June—Aug.—The war transferred to Saxony. Battle at Lützen; and Gustavus Adolphus and Pappenheim slain in the combat, Nov. 6, 1632.

13. Though the fall of Gustavus Adolphus frustrated his own private views, it did not those of his party. It was, however, already felt in Germany, that even Swedish dominion might be oppressive; and the jealousy of Saxony was not extinguished even by victory. The school of Gustavus produced a number of men, great in the cabinet and in the field; yet it was hard, even for an Oxensteirn, to preserve the importance of Sweden unimpaired; and it was but partially done by the alliance of Heilbronn.

What were the aims of Gustavus Adolphus? Necessarily the maintenance of the acquired superiority of the protestant party in Germany. This presupposes, 1st, that he should himself have possession there; 2ndly, that he should remunerate and strengthen his friends and partizans. Who can tell to what extremes this might have led, in an age which was accustomed to violent changes of territory and creations of princes?—Had the hero, snatched away in the midst of his career, himself definitely fixed his plans? Conclusion of the treaty of Heilbronn with the four circles under Swedish direction, April 13, 1633; Saxony however did not accede to it.

Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

SAM. PUFENDORF, *Commentariorum de rebus Suecicis libri XXVI.* (from 1630—1654). Francf. 1707, fol.

Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, par D. M. (MAUVILLON) Amsterd. 1764, 4to.

14. If the forces of Sweden overrun almost every part of Germany in the following months, under the guidance of the pupils of the king, Bernard of Weimar and Gustavus Horn, we must apparently attribute it to Wallenstein's intentional inactivity in Bohemia. The distrust of him increased in Vienna the more, as he took but little trouble to diminish it; and though his fall was not sufficient to atone for treachery, if proved, it was for his equivocal character and imprudence. His death probably saved Germany from a catastrophe.

The principal document substantiating the charge against Wallenstein, is the report of Scesina, his negotiator to the emperor, according to which he had entered as early as 1630 into secret negotiations with Gustavus Adolphus. 1. But had not Scesina an interest in proving him guilty? 2. Was every passionate expression of Wallenstein an actual plan?—He was murdered at Eger, Feb. 25, 1634. The most important information respecting his history lies buried in archives.

Materials are contained in:

Beiträge zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Kriegs, von CHR. GOTTL. von Murr. Nürnberg, 1790; and

Die Ermordung Albrecht's Herzogs von Friedland, herausgegeben, von C. G. v. Murr. Halle, 1806.—The Latin original of Scesina's statement is here first made known.

The Apology and Defence of the Murderers of Wallenstein, printed in Eger, ten days after the deed, was reprinted in *Morgenblatt*, F. 1816. No. clxxv.—clxxviii.

15. A great change took place upon the death of Wallenstein; as a prince of the blood, Ferdinand, king of Hungary and Bohemia, obtained the command. Thus an end was put to plans of revolutions from this quarter. But in the same year the battle of Nordlingen gave to the imperial arms a sudden preponderance, such as it had never before acquired. The separate peace of Saxony with the emperor at Prague, and soon after an alliance, were its consequences; Sweden, driven back to Pomerania, seemed unable of herself, during the two following years, to maintain her ground in Germany: the victory of Wittstock turned the scale in her favour. Thirty years' war. 1618-1648. Sept. 24, 1636.

Defeat of the Swedes at Nordlingen, Sept. 6, 1634.—By the preliminaries of peace at Prague, Nov. 22, (ratified May 30, 1635,) Saxony 1. retained Lusatia, of which she had taken possession. 2. The ecclesiastical property, confiscated forty years or more before, was left in the hands of its possessors.—Most of the other protestant states were forced to accede to this peace.

16. The war was prolonged and greatly extended by the active share taken in it by France: first against Spain, and soon against Austria. From this time the war, in consequence of the neighbouring possessions of Spain in Italy, could hardly remain confined to Germany; but the alliance which Richelieu contracted with the Netherlands, mixed up to a certain degree the German war with that of the Spanish Netherlands. Besides supporting the enemies of Aus- 1635.

Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

tria and Spain, schemes of conquest were among the plans of the French minister. Under such circumstances, when could an end of the war be anticipated?

The war, renewed in 1621, between Spain and the Netherlands, was on land, confined to the Spanish Netherlands, and consisted for the most part of sieges.—Alliance of Richelieu with the Netherlands, for the conquest and partition of the Spanish Netherlands, Feb. 8, 1635, is not followed by the desired success. But the project of that acquisition was never banished from the French cabinet. Alliances in Italy with Savoy, Mantua, and Parma, against Spain, July 11, 1635, for the conquest of Milan, were, from 1638, of advantage to France, by the contest respecting the regency in Piedmont, which its client Christina maintained against Spanish influence.

17. The German war, after the treaty with Bernhard of Weimar, was mainly carried on by France, by the arming of Germans against Germans. But the pupil of Gustavus Adolphus preferred to fight for himself rather than others, and his early death was almost as much coveted by France as by Austria. The success of the Swedish arms revived under Baner; and after a vain attempt to negotiate a peace at Cologne and Lubeck, the two crowns, both desirous of conquest, contracted a closer alliance for only a common peace.

April 28, 1635.

Treaty for subsidies with Bernhard of Weimar, Oct. 27, 1635, who hoped to conquer for himself a state in Alsace. Capture of Brisach, Dec. 3, 1638. After his most unexpected death, July 8, 1639, France made itself master of his army.—

Victory of the Swedes under Baner at Wittstock over the imperial Saxon army, Sept. 24, 1636.

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18. If under these circumstances a glimmer of peace at length became visible, it was not created by compassion for the countries of Germany—what cared strangers about them?—but by a confluence of circumstances. The alliance between Austria and Spain, which was besides embarrassed with the civil war with Portugal and Catalonia, had been less close since Ferdinand III. had succeeded his father as emperor. The independence of the new elector of Brandenburg, Frederic William, left both Austria and Sweden less hope, and at the general diet, which was at last convened, the emperor yielded to a general amnesty, or at least what was so designated. But when at the meeting of the ambassadors of the leading powers at Hamburg, the preliminaries were signed, and the time and place of the congress of peace fixed, it was deferred, after Richelieu's death, (who was succeeded by Mazarin,) by the war, which both parties continued, in the hope of securing better conditions by victory. A new war broke out in the north between Sweden and Denmark, and when at last the congress of peace was opened at Munster and Osnabruck, the negotiations dragged on for three years, during which the south of Germany, and especially Bavaria, was forced, by the repeated invasions of the French and Swedes, to drain the cup of misery to the very dregs.

1640.
1637.–1640.
Oct. 10, 1641. Dec. 25.
1642.
1643 to 1645.
April, 1645.

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Exploits of Torstenson, 1642—1645, as well in Silesia, Saxony, (victory near Leipzig, Oct. 23, 1642,) and Bohemia, as in Holstein, 1644, and again in Bohemia, 1645; while the French army was defeated at Duttlingen, Nov. 14, 1634, by the Bavarians. But after Turenne obtained the chief command, and after the retirement of Torstenson, Nov. 1645, his successor Wrangel, in connection with Turenne, penetrated into Bavaria, 1646, and compelled Maximilian I. to a truce at Ulm, March 14, 1647, the breaking of which, Sept. 1647, was followed by a new united invasion and terrible devastations in 1648; while the Swedes in Bohemia, under Charles Gustavus, Palatine count, and Conigsmark, took Prague itself, by which the peace was not a little accelerated.

19. The very complicated relations of so many leading powers necessarily gave the congress an importance which attracted the eyes of all Europe towards it. Austria was at war with Sweden and several of the protestant states; Sweden with Austria, Bavaria, and Saxony; France with Austria and its allies, as well as with Spain; and Spain with France, with Portugal, and the Netherlands. The war of the Spanish Netherlands and of Germany, were the only ones terminated by this congress; but not that between France and Spain, which was not brought to a close till eleven years afterwards (see below); nor that between Spain and Portugal. The German peace was negotiated at Munster between the emperor and France, and at Osnabruck between the emperor and Sweden; but both treaties, according to express agreement, Oct. 24, 1648, were to be considered as one, under the title of the Westphalian.

Jan. 20, 1648.

At the opening of the congress, all hope of peace was very remote. Obstacles were continually thrown in its way, not only by the demands, but by the character of many of the ambassadors, and by the contested points of ceremony. The whole business was at a stand up to Nov. 1645: and might have remained so, had it not been for count Trautmannsdorf the imperial ambassador, who showed great skill in removing these diplomatic difficulties. The chief points in debate were: 1. the period which should be determined as that by which the laws of restitution should be decided: whether 1618 should be the point, as the two crowns of France and Sweden, together with the protestant states desired, or 1630, as Austria wished; 2. the amount of indemnification both as it regarded the demands of the two crowns, as of the single states. It was a difficult question what should be assigned to these crowned heads, and how? also, whether they should become states of the German empire. 3. The reinstatement of the Palatine family; 4. the remuneration of the Swedish army, finally fixed at 5,000,000 rix dollars; 5. the exertions of France to prevent a separate peace between the republic and Spain.—As these were vain, and most of the other points were settled by compromise, the disputes respecting religious grievances, (which, according to the spirit of the age, were of the highest importance,) were so violent as to menace the final interruption of the negotiations, had not this been prevented by the progress of the French and Swedish arms in the year 1648.

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The French ambassadors at Munster were counts d'Avaux, and Servien; the Swedish at Osnabruck, Oxenstiern (son of the chancellor) and Salvius. Of the imperial ambassadors count Trautmannsdorf was the most important; besides him D. Volmar and Crane. Spain and the Netherlands sent each eight plenipotentiaries; and many other states sent theirs. The papal ambassador Chigi and the Venetian Contarin, acted as mediators.

Beside the work of BOUGEANT, (see p. 143):

Négociations sécrètes touchant la paix de Munster et d'Os-

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nabruc; à la Haye, 1725, 4 vols. fol. From this source is taken the spirited,

Geschichte des Westphälischen Friedens, in zwei Theilen von C. L. von WOLTMANN. Liepzig, 1808. A continuation of Schiller's history of the thirty years' war.

J. STEPH. PÜTTER, *Geist des Westphälischen Friedens*, Göttingen, 1795, 8vo.

The most perfect collection of official documents is:

J. G. von MEYERN, *Acta pacis Westphalicæ*, Gottingen, 1734. Th. i—vi, fol. This author has also published the most correct edition of the treaty of peace. Gottingen, 1747.

20. The matters settled by the peace of Westphalia respected 1. indemnifications as well of the foreign powers who carried on the war, as of single states of the empire; 2. the internal religious and political relations of the empire; 3. the relation of two other foreign states to the German empire. To obtain the means of indemnification, recourse was had to the secularisation of several ecclesiastical foundations, which had already embraced the protestant religion. The foreign powers idemnified were France and Sweden; the German princes, Brandenburg, Hesse Cassel, Mecklenburg, and Brunswick Luneburg.

France obtained Alsace, as far as it belonged to Austria, together with Brisac; the confirmation of the sovereignty of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, (see page 73,) as well as that of Pignerol, and the right of garrisoning Philipsburg. The countries ceded were incorporated with Faance.

Sweden gained Upper Pomerania, with the isle of Rügen, and a part of Lower Pomerania, Wismar, Bremar, and Verden; together with the rights belonging to a state of the empire, and five millions of rix dollars.

To the electorate of Brandenburg, the secularised bishopricks of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Camin, and Minden. Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

To Mecklenburg, Schwerin, and Ratzeburg.

To Hesse, Hirschfeld and four manors, with 600,000 rix dollars.

To Brunswick Lunenburg, the alternative succession of some member of that house to the bishopric of Osnaburg, and some monastic lands.

The electorate of Saxony retained what it had acquired in the peace of Prague.

The Pope protested in vain against the peace on account of its secularisations.

21. The settlement of the internal relations of the German empire did not so much concern new subjects, as those formerly contested or uncertain. For 1. in respect to religion, the peace of Augsburg was not only confirmed, but also expressly extended to the reformed party, and a perfect equality of privileges established; in respect to the property of the Church and the exercise of religion, the beginning of the year 1624 was fixed on as the epoch (*annus normalis*), and therefore the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* was acknowledged as valid for the future. 2ndly, In respect to political relations *a.* a general amnesty and restitution was agreed on; (with the limitation, however, as far as respects the house of the Palatinate, that a new eighth electorate should be established for it, and the electorate taken away from that house, together with the Upper Palatinate, should be retained by Bavaria). *b.* With respect to the relations of all the states to the

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emperor, the rights of sovereignty in their own territories were secured to them, as well as their rights in the diets.

22. The relations with foreign states were so far determined in the case of the republic of the united Netherlands and of Switzerland, that they were acknowledged to be wholly independent of the German empire.

23. The consequences of this terrible war, as regards changes of territory, seem much less important than could at some periods have been expected, had not the removal of Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstien from the scene of action frustrated their projects and their hopes. But the effects of this war were not confined to Germany; but operated upon the whole European system.

24. By it the German body politic obtained its determinate forms, which were soon after more
1663. firmly established by the permanent diet of Ratisbon. The imperial power was now constitutionally restricted within the narrowest limits; the princes were in the fullest sense rulers of their respective states; the welfare of Germany was attached to the territorial government, and but little to the imperial. It was a federation under a limited sovereign. It had its deficiencies. Who can mistake them? But to what extent these might become hurtful, depended on circumstances which could not be previously defined; while the provisions enacted

guaranteed the tranquil existence of the weak by the side of the strong. Does the consolidation into one monarchy, (take Spain for instance,) insure a higher degree of national happiness, than that which Germany attained? Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

25. In the political system of Europe, the peace of Westphalia settled neither all the important, nor even all the contested relations. But 1st, the maintenance of the German constitution, the object of the bloody conflict of half Europe, acquired in practical politics a weight which it could not soon lose. 2nd, by the alliance between France and Sweden, the north and west of Europe were brought into closer connection. But this connection wanted some common permanent interest, there being in a short time nothing to fear from Austria. It languished too the more, as queen Christina made no further use of it than the drawing subsidies from France. 3d, Sweden rose to the rank of one of the first continental powers, and kept it for more than fifty years, without, however, maintaining, like France, the influence acquired by the war. 4th, the independence of the United Netherlands was now universally acknowledged. 5th, the German constitution was indissolubly connected with the maintenance of the balance of power, which consequently became much more distinctly acknowledged and confirmed. It was not therefore by settling all the great political relations, but rather by set- Peace of Westphalia

Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

tling the leading political maxims, that the peace of Westphalia became the foundation of the subsequent policy of Europe.

26. The war between France and Spain was not terminated by the peace of Westphalia, because both parties, but especially Spain, hoped to gain by its prosecution. Freed from the war in the Netherlands, her hopes were further raised by the civil troubles of France; while the latter country formed still greater expectations from the weakness of Spain and the insurrections of Portugal and Catalonia, which it supported. But notwithstanding the advantages which Spain obtained in the beginning, its fortune changed, especially as Cromwell found it expedient to de-
1655. clare war against her, and contracted for this purpose an alliance with France. The peace of
1659. the Pyrenees, concluded by the directing ministers, cardinal Mazarin and count Haro, at last put an end to it. This peace confirmed for ever the superiority of France over Spain; not so much by the concessions made, as by the prospects which the marriage concerted between Louis XIV. and the infanta of Spain, (the source of after wars!) opened for the future.

The favourite scheme of France was to obtain all the Spanish Netherlands, as the price of the evacuation of Catalonia. Victory of the prince of Condé at Lens, Aug. 20, 1648. The change of sides, on the part of Turenne, 1650—1651, and of Condé, 1652, Oct.—1659, occasioned by the *Fronde*, afforded but temporary aid to the Spanish. As early as 1653 the

French under Turenne acquire a preponderance in the Netherlands. Alliance of Cromwell with Mazarin, March 23, 1657. Capture and occupation of Dunkirk by the English, Jan. 23, 1658. Cromwell's death puts an end to the war. Peace of the Pyrenees, Nov. 7, 1659. France obtains: 1. Roussillon; 2. several fortresses on the frontiers of the Netherlands, in Artois, and Flanders; 3. engages on the other hand not to assist Portugal; 4. partial restitution made to the duke of Lorraine, the ally of Spain; entire restitution to prince Condé; 5. the commercial relations were regulated; 6. marriage agreed upon between Louis XIV. and the infanta Maria Theresa. Thirty years' war. 1618-1648.

Hostilities between France and Lorraine sprang from the hatred between Richelieu and Charles III. 1624—1675, on account of the connection of the latter with Gaston of Orleans. France, in consequence, endeavoured to obtain a part or the whole of Lorraine; Charles III. and his nephew, the great Austrian general, Charles IV. (1675—1690) attached themselves to the house of Austria, till full restitution was made to Leopold, the son of the latter, by the peace of Ryswick, 1697. France learnt to her cost, that even a banished prince may become formidable.

Histoire des négociations et du traité de la paix des Pyrenées. Amsterd. 1750, 2 vols. 12mo.

II. *View of the contemporary changes in the principal states of the West of Europe and their consequences.*

I. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

1. Though the political character of Spain continued the same, important changes had taken place in her affairs, and greatly to her disadvantage. The Low Country war, renewed Spain and Portugal. 1621-1648.

1618-1660. and so unsuccessfully conducted, joined to a miserable administration, had led to the loss of Portugal, and a long insurrection fomented by France in Catalonia. The re-establishment of the throne of Portugal in favour of John of Braganza caused a long war, prosecuted without vigour, which terminated in the acknowledgment of the independence of Portugal. Though Portugal was a state of inferior rank, its geographical situation rendered it of consequence as an ally to the enemies of Spain. But the ancient splendour of the throne could not be restored, for there was no Emanuel the Great to ascend it, and the East Indies were already well nigh lost.

Contemporary changes.

~1640.

1640-1652.

~1668.

II. FRANCE.

France. 2. The government of France during nearly the whole of this period was in the hands of two ecclesiastics, cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin. The first, to correct political views, united much energy, though little morality of character. His eighteen years' administration was therefore guided from beginning to end by the same maxims: aggrandisement of the royal power in the interior—extension of the national influence in the affairs of Europe. The former presupposed the disarming of the Huguenots. And after the capture of Rochelle who had he to fear? The block relieved him of the conspira-

~1624-1642.

Oct. 1628.

tors. In foreign countries he restored the influence of the French in Italy, in the Netherlands, in Germany, and established it in Sweden. Wherever he could he encouraged insurrections. Against Austria and Spain he stood almost always in arms. The promotion of the arts and sciences purchased him the usual praise. It is impossible to admire his administration examined in detail; yet on the whole it suited the character of the nation. He laid the foundation of the structure which Louis XIV. perfected. 1618-1660. Contemporary changes. France.

Maximes d'Etat, ou testament politique du Cardinal de Richelieu. Paris, 1764, 2 vols. 8vo. This work is no history, but an undisguised exposition of the political maxims of the minister.

3. Mazarin, the minister of the regent Anne of Austria, during the minority of Louis XIV., only strove to accomplish what his predecessor had begun; but it was soon evident that he did not possess his predecessor's abilities. The minority of the king gave greater scope to the nobles, which brought about the troubles of the *Fronde*—a true national drama in its commencement progress and close, performed by the lords and ladies of the court; and although of somewhat bloody nature, strictly belonging to that species of entertainment whose very essence consists of intrigue. The prime minister maintained his ground against the demagogue Retz; matters therefore remained much as before; but 1642-1661. 1648-1652.

1618-1660. Contemporary changes. France.

the kingly power was much increased by the final limitation of the claims of the princes of the blood, which was effected after the failure of Condé's attempt for their advancement.

Commencement of the troubles, Aug. 1648. Civil war under the great Condé, Oct. 1651. Flight of the condemned prince to Spain, and the disturbances cease, Oct. 1652. Condé was not restored till the peace of the Pyrenees, 1659. (See p. 162.)

L'esprit de la Fronde, ou Histoire politique et militaire des troubles en France pendant la minorité de Louis XIV., par M. MAILLY. Paris, 1772, 2 vols. 12mo.

Among the numerous memoirs, the best is that of the principal actor:

Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz. (1648—1655). Cologne, 1718, 3 vols. This most accurate observer of others, does not always speak truly of himself.

Compare:

Mémoires de M. Joly. vols. i, ii. Amsterd. 1718. As authority on the other side.

III. ENGLAND.

England.

4. This period to England was one of great domestic convulsions, the fruit, like those of Germany, of the Reformation. Here, however, they were produced by the political party-spirit which arose among the protestants themselves, in consequence of the schisms between the episcopalians and the presbyterians or puritans. The crisis was hastened by the difference between the theoretical principles of the Stuarts with re-

spect to the origin and extent of the royal power, and those of the puritans. Thus the kings became involved in quarrels with the nation, at the very time when the want of money, created by their mistaken political economy, rendered them dependent on it. The foundation of the whole evil was laid under James I. But when his son Charles I. increased his embarrassment by a double and fruitless war with Spain and France, the differences between him and the parliament became so serious that his only resource was frequent dissolutions of that body, and he even made the attempt to reign without it. But the troubles in Scotland, caused by himself, forcing him again to convoke it, the lower house usurped in the Long Parliament, a power similar to that of the French national convention of later times.

1618-1660. Contemporary changes. England.

1603-1625.

1627-1630.

1630-1640.

Nov. 1640, to April, 1653.

5. The well-planned attacks of the Long Parliament on the king's ministers and prerogatives, led eventually to a civil war, in which the king was finally defeated. But in the course of this war, fanaticism gaining ground in the Parliament, a party was formed of the wildest and most crafty fanatics, who, under the name of Independents—like the faction of the Mountain in France—made liberty and equality their object; only differing in this, that in accordance with the prevailing spirit of the times, religion was the moving cause. Their leaders, especially Oliver Cromwell, made themselves masters of the army, and, by means of the army, of the captive king,

1642 to May, 1646.

Cromwell 1644.

1618-1660. Contemporary changes.—England.

who was finally brought to the scaffold. Conformably to the maxims of the party, England was declared a republic; and Scotland and Ireland were obliged to submit. But the military character of government had already given rise to a quarrel between the chiefs of the army and the parliament, so that Cromwell judged it expedient to dissolve it, and caused himself to be proclaimed by his council of war, protector of the republic.

April, 20, 1653.

6. The protectorship remained a military government, notwithstanding the repeated attempts made to give it a tinge of parliamentary liberty; and consequently, being in opposition to the national character, it contained within itself the seeds of its own ruin. But the continental relations of England, which had sunk almost to nothing, were revived and carried to a high pitch by Cromwell. If passion had some share in this, it was kept, upon the whole, subordinate to commercial interest. The fruits of this were *the act of navigation,* and the successful naval enterprises in the West Indies, on the coast of the North Sea, and the Baltic. The first was maintained by the bloody maritime war with Holland; the latter were partially effected by the war with Spain, in alliance with France.

The act of navigation passed, 1651, renewed by Charles II. 1660, was 1st, to secure to England the exclusive trade with its own colonies; 2nd, to allow to strangers no importation, unless of their own products and in their own vessels. It was

a fruit of the rising exertions of states to monopolise all commerce to themselves; but affected almost exclusively Holland, who then enjoyed nearly the whole of the carrying trade. 1618-1660. Contemporary changes.

Dutch war, 1652. Great naval battles repeatedly occurred. At the peace, April 15, 1654, England preserved the honour of her flag.—In the war with Spain, 1655—1658; capture of Jamaica—1655; of Dunkirk, during the alliance with France, and ceded to England. England.

7. Upon the death of Cromwell, his son Richard succeeded him in the protectorship; but finding it wiser to abdicate, the contests among the leaders brought about the restoration, finally effected by Monk. This was rather the work of party spirit than of reason, and was unaccompanied by any precautions for the future; and as Charles II. after he had regained the throne, retained the ancient prejudices of the Stuarts, the old elements of dissension between the king and people still remained, and the government continued destitute of any settled character. Sept. 3, 1658. April, 1659. May, 1660.

Besides the sections in Rapin and Hume, we especially cite:

The history of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, from 1649 *to* 1660, by EWD. HYDE, earl of Clarendon. fol. Oxford. [The best edition, containing the suppressed passages, is Oxford, 1826, 8 vols. 8vo.]

IV. THE UNITED NETHERLANDS.

8. When the peace of Westphalia secured to the republic her independence, she was in the full bloom of her prosperity. The late twenty-seven United Netherlands.

1618-1660. Contemporary changes.

United Netherlands.

years' war with Spain had not diminished it, for the theatre of the war on land lay beyond her frontiers, carried on in the Spanish provinces, and at sea she had been decisively successful. Though not free from debt, her citizens were rich. But the germ of internal dissension, suppressed under Maurice from fear, and under his brother Frederic Henry from love, burst out under his son William II., and probably nothing but his early death averted greater misfortunes. The abolition of the dignity of stadtholder in five provinces procured for the grand pensionary of the states of Holland, Jean de Witt, so much influence, that the management of foreign affairs fell almost entirely in his hands.

† 1625.

† 1647.

Oct. 1650.

1653-1672.

Renewal of the war with Spain, 1621. Rendered important on land by the sieges of Breda, Bois-le-duc, and many others, till the alliance with France, 1635. As a naval war, successful on the side of the Netherlands, through privateering, by conquests in the colonies, especially from Portugal; and by the naval wars in Europe, especially in 1639.—Peace negotiated at the congress of Westphalia, which France endeavoured in all ways, but in vain, to prevent from being concluded. At the peace, Jan. 24, 1648, not only was 1. the independence of the republic acknowledged by Spain, but 2. the dominions she then possessed, both in Europe (by which the republic retained the territory vested in the states-general and Mastricht,) and in the colonies, were confirmed to her; 3. the closing of the Scheldt (a solitary example) was consented to by Spain.

V. AUSTRIA AND THE EASTERN COUNTRIES.

1618-1660. Contemporary changes. Austria.

9. Though the influence of the house of Austria in Germany had been contracted during this period within its proper limits, yet on the other hand its power increased in Hungary as well as Bohemia, which latter, being deprived of its privileges, now became an hereditary monarchy. More permanent tranquillity might have reigned here, had it not been disturbed by the prince of Transylvania and the Jesuits. Partial attempts to render Hungary an hereditary monarchy, were already made, however zealously the Hungarians resisted every innovation; and when did a persevering policy ever fail to be finally victorious?

Any lasting quiet was made almost impossible by the relations of Transylvania, whose elective princes were at once vassals of the Porte and of Hungary. If these princes would or could have improved the advantages of their situation, they might have become the founders of a new empire. Austria was compelled to purchase peace of Gabriel Bethlen, (1613—1629,) who was already called king of Hungary, by cessions of territory, 1616 and 1621. Of his successors, George Rakozy I., († 1648), and II., († 1660), the former entered into a connection with Sweden and France, 1643, and concluded on the 24th of Aug., a peace advantageous for him and the protestants; the latter was occupied with Poland more than with Hungary.—In Hungary the religious relations produced continual excitement, since the Jesuits were able to make

1618-1660. their projects against the protestants agree admirably well with those of the court.

Contemporary changes.

Turkish empire.

10. The Turkish empire already showed symptoms of the internal decline common to the great monarchies of the East; inefficient rulers educated in the seraglio; arrogance in the Janisaries, who exercised the right of appointing to the throne; and rebellious governors. But as the personal energy of a barbarous nation does not die, nothing was wanting but a ruler like
1622-1640. Amurath IV. to make it formidable. Happily however for Austria and Germany, he sought no influence over the European political system, from his projects of conquest being levelled against Persia. And though his successor, Ibra-
† 1648. him, began the protracted war against Candia, which was wrested from the Venetians by his son Mohammed in 1668, yet it was the part they
From 1675. took in the Transylvanian contests, that rendered the Turks so dangerous to their western neighbours in the following period.

General observations.

11. As regards practical policy, this period was important both for its forms and its fundamental maxims. The forms were rendered far more definite by Richelieu, the founder of cabinet policy, but the web at the same time more complicated. Yet it was the congress of Westphalia, which exercised the principal influence upon it. Never had Europe seen negotiations of such extent and importance. What was it not deemed possible to effect after this by con-

gresses? The example of Richelieu and Mazarin, led ecclesiastics to be preferred as negotiators. Policy may have gained thereby in dignity, but certainly not in uprightness. 1618-1660. General observations.

12. However political maxims had been developed, their consequences had not been foreseen. The work of HUGO GROTIUS, *de jure belli et pacis*, taught rulers, that there was a law of nations, and effected much from the high reputation of its author. The British revolution had occasioned the question respecting the rights of the people and the rights of kings, to be thoroughly discussed: both were defended by the sword as well as with the pen. Though Filmer was forgotten, Hobbes and Algernon Sidney did not write without effect. The obstinate unreasonableness of the Stuarts only animated these investigations; and prepared for the establishment of national liberty. The maxims of freedom and equality, promulgated by the independents, were not lost. Though they were not received and acted upon in England, they took root and flourished in the soil of America, whence they have since been transplanted to Europe, though not in their original purity. 1625.–

Political Discources of ROB. FILMER. Lond. 1680. A poor, but at that time weighty defender of the sovereign power of kings; far excelled by:

TH. HOBBES *Leviathan, sive de materia, forma et potestate civitatis.* Lond. 1651. [First printed in English.] *Discourses on Government by* ALGERNON SIDNEY, first printed at Lond.

1618-1660. General observations.

1698. The famous defender and martyr of republicanism. He wrote in reply to Filmer.

13. Political economy made no essential advance. Richelieu only provided—no matter how—for the public exigencies of the moment; Mazarin, for himself as well. Little progress could be expected, in this department of government, during the wars of Germany or the revolution of England. Even in the Netherlands, loans were the only resource on the renewal of the war. But the example of this state served to confirm more and more the fact, that manufactures and foreign trade are in general the principal sources of national wealth; from the misapplication of which so many injurious errors afterwards sprung.

14. The military art necessarily underwent great changes during such wars as that of the thirty years' and of the Netherlands. These changes, however, did not consist in the increase of standing armies. The generals levied and disbanded their troops; what Mansfield and Christian of Brunswick had done on a small scale, Wallenstein did on a large one. Gustavus Adolphus was the only general whose genius struck out a new species of tactics, which aimed at quicker motion, by means of files less deep, lighter arms, and improved artillery. His brigades overthrew the imperial regiments, much the same as the Roman legions of old did the Macedonian phalanx.—In discipline, also, he set

a good example; but murdering and pillaging did not cease, till the private advantage of the pillagers, taught them to set some bounds to their outrages. 1618-1660. General observations.

III. *History of the affairs of the European Colonies, from* 1618 *to* 1660.

1. The history of the colonies during this period is not so important for the changes they underwent as for their rapid advance. The Dutch, already the first commercial people, had established their system in the last period, which they extended, but without any essential alteration. The same holds good of the English. Least of all among the Spanish and Portuguese were any voluntary changes to be expected. Colonial affairs. 1618-1660. Dutch.

2. The commerce and manufactures of the Dutch, favoured by national liberty, which was perfected during this period, became so flourishing as to awaken the jealousy of their neighbours. Their industry was directed to manufactories by the peculiar character of their country; but these could only have been carried to the extent they were by the happy concurrence of two circumstances: the facility of procuring funds in consequence of the immense accumulation of national capital, and the increasing wants of Europe and the colonies, through the accelerated improvement of the social condition.

Scarcity of fuel naturally occasioned handicraft and manufactures performed by human labour to flourish, rather than

Colonial affairs. 1618-1660. Dutch.

manufactories impelled by machinery, such as the steam engine in modern times have given rise to in England. Among these stand the manufacture of woollens, hemp linen, paper, and ship building, besides innumerable smaller wares.—The propelling power was obtained by various kinds of mills. The contrivance of these called forth the mechanical skill of the inhabitants, and rendered Holland unrivalled, or indeed unique, in that branch of industrial art.

3. As with all great commercial nations the colonial trade stands foremost, so amongst the Dutch the East Indian remained the principal branch. The company, even as a political body, was now seen in its full power; and, notwithstanding the treaty concluded with the English, contrived at length, chiefly by the horrible transactions in Amboyna, to drive its rivals entirely from the Moluccas. The maintenance of this monopoly, in the most odious forms, remained therefore its chief object. To obtain the productions of these countries they subjected the natives by arms and treaties. The Dutch themselves were not colonists; for there was nothing at home to drive them in any numbers beyond the sea.

1619. 1623.

4. The new settlement of Batavia remained the seat of government, and the centre of the Dutch possessions in India. As a city however its rise was comparatively slow. It was the point from which their conquests and traffic spread; the former on Malabar, Coromandel, Ceylon, and other islands; the latter by their relations with China and Japan.

Possessions taken from the Portuguese: 1. Paliakata off the Coromandel coast, 1615, instead of which Negapatam, from 1658, became the principal residence. 2. On the Malabar, Calicut, 1656, Cochin and Cananor, 1661, by which the whole pepper trade fell into their hands. Factories also were spread over both coasts, as far as Bengal. 3. In the island of Ceylon they gained possession of Columbo, 1656, being their share of the spoils captured from the Portuguese, in the war with the latter as allies of the king of Candy, whom they had assisted since 1638. Mannaar and Jaffanapatam in 1658. But the Dutch became involved in a war with Candy, which soon ceased and as soon broke out again. 4. On the further side of India, Malacca was conquered, 1640, and Pegu and Siam invaded. 5. They extended their power on the Sunda islands, as they became masters of the greater part of Java, on Celebes, 1660, Sumatra, etc. partially by forts and factories. 6. In Japan they succeeded, by the revolution of 1639, in driving out the Portuguese, and, although under great restrictions, in gaining a footing for themselves. The Dutch trade with China was less important, especially after their expulsion from Formosa, 1661.—The whole territory of the company was divided into five governments: Java, Amboyna, Ternate, Ceylon, and Macassar, in addition to which there were settlements under directors and commanders. All were subordinate to the government at Batavia.

Colonial affairs. 1618-1660. Dutch.

5. But the surest bulwark of their Indian possessions was the settlement founded at the Cape of Good Hope. According to the intentions of its founders, it was an agricultural colony, and its situation, joined to the judicious regulations which were at first adopted, would have rendered it far more important, had not the company made it the place of call for vessels in their voyages to the East Indies. It constituted a government by itself, making the sixth.

Colonial affairs. 1618-1660. Dutch.

ROLBE *Beschreibung des Vorgebirge der guten Hoffnung.* Nurnb. 1719, folio.

SPARRMANN *Reise nach dem Vorgebirge der guten Hoffnung,* (From the Swedish of GROSFORD). Berlin, 1784, 8vo.

Vollständige Beschreibung des Vorgebirges der guten Hoffnung, von O. F. MENTZEL. Glogau, 1785, 2 parts, 8vo.

BARROW's *Travels in Southern Africa,* Lond. vol. i, 1801; ii, 1804, 4to. With the first good map.

6. The success of the East Indian company led the Dutch, immediately after the breaking out of the second war with Spain, to incorporate another privileged company. It was formed on the same model, and the West Indian trade was entrusted to it. Brazil was the object of its attacks, but it soon disovered that war, carried on either openly or by privateering, is in the end no very lucrative employment.

Foundation of the company, June 3, 1621. Its privileges comprised the western coast of Africa, from the northern tropic to the Cape; almost the whole of the eastern and western coasts of America; and the islands of the Pacific. It was divided into five chambers, and their funds amounted to about seven millions of guilders.—During the first years, privateering was a profitable pursuit, especially the capture of the fleet laden with silver, 1628.—Conquests in Brazil from 1630, Olinda in Pernambuco taken and burned; where the fortified suburbs of Recif, become the principal seat of the Dutch; the resistance, however, made by Mathias Albuquerque, prevent their subjugating more than the coasts of Pernambuco. But in 1636—1643, count John Maurice is sent out as stadtholder-general, with unlimited power. He seemed exactly calculated to form a state beyond the ocean, founded on freedom of commerce and religion. All Pernambuco and some contiguous provinces were brought under the dominion of the Dutch; who were unable, however, to make

themselves masters of St. Salvador; and although by the truce with Portugal, now again independent, June 23, 1641, the Dutch were to retain their conquests, they were lost again in the course of a few years, when envy and distrust at home led to the recall of John Maurice (1643). Even while peace still existed between the mother countries, the war revived here in 1645; and to the heroism of Don Juan de Vieira, Portugal was indebted for the preservation of Brazil. Recif was surrendered to Vieira, Jan. 27, 1654, and all the Dutch expelled.—Conquest of St. George della Mina on the coast of Africa, 1637.—Settlements made in the West Indies, on the island rocks of St. Eustatia, 1632, of Curaçao, 1634, and on the isles of Saba, 1640, and St. Martin, 1649; these settlements were never very important as colonies, but more so for their contraband trade.

7. The Dutch herring and whale fisheries had no direct connection with their colonies; but the disputes which arose with England, respecting the herring fishery on the Scottish coast, led to political quarrels, as well as to the claims of England to the dominion of the sea.

The question respecting the herring fishery on the British coasts was first raised by James I. 1608; renewed by Charles I. 1635, and by Cromwell 1652. The Dutch, however, maintained the right of fishing, to within about forty miles from the coast. The whale fishery, after the abolition of the company in 1645, was left entirely free.

8. Of the branches of European trade, that of the Baltic deserves more especial notice, from its political importance, as it involved the republic in the disputes of the north; though the commerce of the Rhine surpassed it in other respects. But the carrying trade was beyond all the most extensive, owing to the other countries

Colonial affairs. 1618-1660.

being entirely without ships; this however received a powerful blow from the British navigation act.

English.

9. While the republic thus raised her commerce to an extent which rendered it almost a monopoly, it was inevitable that a rivalry must ensue with England, who was struggling to attain the same advantage. This rivalry contributed essentially towards the two wars under Cromwell and Charles II.; but political relations subsequently prevented its continuance, and the opposition of trading companies did not, at this time, lead to national hostilities. In England monopolies were, during this period still more than in the former one, a principal source of revenue under the arbitrary reign of Charles I. These nourished discontent, yet, notwithstanding their baneful effects, trade flourished and national prosperity increased, for these were the work of the nation, not the government.

J. SELDEN, *mare clausum seu de dominio maris*, liberi ii, Lond. 1635. Written by order of the government. A prolix historical deduction, which proves nothing.—It maintains that the four seas around England were its property. But where were their limits in the north and west?

10. The British East Indian trade remained, during this period, in the hands of the company, although great changes were made in it. Driven from the Spice islands by the Dutch, its only remaining factories were in Bantam, and on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts; even the ac-

quisition of Madras improved its situation so little, that it seemed on the verge of ruin; and a free trade with India had begun, till Cromwell in some measure restored it by the renewal of its privileges. Colonial affairs. 1618-1660. 1653. 1658.

Expulsion of the English from the Spice islands, after the massacre of Amboyna, 1623; in lieu of these, they were promised, at the peace, 1651, the spice island Poleron; but were unable to keep it.—The expulsion from the Moluccas turned their attention to the Carnatic. Madras obtained, and fort St. George established, 1640, with the consent of the king of Golconda. At first dependent on Bantam, but raised in 1658 to a presidency.—The Persian silk trade was carried on from Surat to Ispahan by way of Grambron, after the English had assisted the Persians, in 1622, to conquer Ormus. But the competition of the Dutch, and the insecurity of the route, rendered it difficult; and the company still needed the firmans of the Sophis and Moguls.—The domestic troubles of England were unfavourable to this trade; from the maxims which now prevailed there, and the needy state of the government.

11. The possessions of the English in the West Indies consisted of settlements made by private persons on several of the smaller Antilles, which were little valued, as inferior tobacco and cotton were almost their only produce. Nor was it till the cultivation of the sugar cane began to thrive in Barbadoes, where it had been introduced from Brazil, that their value was appreciated. This, and the conquest of Jamaica, laid the foundation of the future commere of the British in this part of the world. 1641.

First settlement on Barbadoes and part of St. Christopher, 1625; on Bermuda and Nevis, 1628; on Montserrat and

Colonial affairs. 1618-1660. English.

Antigua, 1632. Conquest of Jamaica, 1655, and introduction of the sugar cane there, 1660. The English settle also on Surinam, 1640. Capture of the uninhabited Bahama islands, and a settlement on Providence, 1629, the key, as it were, of the West Indies.

The History, civil and commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies, by BRYAN EDWARDS, 3 vols. 4to. 1793; reprinted in 6 vols. 8vo. The principal work for the general history of the British West Indies.—The third volume comprehends the wars of St. Domingo.

America.

12. The North American colonies, however, above all others, made such rapid strides during this period, that their importance was already felt by the nation. The persecution of the puritans, and the internal convulsions of England, drove great numbers of its inhabitants across the Atlantic. The various states, as comprised under the general names of Virginia and New England, began to separate; and received, after 1624. the breaking up of the London company and 1637. the ruin of the Plymouth association, constitutional governments, which, though intended to promote a greater dependence on the king, were united with a considerable leven of republicanism, which the state of society in these colonies naturally produced.

Rise of Massachusetts, 1621, and settlement of Boston, 1627, chiefly by enthusiastic lovers of religious and civil liberty, whose lives made their principles prevail on that side of the ocean. Introduction of a free representative system as early as 1634. Rhode island founded in the same year, by emigrants from Massachusetts. From this state likewise proceeded the first settlement in Connecticut, in 1636. Set-

tlements were likewise made from it in New Hampshire and Maine, in 1637; subject, however, to the government of Massachusetts. Union of these provinces for their common defence, under the name of New England, 1643.—Maryland settled under Lord Baltimore, and the city of Baltimore founded, mostly by catholics, 1632.—Virginia, as the southern portion of the coast, still undivided; it increases in proportion to the spread of tobacco.—The Act of Navigation renewed, embracing also the North American colonies, 1660; an acknowledgment, on the part of the mother country, of their importance to navigation and commerce. Colonial affairs. 1618-1660.

For the earlier history: *A General History of the British Empire in America*, by J. H. WYNNE, in two volumes, London, 1770, 8vo. Comprehending Canada and the West Indies.

ROBERTSON'S *America*, see above p. 140.

CHR. LEISTE, *Beschreibung des Brittischen Amerika*, Wolfen. 1778, 8vo.

13. The French, too, fixed their regard on both Indies, and began to make some figure on account of their colonies. But the attempts under Richelieu, to acquire a share of the East Indian trade, were without success: on the other hand, the plantations on several of the West Indian islands flourished, but as they were founded by individual perseverance, they remained private property. French.

First settlements on St. Christopher at the same time with the English, 1625. Thence on Guadaloupe and Martinique, 1635, which produced a considerable supply of sugar towards the end of this period.—About this time, the first attempts were made to form settlements on Cayenne; and at Senegal, on the coast of Africa.

For the earlier history, *Histoire générale des Antilles, habitées par les Français*, par LE PERE DU TERTRE, Paris, 1667, 4 vols. 4to.

Colonial affairs. 1618-1960. Spain and Portugal.

14. Spain lost all the colonies of Portugal, with the exception of Ceuta, when the latter regained its independence. All her old possessions, however, she still retained. But although Portugal repelled all the attacks of the Dutch in Brazil, their conquests deprived her of all her East Indian possessions, except Goa and Diu, 1622. while Ormus was taken from her by the Persians, with the assistance of the English. Nothing but the rising importance of Brazil enabled her to maintain her rank among colonial nations.

Next to Philip II., Philip IV. is the king who made the greatest number of regulations in the colonies. But the principal ancient regulations were preserved; and no important changes took place either in the administration (some regulations in Chili excepted, see *Leyes*, L. VI. tit. 16,) or in commerce. Many things were more accurately settled, such as the time of the departure of the fleets. Greater freedom was not to be expected.

FIRST PERIOD.

From the end of the Fifteenth Century to the time of Louis XIV. 1492—1661.

PART THE SECOND.

HISTORY OF THE NORTHERN POLITICAL SYSTEM, FROM THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION OF CALMAR TO THE TREATIES OF OLIVA AND COPENHAGEN, 1523—1660.

J. J. SCHMAUSS *Einleitung zu der Staatswissenschaft. Zweiter Theil; die Historie aller zwischen den Nordischen Potenzen, Dänemark, Schweden, Russland, Polen, und Preussen geschlossenen Tractaten in sich haltend,* 4to. Leipzig, 1747-8.— Extending down to 1743. Hitherto the principal work for the general diplomatic history of the north.

Preliminary remarks. 1523-1660.

1. THE beginning of the sixteenth century constitutes no less an epoch for the north of Europe, than for the west. In the five principal northern states, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Russia, and Prussia, as it then existed, revolutions took place, which either at once determined their future form and character, or had a vast influence upon them.

2. These revolutions were brought about by two great events, by the re-establishment of the Swedish throne by the dissolution of the union of Calmar; and the Reformation. The formal

Preliminary remarks. 1523-1660.

dissolution of that alliance, which aimed at placing the three northern kingdoms under one ruler, without having fully obtained its object, created a number of independent states in the north, whose relations, as soon as common points of collision arose, became extremely intricate.

3. The Reformation had a still greater political influence, if possible, in the north of Europe than in the south. It was so favourably received in the three principal countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, that it soon prevailed; in the last it immediately became the principal basis of the constitution, in the two others it became so after a very short period. It affected all the subsequent relations of Prussia; and in a great measure prepared the future fate of Poland.

4. The ruling nations of the north were of twofold descent, partly German, partly Slavonian; and this diversity shewed itself in their governments. Among the former the feudal system had been established in the same manner as in the west; but the citizens here formed a separate order, although the nobility and clergy possessed a great preponderance. In the Slavonian countries of Poland and Russia, on the contrary, the nobility, without any distinct feudal relations, had reduced the people to slavery; and no class of citizens could be formed, as there were no commercial cities. The two therefore differed essentially in this, that the former contained the ele-

ments for the construction of a civil constitution, while in the latter they were wholly wanting. Preliminary remarks. 1523-1660.

1. DENMARK. Its kings, elected since 1447 from the house of Holstein Oldenburg, intended to be kings of the three united northern monarchies; they, however, but seldom were so; and when Christian II. attempted in vain to enforce the union in Sweden, a rebellion broke out even in Denmark, 1523, which cost him his throne, and soon after his liberty, 1532. The Reformation first introduced into Denmark, 1527, under his successor Frederic I., and gradually into Norway. Denmark and Norway united into one kingdom, 1532. The Danish elective kings much restricted by their capitulation, by the council of the kingdom, and by the administration of the nobility.

J. M. SCHROECKH, *Christliche Kirchengeschichte seit der Reformation.* Zweiter Thiel, 1804, 8vo. For the history of the introduction of the Reformation into the kingdoms of the north.

2. SWEDEN. The Swedish monarchy was re-established in 1523, by Gustavus Vasa, († 1560,) and strengthened, 1st, by a change in the relations with Denmark, under Frederic I. and by the treaty with him at Malmo, 1524; 2nd, by the aid of the Reformation, and the confiscations connected with it, of the property of the clergy, 1527; and 3rd, by making the crown hereditary in his family, in the diet at Westeräs, 1544. Happy was it for Sweden that he reigned long enough to secure the succession to his house.

Geschichte Gustav's Wasa, König von Schweden, von J. W. VON ARCHENHOLZ. 1801, 2 vols. 8vo. From Swedish historians. But superseded by: RUHS, *Geschichte von Schweden*, 1803, 2 vols. 8vo.

3. POLAND was united with the grand duchy Litthau under one king, (but not into one kingdom till 1569,) and continued till 1572 under the Jagellos. Whether it was an elective or an hereditary kingdom, was not exactly known in Poland itself. The seeds of domestic and foreign discord were

Preliminary remarks. 1523-1660.

nowhere more thickly sown; nowhere was there so little hope of amelioration as here. Who could define its boundaries with respect to Russia, the Tartars, and the Teutonic order? or who could define its internal relations? Small as the immediate connection between the forms of a state and its happiness may appear, there are yet some which are so prejudicial, and at the same time so incapable of improvement, that their annihilation by a despot is the only means of escape. These forms Poland possessed, but Poland unfortunately never obtained so beneficent a despot.—Even the Reformation, though it soon found access to Poland, had little influence on the nation, as local causes for a long time prevented the new sects, (among which, besides the evangelicals, were the socinians,) from forming a political party.

4. PRUSSIA. Neither by its situation or extent did this country seem calculated to play any considerable part in the general affairs of Europe, yet by a strange concatenation of events, occasioned by the introduction of Christianity, and afterwards by the introduction of the Reformation, it became one of the chief actors. By the former 1230—1283, the dominion of the Teutonic order was established. The natives were subjugated. German commercial colonies arose, but perpetual and bloody wars were carried on with Poland and Litthau, and at last, in 1525, between the order itself and the country and towns. By the introduction of the Reformation, the country was secularised under the grand master Albert, of Brandenburg, 1525, and transformed into an hereditary duchy, but as a Polish fief, (in as far as it had not already become, by the peace of Thorn, 1466, a Polish province, under the title of Polish Prussia.) It passed to the electoral line, 1618, which prepared its future fate and high political importance.

5. RUSSIA. Under Ivan Vasilevitch I., 1462—1505, Russia, by its liberation from the dominion of the Mongolians and the conquest of Novgorod, was rendered an independent empire, which, although nearly bounded by the Dneiper and the Don, was already formidable from its size and its desire of conquest. As this empire, however, lay quite beyond the

reach of the Reformation,—that common spring of national advancement,—its internal civilisation required some other strong stirring principle. But the framework of society would have seemed as unpromising here as in Poland, had it not happened that the energy of the rulers possessed a freer space for action. The reign of Ivan Vasilevitch II. the first czar, the founder of Russian dominion in the north of Asia, in Casan, and Astracan, 1533—1584, the precursor of Peter the Great, affords an example of this which we in vain seek for in the history of Poland. Preliminary remarks. 1523-1660.

I. *History of the Affairs and Wars respecting Livonia, to the beginning of the Struggle for the Swedish succession.* 1533—1600.

5. Down to the middle of the sixteenth century there was no event which affected the common interest of the states of the north, so as to become the centre point of their politics. Each was engaged with its own domestic affairs, or at most, with those of its nearest neighbour. Ivan Vasilevitch had, indeed, among his other conquests, aimed at that of Livonia; but the truce of fifty years suppressed the dreadful hostilities respecting this country, till they were renewed by Ivan Vasilevitch II., when Livonia became for the north of Europe, what Milan had been for the south. Contests respecting Livonia. 1533-1600.

The political relations of Livonia (with Courland and Semigallia) similar to those of Prussia from 1525. Christianity introduced, and the country conquered by the Knights of the Sword, 1205, who, however, attached themselves, in 1238, to the Teutonic order. But in 1520, their Heermeister, Walter of Plettenburg, purchased his freedom from this dependence,

Contests respecting Livonia. 1533-1600.

and made use of the introduction of the Reformation, by means of the subjugation of the city and archbishopric Riga, to constitute himself master of the whole country, though without either having recourse to a formal act of secularisation, or rendering the sovereignty hereditary. Previous to this the Heermeisters had only been rulers over the western portion of the country, as the archbishops of Riga possessed dominion over their archbishoprics. This partition was the source of contests and wars, in which all the powers of the north were involved.

Essai critique sur l'histoire de la Livonie suivi d'un tableau de l'etat actuel de cette province, par L. C. D. B. (M. LE COMTE DE BRAY,) à Dorpat, 1817, 3 vols. 8vo. An equally critical and lucid exposition of the relations of the country, which are often extremely intricate.

1558. Nov. 28, 1561. 6. Attack on Livonia by Ivan Vasilevitch II. and a treaty concluded between the grand master, Gotthard Kettler, and Poland, by which 1st, Courland and Semigallia are ceded to him as an hereditary duchy under the protection of Poland; on the other hand, 2nd, Livonia itself is united 1562. to Poland, for which Esthonia and Reval are united to Sweden. Thus Livonia became the subject of contention between the three leading powers of the north; and the claims of the czar necessarily caused a general war, (in which even Denmark became implicated from her jealousy of Sweden,) till Russia was compelled, after a contest of twenty-five years, to relinquish its attempts, and Livonia was left to Poland and Sweden.

Invasion of Livonia by the czar, 1558. War between Russia and Poland, and also between Poland and Sweden,

1562. Livonia ravaged in a dreadful manner. A war broke out in 1563 between Denmark and Sweden, under pretence of the contested claims of right to the armorial bearings of the empire; it was at the same time a war by sea and land; and although peace was restored between the two latter at Alt-Stettin, Dec. 13, 1570, in consideration of a mutual surrender of claims, yet the war continued in Livonia, on which the czar sought in vain to impose Magnus, a Danish prince, as king, till Sweden and Poland united, in 1577, against Russia, by which the Russians, in the peace with Poland, Jan. 15, 1582, and the truce with Sweden, 1583, not only lost all Livonia, but also resigned Carelia to Sweden, and were totally excluded from the Baltic. Livonia remained, though without any fixed adjustment, till the treaty of May, 1595, in the possession of Poland, Esthonia in that of Sweden.

Contests respecting Livonia. 1533-1600.

7. While these wars were going on, and immediately after their close, the reigning families of two of the northern states became extinct. In Russia, the czar Feodore I. son of Vasilevitch, being the last male of the dynasty of Rurik, this line of monarchs closed at his death; a circumstance which was followed by an anarchy of fifteen years, and which plunged the states of the north into a general war, till the dynasty of Romanow ascended the throne. But the extinction of the house of Jagello in Poland, which had happened some time before, was of still greater importance. From the erection of that kingdom into an elective monarchy, a volcano, in a manner, burst forth in the midst of Europe, whose eruptions, at almost every change of government, threatened in turn every country, far and near.

1598.

1572.

Contests respecting Livonia. 1533-1600.

Of the eleven kings of Poland, from Henry of Valois, 1572, to Stanislaus, 1764, hardly three were unanimously elected; foreign influence and a wild spirit of faction continued from first to last.

II. *History of the Polish and Swedish war of succession, and other matters connected with it, to the peace of Oliva and Copenhagen*, 1600—1660.

Besides SCHMAUSS, the great work for northern history, from 1578—1637, is KHEVENHILLER'S *Annales Ferdinandei*, etc., see above p. 95.

War of succession. 1600-1660.

1. While Livonia had become the object of contention between the northern powers, and continued to be so between Sweden and Poland, there arose between these kingdoms the much more dreadful war of succession, which lasted for more than fifty years, being nourished by religious differences and foreign policy. It was one of the earliest fruits of the Polish freedom
1587. of election, and was occasioned by the Poles electing Sigismond of Sweden, the future heir of that country, their king, and thereby opening an avenue to the monstrous union under one monarch of two kingdoms, separated not only by their geographical situation, but far more so by their difference of religion.

Sigismond, son of John III. and the Polish princess Catharine, was, like his mother, a zealous catholic, and the tool of the jesuits. By his means they hoped to effect the great object of their wishes, which they seem almost to have done

under his father; viz. the restoration of the catholic religion in Sweden. Polish and Swedish war of succession. 1600-1660.

2. But when upon the death of John III. of Sweden his son Sigismond actually succeeded him, the consequences soon displayed themselves. No credit was placed in Sweden in his assurances. His uncle, who was appointed regent in his stead, felt more inclination to rule in his own name; and all measures, even the most severe, became to him justifiable. Thus there soon arose altercation, which led to wars, that ended in the banishment of Sigismond and his heirs from the crown of Sweden, which was conferred on the new king Charles IX. Hence a war of succession arose between these two princes and their descendants, which lasted till the peace of Oliva, when it was decided in favour of the dynasty of Charles IX. May 21, 1592. 1598. 1600.

3. The anarchy, however, which at this time reigned in Russia, prevented an immediate war from breaking out between them, both parties having their views turned towards that country, with the hopes of being able to seat one of their princes on the Russian throne. The elevation, however, of the house of Romanow, finally disappointed their expectations, and led to the treaties of peace at Stolbova and Moscow. 1613.

On the death of Feodor, Jan. 1598, whose brother Demetrius had been murdered, 1591, he is succeeded by his brother-in-law Boris, who, in 1605, being supplanted by a false Demetrius, poisons himself. The latter, after ascending the throne,

Polish and Swedish war of succession. 1600-1660.

is slain, May 17, 1606, by Vasil Schoniski the conspirator, who had already been declared czar by his party. The Poles and Swedes now interfere, in hopes of placing their own princes on the throne, or of making conquests. The Poles, espousing the cause of a second false Demetrius, take Moscow, and cause their own prince Uladislas to be appointed czar; while on the other hand Schoniski attaches himself to Sweden, by a contract at Wiborg, 1609; but is nevertheless overthrown in 1610, when Charles IX., after the taking of Novgòrod, endeavours to raise his second son, Charles Philip, to the throne of Russsia; but dies Oct. 30, 1611, and is succeeded by his eldest son, Gustavus Adolphus. The Russian nation settle this matter by unanimously appóinting czar, in a solemn election, the young Michael Federovitsh, a descendant of the house of Romanow, and connected with that of Rurik, on the 12th of Feb. 1613. The war with Sweden continued after this to the peace of Stolbova, Feb. 27, 1617, in which Sweden obtained Ingria and Karelia (Kexholm); and the war with Poland till the fourteen years' truce before Moscow, Jan 3, 1619, (afterwards changed to a peace at Wiasma, June 15, 1634,) by which Uladislas renounced his claims to Russia, which in turn relinquished to Poland, Smolensk, with its territory Severia and Tchernigov.

Geschichte der Russen. Versuch eines Handbuchs von JOB. PHIL. GUST. EVERS, Erster Thiel. Dorpat, 1816, 8vo. Far more than an attempt. The first part, all that has yet appeared, comes down to Peter the Great.

4. The Poles and Swedes were no sooner free from these wars, than hostilities broke out between themselves. Gustavus Adolphus hastened
1620. to transfer it to Livonia, and as the Poles were by no means disposed to support the claims of their king to the crown of Sweden, both Livonia and a part of Polish Prussia fell into the hands of the young Swedish hero. Had he not been

allured by the nobler scenes of Germany, what would have become of Sigismond? By the mediation of France a truce was effected, which gave Gustavus Adolphus time to enter upon his heroic career in Germany.

Polish and Swedish war of succession. 1600-1660. 1625.

Truce of six years concluded between Poland and Sweden, at Altmark, Sept. 26, 1629; prolonged, Sept. 12, 1635, for twenty-six years. Sweden was placed by this in possession of almost all Livonia.

5. The deep participation of Sweden in the thirty years' war, now gave the north a period of repose; especially as the Turks were at this time occupied against the Persians, (see above, p. 172.) But the jealousy entertained by Denmark towards Sweden, which had its foundation partly in the personal characters of Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus, partly in the rapid increase of Sweden, caused a distrust between these states, which broke out into repeated wars; Denmark, however, was unable to prevent Sweden from acquiring a predominancy at the peace of Westphalia.

Christian IV. had already, in 1611, taken advantage of the embarrassment of Sweden, caused by the Polish and Russian wars, to make a successful attack on Charles IX., which did not terminate till after his death, at the peace of Siöröd, Jan. 20, 1613, when restoration was made by Denmark of her conquests in consideration of Sweden paying a million of dollars. The part which Christian IV., so unhappily for himself, took in the German war, (see above p. 146,) had forced him to remain quiet since the peace at Lubeck, 1629; but the exten-

Polish and Swedish war of succession. 1600-1660.

sive views of Sweden during the negotiations of the peace of Westphalia, irritated anew the jealousy of Denmark, stimulated as it was by Austria, and caused the war of 1643—1645. Invasion and conquest of Holstein and Jutland by Torstenson, Sept. 1643. Schonen, then belonging to Denmark, attacked. The Dutch fleet also came to the assistance of the Swedes. Peace at Bromsbro, Aug. 13, 1645. Sweden obtains, 1st, full freedom from duties and search in the Sound and on the Elbe at Gluckstadt: 2nd, Jamtland, Herjedalem, and the islands of Gothland and Oesel resigned by Denmark for ever, and Halland as a pledge for thirty years.

6. This peace and that of Westphalia raised the superiority of Sweden in the north so high, that it appeared to depend solely on the personal character of its kings what use should be made of it. Under the personal dominion of Christina, whose foreign influence since the peace of Westphalia had been confined almost exclusively to fruitless negotiations, no danger was to be apprehended: but the case was different when she
1654-1660. resigned the government to her cousin Charles Gustavus. Already proved an able general, full of ambition and activity, the new Pyrrhus ascended the throne with projects of conquest, which rendered peace in the north impossible during his life.

1655. 7. A new war with Poland, because its king, John Casimir, would not acknowledge him and renounce his pretensions to the throne of Sweden. The extraordinary progress made against Poland, (which was besides entangled in an un-
1654. happy war with Russia, on account of the Cos-

sacks,) by which the whole kingdom appeared on the point of becoming a Swedish province, roused the interests of the neighbouring nations, in proportion to the greatness and boldness of the plans of Charles Gustavus, who, aiming immediately at the annihilation of Denmark, seemed to have no less a design than the erection of an universal monarchy in the north. His views, however, were interrupted by the active part which nearly half Europe took in opposing them, and were wholly frustrated by his sudden death.

Polish and Swedish war of succession. 1600-1660.

The king invades Livonia and Poland, 1655, Warsaw taken, and John Casimir flies to Silesia. But Poland was easier to conquer than to maintain; great insurrection, and a battle of three days at Warsaw, July 18-20, 1656, to the disadvantage of the Poles. The extent of the war much enlarged, when the czar Alexis, emperor Leopold II., Frederic III. of Denmark, (May and June, 1657,) and soon also Frederic William, elector of Brandenburg, (Sept. 1657,) declared against Sweden. All Poland, with the exception of Polish-Prussia, was soon lost, but the scene of the war was transferred to Denmark, when Charles Gustavus attacked the Danes. Denmark was subdued, the frozen Belt crossed in Feb. 1658, and peace made at Roschild, Feb. 26. Conditions: 1. Denmark resigns for ever to Sweden, Halland, Schonen, Blekingen, Bahus, Drontheim, and the island Bornholm. 2. The freedom from duties in the Sound is confirmed. 3. The feudal allegiance of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to Sweden is given up.—But the weakness of Denmark had only renewed the schemes of conquest of Charles Gustavus. Zealand was therefore suddenly invaded again from Holstein, Aug. 1658, in order to annihilate the kingdom by the destruction of the capital. But the siege of Cronberg (Aug. 16—Sept. 6, 1658,) gave the

Polish and Swedish war of succession. 1600-1660.

Danes time to recover their faculties; and the bold defence of Copenhagen gave time to foreign powers, Austrians, Poles, Brandenburgians, and several German princes, to come to their aid on land, and above all, to the Dutch, (who feared for their commerce on the Baltic,) to reach them with a fleet. The siege was raised, and Charles Gustavus died suddenly, Feb. 23, 1660.

8. With Charles Gustavus died his wild projects. Peace was now easy, for it was desired by all; and these treaties were the more beneficial, because by them were exterminated the seeds of the former wars, with the exception of the Cossack disturbances. Thus the liberty of the north was preserved, notwithstanding the dangers with which it had been menaced.

Peace was concluded at Copenhagen, May 27, 1660, under the mediation of France and of the maritime powers. The peace of Roschild was renewed; Denmark retaining the reconquered district and city of Drontheim, and, by a particular compact, the island of Bornholm.

Peace concluded between Sweden and Poland at Oliva, April 23, 1660. Conditions: 1. John Casimir renounced for himself and descendants, all claims to Sweden. 2. Poland resigns Livonia to Sweden, (excepting the southern part, or former Polish part,) Esthonia, and the island Oesel. 3. The duke of Courland, taken captive by Sweden, is released and restored to his possessions.

Peace concluded between Sweden and Russia at Cardis, June 21, 1661. Conquests mutually resigned, and matters restored to their former footing.

SAM. PUFFENDORFII, *de rebus gestis Caroli Gustavi* lib. vii. Norimberg, 1696, fol. The leading work for the history of the wars of this king.

Mémoires du Chev. de Terlon, depuis 1656—1661. Paris,

1681, 2 vols. 12mo. The author was the French ambassador to Charles Gustavus, and enjoyed his confidence.

Polish and Swedish war of succession. 1600-1660.

9. If Sweden, by these treaties of peace secured to itself not only the possession of Livonia, but also of the Danish provinces along its coast, Prussia and Denmark reaped from it as a counterbalance, other advantages. The elector Frederic William, under whom Brandenburg rose to be a considerable power, availed himself with rare ability of the war between Poland and Sweden, to break the feudal relations of Prussia to Poland. By appearing at first inclined to embrace the Swedish interest, he purchased this independence by the treaty at Welau. But when Charles Gustavus desired to render him his vassal, in accordance with his design of founding a great monarchy, the elector was fully aware of the danger of his own situation, and became one of Charles' most violent enemies. The treaty of Oliva confirmed the entire independence of Prussia, on the side both of Sweden and Poland.

Sept. 19. 1657.

10. To Denmark, the storm that had arisen, was the occasion of a civil revolution, by which Frederic III. became hereditary and absolute sovereign. The cause of this revolution had long existed in the great disproportion which had grown up between the different classes of the community, and the constitutional states of the realm; but there was need of a concurrence of circumstances like the present to bring it to

Oct. 16. 1660.

Polish and Swedish war of succession. 1600-1660.

maturity. A royal couple, like Frederic III. and his wife, seconded by a faithful servant like Gabel, can do much of themselves; but how much more, when aided by such ministers as the bishop Svane and the burgomaster Nansen; who, however, can prescribe the limits of a revolution? The original object of the king was to render the throne hereditary, instead of elective; and to destroy the great power of the aristocratic nobility. He had hardly expected the annihilation of the constitutional assembly would follow. Thus Frederic III. by the *act of sovereignty* and the *royal law*, was made the most absolute monarch of Europe.

Jan. 10. 1661.

Geschichte der Revolution in Dänemark, von L. T. SPITTLER. Berlin, 1796. Principally from the materials made public by von Suhm.

SECOND PERIOD.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV. TO THE DEATH OF FREDERIC THE GREAT, AND THE RISE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD. 1661-1778.

Preliminary remarks. 1661-1786.

1. THE reader is now commencing a new and highly interesting portion of the history of modern Europe. If the last period derived its general character from an extraordinary interference of religion with politics, the present is no less determined by the influence of the monied system upon them. The continually increasing importance of money matters in politics, was certainly, upon the whole, a consequence of advancing civilisation, which drove the states to the formation of numerous projects, mostly of an expensive nature. Based, however, upon no fixed principles, it led to errors, with which it is necessary to be acquainted, in order to understand the subsequent history of Europe. Men now discovered that a certain relation always exists between the means of government and that of the nation; and endeavoured, accordingly, to promote the wealth of the latter. But the three great questions, which from their nature constitute the foundation of political economy, namely: 1st. What are the nature

Preliminary remarks. 1661-1786.

and sources of national wealth? 2nd. What influence may a government exercise in the promotion of national wealth? and 3rd. What relation exists between the revenues of the nation and that of the government? were left untouched, till a routine had become established, against which even better principles could do but little.

The system formed from the maxims to which this routine gave birth, is that comprehended under the name of the mercantile system, which is therefore nothing but this practice reduced to rules.

The best delineation of it will be found in:

Staatswissenschaften von v. JUSTI. Göttingen, 1755, 2 parts.

2. While these principles, which we are accustomed to consider as the most correct, place the nation's means, not so much in its material, as in its moral wealth, that is, in the talents and knowledge which alone make the former available; this practical system, on the other hand, placed it merely in the amount of its ready money. Since, then, the increase of this was alone deemed a real gain, and the diminution of it a real loss, the highest aim of political economy was naturally very limited; for industry was to be encouraged only on the principle of turning its produce into money, while the everlasting truth, that all productive industry is actually useful only in proportion as it is adapted to the character of the country, and the wants and cir-

cumstances of its inhabitants, at the same time impeding no more useful application of their power, was entirely kept out of sight. While the whole horizon of political economy was circumscribed in this incredible manner, there resulted from it a series of the most perverse measures, which were the more oppressive, as hardly a doubt arose respecting their justice, and even their expediency.

Though the resources of a nation consist in its possessions, yet the (material) wealth of a government consists principally in its ready money; because this, above all things, is needed for accomplishing its purposes. Thus the increase of ready money was regarded as the chief object of political economy by the governments; but does this excuse the mistaken views entertained of national wealth?

3. It will scarcely be expected that the ideas formed respecting the resources of national wealth, were more enlarged than those respecting its nature. Mines, and the acquisition of money from foreign countries, were considered as the only means of increasing a nation's wealth. As manufacturing and commercial nations were found to become the richest, men were confirmed in the belief that manufactures and commerce were the prime sources of wealth,—that to increase by art the value of raw materials and to sell to foreigners, was more important than to produce for home consumption and home trade. Participation in foreign commerce, and the establishment of large manufactures became,

Preliminary remarks. 1661-1786.

therefore, now the great object of domestic policy.

4. But as navigation and foreign commerce depend almost entirely upon colonies, it naturally follows that these acquire a greater importance; and that the maritime powers, who alone were able to possess and defend, should obtain a greater weight in the political balance than would have been possible under other circumstances.

5. These ideas obtained at once a practical consequence, because the governments felt every day less hesitation in directing the whole force of national industry to the acquirement of money —particularly by commerce and artificial industry. To do this, rulers established privileged manufactories, partly by tariffs, partly by the entire prohibition of the importation or exportation of certain articles. It mattered not whether the articles purchased were either bad, or dear, or both, provided the money did but remain in the country. Even knowledge and information were only to be fabricated and produced at home. In consequence of these mistaken views respecting the fundamental principles of finance, commerce and the influence of government, and the confounding together the entirely distinct objects of political and commercial independence, there became formed *a system of isolation,* according to which every nation was to be as much as possible sufficient for itself,—

to buy nothing, but to sell all it could. Strange infatuation! That while every government was seeking to extend its commerce, all were taking the most effectual means to destroy it. Preliminary remarks. 1661-1786.

By leaving the industry of nations to itself, and to the management of those engaged in it, it is by no means intended to exclude the influence of government entirely from it. It may be asked, where is the limit of this influence? No general formula can mark this for particular cases. It must be left to the discernment and knowledge of the government.

6. At the first glance it may seem astonishing, how commerce, notwithstanding this, contrived to raise itself to the importance it did, and obtained an extent never before known. But it is to be considered, that this system only came into operation by degrees; that nature is still more powerful than government; and finally, that many commodities produced in remote quarters of the world, found so ready an access into Europe, that they ceased to be articles of luxury, but became of the number of necessaries, and consequently immeasurably important. It is only single branches of commerce among single nations, that have been rendered flourishing by the ordinances of governments; the commerce of the world, as a whole, has risen into prosperity, not through them, indeed, but, absolutely in spite of them.

7. The consequences, which the application of these maxims had upon the mutual relations of the states, could not but be highly pernicious,

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both in peace and war. In peace, on the one hand, a continual distrust was maintained, as each one was apprehensive of being overreached, a state of feeling to which the many commercial contracts only gave fresh encouragement. And on the other, those states which were enriching themselves by commerce, inasmuch as their gain was supposed to be the loss of others, were the means of exciting a general envy, which became vehement in proportion to the increase of commerce, and but too often broke out in violent wars.—But in war itself, there arose, 1st. Attempts to annihilate the commerce of the enemy, and thence privateering with all its abuses, a mode of warfare which is never decisive. 2nd. The extension of war to the colonies. 3rd. The restrictions and oppressions of the neutral trade, as soon as ever a nation deemed itself strong enough to impose them.—The gradual developement of these principles eventually led to extremes, such as no age had witnessed and no statesman could have foreseen.

8. With this mercantile character of the age, the military also, was in a peculiar manner combined. From the general state of society, in connection with the continual dissensions to which the mercantile system gave rise, proceeded the system of standing armies, which, having been previously founded, received its ultimate perfection from Louis XIV. and Frederic II. By the separation of the military class, this sys-

tem accorded with the character of an age, which placed so high a value on the arts of peace; and for that reason it succeeded. It had no beneficial re-action either on the diminution of wars, or on morality; but it brought with it the advantages of more secure tranquillity in peace, and of a considerable mitigation of the evils of war. But is it not evident that nations must grow ripe for subjugation, in proportion as they lay aside the instruments of defence? Preliminary remarks. 1661-1786.

9. Though frequent attempts were made in this period, to give a single state the preponderance in Europe, by the destruction of the balance of power, they were always frustrated; and their failure naturally contributed to confirm that balance. The maritime powers operated in this period far more powerfully than in the former; since their interest demanded the preservation of their own influence, and the value placed on commerce and colonies, would of course render it decisive. Standing armies are not fit for great conquests; they have their natural limits of themselves. Thus the political system of Europe, though the inequality of its members was so great, still remained a system of self-existent independent states.

10. The relations between the states became in this period much closer, owing to the perfection which diplomacy had attained; the natural fruit of a political system, where it was not an authoritative decree, but negotiation that was

Preliminary remarks. 1661-1786.

the efficient power. The custom, which had become prevalent in the great courts, ever since the time of Richelieu, of keeping continual embassies even at the smaller, was thus enlarged, and the whole reduced to system. If the web of political negotiations was in consequence rendered much more complex, the introduction of personal influence into politics was, perhaps, the most pernicious consequence, because the petty passions of the potentates, and those who immediately surrounded them, were too frequently roused by unfavourable despatches, which even produced and prolonged wars. But, on the other hand, these embassies contributed very much towards settling the forms of foreign policy, and whoever, in examining these forms, sees something more than mere ceremony, will not hesitate to appreciate them accordingly.

Ferdinand the catholic had established the maintenance of permanent embassies, but only at single courts. It was not till the French policy under Louis XIII. and XIV. comprehended almost all Europe, that the system of diplomacy was enlarged, and with the enlargement of it, the etiquette also became permanently fixed.

FIRST PERIOD.

From 1661 *to* 1700.

PART THE FIRST.

HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN STATES-SYSTEM.

Preliminary remarks. 1661-1700.

1. THE following period is generally called the age of Louis XIV., as it includes the golden years of this monarch's reign. The name itself shows that France was, at this time, the prominent state of Europe. But although this precedence was founded partly on arms, it was far more so on the preponderating influence of civil refinement, which attracted the observation of foreign countries, by its splendour no less than its variety. To it the nation owed the dominion of their language; and does not a well-grounded dominion of the language in some degree establish a correspondent dominion of the nation? Conquests by arms are, after all, extremely limited; but these peaceful conquests comprehended the whole civilised world; and were imperishable because they were based, not on compulsion, but on freedom.

Le siècle de Louis XIV. (par M. de VOLTAIRE). à Berlin, 1751. Rather a sketch than a complete account.

Preliminary remarks. 1661-1700.

For the history of Belles Lettres; LA HARPE *cours de littérature.* But also compare:

F. BOUTERWECK *Geschichte der Französischen Litteratur.* B. ii. Gottingen, 1807; and the masterly critiques of LESSING and A. W. SCHLEGEL.

2. Not only from its population, situation, and extent, was France the most powerful state of Europe; but also in consequence of the royal power, so much increased by Richelieu; this power, however, was still very remote from pure despotism. The constitution was too complicate to admit of this. In fact, what limits were not set to the royal will by the nobility and clergy, by prescription and local privileges? It could become formidable only to individuals, and not to the whole nation; nor easily even to single powerful bodies. Thus, in defiance of it, national spirit was preserved, and was elevated by the splendour of the age. The internal relations of the other leading states of the south of Europe, Spain, England, the Netherlands, and Germany, seemed especially adapted to exalt France, by serving as a foil to her.

1. After the death of Philip IV. († 1665), SPAIN seems to have been in a passive, rather than an active state, under Charles II. († 1700), a minor who never became of age, though it still continued to be the aim of French conquests in its Netherlands. But although the causes of the debility of Spain are to be attributed in part to the weakness of the government and its mistakes, (see p. 123), they lay yet more in the constitution and the manners. In a kingdom, where the high offices of government are but benefices, purchased for

three or four years, where the landed property is vested almost entirely in the hands of the nobility and clergy, a kingdom, where, from the want of circulation, no capital is accumulated, and where wealth consists in silver plate, a general impoverishment must ensue in the midst of riches. What an entire stagnation must then take place, when in seasons of war the treasures of America failed to be received. Preliminary remarks. 1661-1700.

Lettres de l'Espagne (par MD. D'AULNOI). Paris, 1682; and—

Relation de la Cour de Espagne. Paris, 1687. Incontestably the most lively description of the miserable condition of the country.

2. ENGLAND, given up to foreign influence under the government of the unworthy Charles II. and (since Clarendon's fall, 1667) of his venal minister, was destitute of any stable character; because there was a perpetual contradiction between the maxims of the Stuarts and those of the majority of the nation, which necessarily terminated in a catastrophe, such as the revolution of 1688, which hurled James II. from the throne, and raised to it William III.

3. The republic of the UNITED NETHERLANDS, powerful on the ocean, was so much the weaker on land, since the interest of the now prevailing party of the states, under the grand pensionary of Holland, Jean de Wit, 1653—1672, required the weakening of the land force. Great as a statesman, that is, as far as diplomacy could make him so, De Wit was obliged to find by experience, that continual negotiating hastens rather than averts a catastrophe.

4. AUSTRIA, under Leopold I., was, during its operations in Hungary, too much occupied with itself and the Turks, to be able ever to use its full power against France. But what an inequality was produced by the personal difference between the monarchs?—What an inequality, by the talents of their ministers and generals? And what could not be effected by means of the secret influence of the jesuits, in whose hands Leopold was; for the jesuits were also the confessors at the French court?

Preliminary remarks. 1661-1700.

5. Under the political relations of this period, the GERMAN EMPIRE could not conceal its weakness; and its subsequent history demonstrates, that Louis XIV. had discovered but too soon, what force and policy might here accomplish. But the new roll of the empire in 1681, though it could not remove the actual deficiencies in its military constitution, proved that the nation would not remain behind the age; and the weight, thrown into the balance of politics by the great elector, showed, what even individual states of the empire were competent to effect.

I. *Public Contests in Europe from* 1661 *to* 1700.

Besides the general works on the history of France and the Netherlands, there belong here:

Histoire de la vie et du règne de Louis XIV. publiée par M. BRUZON DE LA MARTINIERE. á la Haye, 1740, 5 vols. 4to. This work is valuable, as it is not written in the court tone.

Histoire du règne de Louis XIV. par M. REBOULLET. 1746, 9 vols. 12mo. The author was a jesuit.

Of memoirs:

Mémoires Historiques et instructions de Louis XIV. pour le Dauphin son fils, in the *Œuvres de Louis XIV.* Paris, 1806, 6 vols. Especially the two first volumes.

Œuvres de Louis D. de St. Simon. Paris, 1791, 13 vols. 8vo. A lively delineation of the principal personages, from personal observation.

1. There was no room in the existing political system of Europe for the plans of conquest formed by Louis XIV. They had reference to countries, with the fate of which the fate of the whole was intimately connected; and in case of success they would at the same time have overthrown their political principles. Frustrated in

their principal aim, they served only to consolidate the existing order of things.

Public contests in Europe. 1661-1700.

2. The commercial spirit, now excited in France by the government, acted no less strongly on the rest of Europe than the spirit of conquest. The genius of one man created for this empire, not only well-arranged finances, but also manufactures, commerce, colonies, ports, canals, and a powerful navy; all this surrounded by the splendour of high scientific, social, and military refinement. But the manner in which Colbert raised France to the rank of one of the first commercial powers, established the future influence of the mercantile system on general practical politics.

France was placed in an entirely new political situation, by its colonies, its monopolising commercial companies, its treaties of commerce, and especially by the new tariffs of 1664 and 1667, regulated altogether according to the maxims of the mercantile system. Colbert's manufactures flourished, because the condition of society was ripe for them; his foreign commercial projects, modelled after the example of Holland, could hardly flourish, because France neither was nor could become like Holland.

Tableau du ministère de Colbert. à Amsterdam, 1774.

Eloge politique de Colbert, par M. PELISSERY. à Lausanne, 1775. Neither of the two exhausts the subject.

3. The commercial regulations of the English and Dutch contributed no less on the other side towards fomenting mutual jealousy. What else could have resulted from the confirmed and renewed Navigation Act of the former, the great 1660.

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commercial companies of the latter, and from the mutual exertions of all to supplant one another, or to spoil the market by excessive duties.

[1] *Mémoires de J. de Wit, traduits de l'Hollandois.* Ratisbon, 1709, 12mo. An instructive exposition of the interests of the republic, with respect to politics and commerce; and generally of the political prospects at that time.

4. Besides this newly-awakened commercial policy, an effect more speedy and more powerful was produced by the ambition and plans of conquest of Louis XIV., supported by Louvois. 1661. The contest respecting precedence with Spain, 1662. the disputes with Rome respecting matters of police, however insignificant in themselves, were made very important by the claims to be in every thing the first. Could this be reconciled with the previously existing relations between free states?

5. But the favourite idea of Louis XIV., as it had previously been that of Richelieu, was the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, or Belgium. What could be more inviting? The accomplishment would have established the sovereignty of France in Europe. The freedom of the republic and of the German empire must have fallen of themselves; and Spain would ultimately have been obliged to submit. The preparation in the mean time, involved Louis XIV. in a series of negotiations, and at the same time in closer connections with the republic of the United Ne-

therlands, which soon, however, became burdensome to him, as they disturbed his more important relations with England, which had already procured for him the acquisition of Dunkirk. 1662.

Negotiations were commenced between the grand pensionary de Wit and the marquis d'Estrades, at the Hague, in order to retard, or at least to modify the project. A treaty of commerce and alliance was concluded with the republic on the 27th of April, 1662.

Lettres, Mémoires, et Négociations de M. le Comte d'Estrades. Londres, 1745, T. i.—ix. The true school for the formation of diplomatists.

Brieven van de Wit. Amst. 1725, 6 vols. The leading source for the historical details.

6. Meanwhile war broke out between England and the Republic, occasioned partly by commercial jealousy, partly by the personal hatred of Charles II. towards Holland. Although France and Denmark were the allies of the Dutch, the war was in reality carried on between the parties themselves only on the ocean, though with great obstinacy. The peace of Breda, by which the war was terminated, gave neither of the two maritime powers a decided superiority.

Hostilities were commenced on the coasts of Guinea as early as 1664. War was declared, March, 1665. Naval battles were fought, June 21, 1665, June 11, 14, and Aug. 4, 1666. France took an inefficient part, Jan. 26, 1666. The weakness of the Dutch on land was strikingly displayed in the contemporary war with the bishop of Munster, 1665. Peace was made at Breda, (after Ruyter had sailed up the Thames, June, 1667,) July 31, 1667. 1. Between England

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and France. The islands St. Christopher, Antigua, and Monserrat were restored to England, and Acadia to France. 2. Between England and Holland, on the principle of the *Uti possidetis*. In accordance with this, England retained New Belgium, (New York and New Jersey,) Holland retained Surinam. The Navigation Act was modified in favour of Holland, with respect to the navigation of the Rhine.

7. However, even before the conclusion of the peace of Breda, Louis XIV. had taken up arms to enforce his alleged claims to the Spanish Netherlands, founded principally on the *jus devolutionis*, after the death of his father-in-law, Philip IV. king of Spain. Such a violation of the just right of possession was certainly an offence, not against Spain merely, but against all Europe. There were statesmen who were aware of this; and sir William Temple formed at the Hague, with de Wit, and afterwards with Dohna, the triple alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden.

The negotiation and the conclusion of the triple alliance, Jan. 23, 1668, consisting of a preliminary defensive league, and a further agreement of an armed mediation between France and Spain, for the liberty of Europe, is one of the noblest spectacles of modern history. Thus nobly do great statesmen feel, and thus openly and boldly do they act.

† SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE; *Biographie von Heinrich Luden.* Göttingen, 1808. Derived mostly from SIR WILLIAM'S own account in his *Letters*, (*Works*, vol. ii.) and worthy of that great man.

8. Under these circumstances Louis XIV. considered it judicious to conclude the peace of Aix-

la-Chapelle. But why did not the allies perfect their work, and leave the conqueror no portion of his booty? The maintenance of the sanctity of rightful possession can never be bought too dearly, in a system of states. But they were obliged to make haste, and the chief object was attained.

Peace was made at Aix-la-Chapelle, May 2, 1668. France retained twelve fortresses on the frontiers of the Netherlands, among which were Douai, Tournay, and Ryssel. The war between Portugal and Spain (see p. 163) was also terminated by a peace with the latter country, Jan. 13.—Spain retained Ceuta only.

9. Even after the restoration of peace, the political relations remained essentially changed. The conqueror was, or at least seemed to be, restrained by an alliance. What was not afterwards expected of alliances? On the other hand France maintained a large army, equipped even in peace. Her relations with the republic were severed, and of all others they were apparently the most difficult to form anew, because the pride of the king was mortified, and defenceless Spain had shown all its weakness.

10. What else could arise from these incongruities, increased yet more by commercial disputes, but a project of revenge on the republic? with the downfal of which, it was likewise hoped, as if such a thing were possible, to gain by conquest her commerce and industry. But the more it was felt that such an attempt must raise

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a mighty storm, so much the more active was French policy in its endeavours to avert it.

The commercial disputes had their origin in the prohibition of the importation of Dutch goods, or the high duties laid on them by the augmented tariff of 1664, which the Dutch retaliated, 1671, by similar duties on French wines.—Thus the mercantile system, now in its developement, afforded at least a pretext for ruinous wars.

11. To produce a dissolution of the renewed
1670. triple alliance, was the first object of French policy. And how could it fail of success, since this combination, the work of the ministers, had never seriously occupied the attention of Charles II., and to Sweden was a mere financial speculation?—But that it should not merely be dissolved, that it should, on the other hand, be converted into an alliance with France, was certainly more than could have been expected.

A secret alliance was formed between England and France by the Cabal ministry, not merely to produce the fall of the republic, but also of the British constitution; and, in consideration of subsidies, as usual, an alliance was soon after made with Sweden, April 14, 1672, nominally only for protection.—Sir William Temple, having been deceived by the king, retired into private life.

12. But it was principally the negotiations, which preceded this peace, that established the influence of Louis in the German empire. Negotiations were made with every one; and who, the great electors alone excepted, could resist the proposals of neutrality, subsidies, and marriage? Cologne and Munster, actually became

allies. Austria and Spain were silenced; while the duke of Lorrain, as the friend of the latter, was expelled from the country. But can this seem strange, when de Wit himself could be deluded? That high-minded man, like so many ministers, viewed his state through a magnifying medium.

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13. Policy appeared therefore to have prepared every thing with unexampled care, though to a senseless purpose. And, nevertheless, how falsely had it reckoned? When the storm of annihilation burst forth, the republic did not sink; but by the fall of de Wit, Louis himself was instrumental in raising up, in the person of William III., the man who subsequently stood in opposition to him, as the first prince of Orange had done to Philip II. But if the latter fought only for the freedom of his country, William III. contended,—equally unwearied, and with equally varying success, in the cabinet as on the field of battle,—for the liberty of Europe. And he maintained it.

An attack was made on the republic by water and by land, in May, 1672. A naval battle was fought at Solbay, June 7, and a landing was frustrated, July 15. But great advances were made on land in connection with Cologne and Munster; and four provinces were conquered in June and July.—Amsterdam was preserved by putting the country under water.—A revolution took place at the Hague; the brother of de Wit was murdered, Aug. 20. William III. was made hereditary stadtholder in five provinces.

Histoire de la vie et de la mort des deux illustres frères, Corneille et Jean de Wit. à Utrecht, 1709, 2 vols. 12mo.

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14. The actual progress of France created, moreover, an entirely different sensation in Europe, from what mere diplomacy could have done. All were filled with consternation at the imminent overthrow of a state like the republic. She soon found allies in Austria, Spain, Germany, and Brandenburg; while France lost those that it previously had, and not without trouble induced Sweden to take an active part, in order to employ Brandenburg and the empire. Thus unoffending countries had to suffer in a foreign cause; but the republic was saved, as soon as the war was removed from her boundaries. Without the loss of a foot of territory, she eventually withdrew from the contest; but the cost of affording satisfaction fell upon the weaker of her allies; as the superiority of the French generals held victory, as it were, in chains.

An alliance was formed between the republic, the emperor, Spain, and the duke of Lorrain, Aug. 30, 1673. The German empire engaged in the quarrel, March 31, 1674. The elector of Brandenburg, who had previously been compelled to conclude a separate peace at Vossem, June 6, 1673, renewed his alliance, and Denmark joined, July 1674.—Already, in 1673, the war was transferred to the regions of the Rhine. The French conquered Mastricht, July 1. A disembarkation was prevented by three naval battles, on the 7th and 14th of June, and the 21st of August. On the other hand, a separate peace was made by England, Feb. 19, 1674, demanded by the voice of the nation. The Spanish Netherlands and Upper Rhine were subsequently the principal theatre of combat. In the former were Condé and Orange; and a bloody but indecisive

battle occurred at Seneffe, Aug. 11.—In the latter were Turenne and Bournonville, at last joined by the elector of Brandenburg. Battles were fought at Sinsheim, June 16, at Ensisheim, Oct. 4, and a sudden attack was made at Mulhausen, in Alsace, Dec. 29. Turenne was always superior.—The Swedes invaded Brandenburg in 1675, but were defeated at Fehrbellin, June 28. Denmark and the empire declare war against them. Turenne and Montucuculi met on the Upper Rhine. The former died at Sasbach, July 27. But with the master of higher tactics, his school did not perish. In 1676 and 1677, Luxemberg and Orange were in the Netherlands. A battle was fought at Mont Cassel, April 11. The superiority of the former, opened to Louis, in 1678, the way to the frontiers of Holland.

15. During the war, all sight had been lost of the original object, the annihilation of the republic. But the question was rendered so much the more complicate by the participation of so many powers. After a useless attempt to bring about a peace at Cologne, Nimwegen was finally 1673. fixed upon as the place for the meeting of a general congress. The manifold claims, the form of the negotiations, the intermediate events of the war, which proceeded in the meanwhile, no less than the disputed points of ceremonial, gave reason to expect long and perhaps useless negotiations; but did not all these forms, not excepting the contests respecting rank, spring from the nature of a free political system, where each member felt its own independence, and mere physical superiority dared not dictate laws?—The proceedings were, at least, successful, being promoted by the zealous love of peace on the

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part of the states of Holland, and the apparently threatening position which England took by an alliance with Holland. But French policy severed the combination, by inducing the republic to make a separate peace, notwithstanding the resistance of the hereditary stadtholder.

July 26, 1678.

The congress at Nimwegen had been slowly convening since 1676, and was opened in 1677. From the nature of things, a series of treaties of peace ensued.

1. Peace between France and the republic, Aug. 10, 1678. Complete restitution was made, in consideration of a promise of neutrality.—Of greater consequence to the Dutch than the treaty of peace, was the commercial treaty, concluded at the same time. The old commercial relations were restored.

2. Peace between France and Spain, Sept. 17, 1678. France retains *a*. Franche Comté; *b*. twelve fortresses on the frontiers of the Netherlands, with their territory; including Valenciennes, Condé, Cambrais, Ypres, etc.

3. Peace between France and the emperor and empire, Feb. 5, 1679. *a*. France retains Freiburg, in lieu of the right of holding a garrison in Philipsburg. (See p. 158). *b*. To the duke of Lorrain a very imperfect restitution was made, which he refused to accept.

16. More difficulties were caused by the treaty of peace between Sweden, now deprived of its provinces, and Brandenburg and Denmark; for Louis made it a point of honour not to desert his ally. Peace was concluded by France and Sweden, with Brandenburg at St. Germain, and soon after with Denmark. To the latter, full restitution was made; to the former, one almost complete. The treaties between Sweden and the other allies contained nothing remarkable.

June 29, 1679.

Sept. 2.

The principal ambassadors to the congress at Nimwegen were: from France, the counts d'Estrades, Avaux (nephew of the ambassador to Munster, see p. 157) and Colbert-Croissy. From Holland, van Beverning, van Haren, Boreel. From Austria, the bishop of Gurk and count Kinsky. From Spain, the marquis de los Balbasos, count Fuente, etc. As mediators; from England: Temple, Hyde, Jenkins; from the pope, Bevilacqua.

Actes et mémoires des négociations de la paix de Nimegue. à Amsterd. 1680, tom. i.—iv. 12mo.—A collection of documents.

ST. DIDIER, *Histoire de la paix de Nimegue.* Paris, 1697, 8vo. The author was secretary to the embassy of count Avaux.

Histoire de traités de paix de Nimegue. 1754, tom. i, ii.

The memoirs of lord Temple, both the older, from 1672 to 1679, and the latter, from 1679 to 1681, are replete with information for this period.

17. The concessions that France acquired by the treaties of peace, were by no means very dangerous for Europe, though the possession of the fortresses opened to it a door for perpetual invasions of the Netherlands. The greatest dangers arose from the manner in which the peace had been accomplished. France had not only sustained with success, the combat with half of Europe; she had also severed the combination formed against herself; and when is the powerful more powerful than at such a moment? The disorder which prevailed in the public relations, and seemed to render a new combination impossible for a long time—and no individual state dared any longer to defy the preponderance of France—gave Louis time to reap all the

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advantages of his policy. Whether the projects that now appeared were a consequence of the peace, or whether the peace was a consequence of those projects, Europe had never before witnessed such encroachments on the sanctity of the rights of property as she now beheld.—Was the prince of Orange wrong, in opposing, to the last, the conclusion of the separate peace? Was it the interest of the house of Orange alone, or was it the interest of all Europe?

The changes in the French administration of foreign affairs had an important influence on politics. The intriguing and luxurious Lyonne (since 1663) was followed, in 1671, by the reasonable and upright Pomponne, who was dismissed in 1679. His successor, the rough and violent Colbert-Croissy, (brother of the minister of finances, and father of Colbert-Torcy, his successor,) till 1696, accorded too well with the wild Louvois, to leave any thing to be hoped for but the worst.

18. Acts of violence were committed in Alsace, immediately after the peace; re-unions (so called) were made of the countries of the German empire (as dependencies of the new concessions), and soon after, open violence was used against the Spanish Netherlands. It seemed clear that the Upper Rhine was to constitute the boundary of France.

The chambers of the re-unions were erected at Metz, Brisac, and Besançon, in 1680. Was not the form more irritating than the reality?—Possession was taken of Strasburg and Casale, Sept. 30, 1681, the keys of Upper Germany and Lombardy, in one day.—The Spanish Netherlands were invaded in 1683.—Luxemburg was conquered and Treves subdued,

June 1684. Lorrain still continued to be occupied by the French; and Genoa, which had become the friend of Spain, was obliged to find, by experience, what ideas Louis entertained of the laws of nations.

19. Loud remonstrances were not wanting in Europe; but the political relations of almost all the principal states, the weakness of Spain and the empire, the partiality of Charles II., the desire for peace entertained by the party of the states in Holland, which Louis managed by means of his ambassadors, and above all, the distress of Austria from the Turkish war, (see below,) appeared to destroy every hope of future resistance. Nevertheless, the unwearied activity of the prince of Orange produced an alliance between the four leading states. But how careful were they, to make it only defensive. Thus Louis advanced from conquest to conquest, always offering peace; and could still speak of generosity, when in the truce of twenty years he retained the greater part of his booty.

A defensive alliance was made at the Hague, Feb. 6, 1683, between the emperor, Spain, Sweden, and the republic, preceded by particular contracts, for the maintenance of the peace of Munster and Nimwegen. But it was the interpretation of this peace which was contested. A truce was finally agreed upon for twenty years, Aug, 15, 1684, partly with the emperor and empire, with the retaining on the part of France, of Strasburg and the re-unions which dated from before the 1st of August 1581, partly with Spain, with the retaining of Luxemberg, and the conquests made before the 26th of August, 1683.

Négociations de M. le Comte d'Avaux en Hollande depuis

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1679—1688. Paris, 1751. T. i.—vi. 12mo. He was French ambassador at the Hague.

J. V. LUCHESINI *Historiarum sui temporis libri XIV.* Romæ 1779, 3 vols. 4to.

20. But was it possible for a truce thus purchased, to defer the war for so long a period, as that for which it was formed? Was any barrier opposed to the devastations of the stream? Nothing could effect an alteration, but the exhaustion, with which the preponderating state purchased its superiority, and perhaps the change of very important personages. But in such a state, exhaustion must proceed very far in the interior, before it becomes externally visible;
1683. and although Colbert died, yet Louvois lived; one, to whom war was an absolute necessity.

21. Notwithstanding the temporary preservation of the peace, the materials of a new war were very naturally accumulated, by a series of single occurrences, which however heterogeneous in other respects, contributed to aggravate the animosity against the too overwhelming power of France; but the elements of combustion were spread so abundantly and so extensively, that should a war break out, it could hardly fail to become general. The new contests with the pope, the altercation respecting the succession to the palatinate, and the quarrels about the election of bishop at Cologne, all concurred to produce this effect. And the persecution of the
1685. Huguenots, which was long ago organised, and

which terminated in their banishment by the revocation of the edict of Nantes, must have contributed so much the more to involve Louis in continual difficulties with the protestant powers, because such scenes were no longer common in Europe. And in addition, there were still perpetual petty altercations between France and the republic, on account of tariffs and prohibitions.

Disputes arose, in 1673, with pope Innocent XI., respecting the *regale;* and led, in 1682, to the convocation of a national council, which by its four articles determined the relations with Rome, or the rights of the Gallican church; and in 1682 respecting the absurd freedom of quarters.—The altercation respecting the succession to the palatinate had its origin in the attempt of Louis, after the extinction of the palatine Simmerian male line with the elector Charles, in 1685, to assert the claims of his sister, the duchess of Orleans, to the allodial succession, and also to the greater portion of the country.—Quarrels arose about the episcopal election at Cologne in 1688; Louis supported his client, the bishop of Fürstenberg of Strasburg, in opposition to John Clement, prince of Bavaria, who, though chosen by the minority of the chapter, was nevertheless confirmed by the pope.

22. While all thus felt themselves injured, and were apprehensive for themselves, it was more easy for the prince of Orange to negotiate a new league, for maintaining the truce, which was concluded at Augsburg. As Louis considered it to be formed against himself, the immediate breaking out of a great war hardly appeared any longer doubtful; and though the embarrassment of Louvois precipitated the erup-

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tion, this was only what must have taken place at a somewhat later period.

The league of Augsburg was concluded July 29, 1686, between the emperor, Spain, Sweden, the elector of Bavaria, the Suabian, Bavarian, and Franconian circles, and some German princes. As the breach was already wide enough, the choice of elector of Cologne (see above) brought the matter to a crisis. War was declared against the emperor and empire Sept. 24, 1688.

23. But scarcely had the war broken out, when an event occurred, that alone would have rendered war inevitable; the revolution in England, which raised William III. to the throne of his father-in-law. The reception given by Louis to James II. as a friend and a king, was a virtual declaration of hostilities.

Jan. 1689.

24. Thus there was kindled in Europe a new war, the extent of which was as uncertain as its duration. In three months there was no longer a neutral state in the west of Europe; and Louvois took the best care to spread the flames most widely.

The declaration against the emperor and empire was followed by one against the pope, as a secular prince; against the republic, Nov. 6, 1688; against Spain, April 15, 1689. War on France was declared by England, May 17. A grand alliance was formed at Vienna, May 12, 1689, to which the duke of Savoy also, forced by Louvois, acceded June, 1690. Denmark promised auxiliaries to England.

25. It seemed inevitable, that the fearful nine years' contest, (remarkable also for new interdictions laid upon commerce,) in the Nether-

lands, in the Rhine lands, in Italy, in Ireland, and on the Spanish frontiers, and moreover on the ocean and Mediterranean, would terminate either in the subjection, or the most decisive triumph of France. And yet neither was the case. The superiority of the French generals, the unconquered Luxemberg, and the modest Catinat, still continued; but the progressive exhaustion of the interior became too apparent abroad, and Colbert had formed no pupils like Turenne.

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Were not the horrible devastations of the palatinate, in 1688 and 1689, with fire and sword, by Louvois (†1691) in order to protect the frontiers, proofs of the consciousness of internal weakness? The French could never penetrate much beyond the Rhine, especially as they were opposed, after 1693, by the bold Louis, prince of Baden.—The principal theatre of the war was in the Netherlands, where Luxemberg gained a victory at Fleurus, July 1, 1690; one at Steenkerke, August 3, 1692; and at Neerwinden, July 29, 1693, the two latter over William III., and took Namur and several fortresses. Yet the prince of Orange, often defeated but never vanquished, stood his ground; and what Luxemburg (†Jan. 1695) could not effect, how could his successor Villeroy accomplish?—In Italy, a battle was fought between Catinat and Victor Amadeus II. of Savoy. Catinat obtained a victory at Stafarda, Aug. 18, 1690, and subdued Savoy, and a part of Piedmont in 1691. A battle was gained at Marsaglia, Oct. 4, 1603, when secret negotiations were commenced between the duke and France.—The war on the boundaries of Catalonia was for a long time, a matter of secondary importance, but terminated 1697 in the conquest of Barcelona.—The naval war, successfully begun by France, by Tourville's victory at Dieppe, July 10, 1690, was connected with the project of a landing in England and Ireland, in favour of James II. The latter, executed indeed

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by France, but badly sustained, was frustrated by the victory of William III. on the river Boyne, July 1, 1690; the former was frustrated by the naval victory of the British at La Hogue, May 29, 1692, the result of which ensured to them the superiority.—The war reached also the East and West Indies. Carthagena in South America was conquered, May 5, 1697.—A strict embargo had been imposed by England from the commencement of the war; (the interdiction previously laid on all commerce with France, by an act of parliament, 1678, having been revoked by James II.); for not only was the contraband trade, as usual, forbidden, but all commerce with France, either by natives or foreigners, Aug. 22, 1689. Scarcely, however, were any foreigners to be found, who were neutral.

26. It was to be expected, that, in this war also, the separation of the grand confederacy would be the aim of French policy. It was hoped at least to gain the duke of Savoy, and secret negotiations were begun in 1694, that finally led to a treaty, by which France attained its object.

By the treaty at Turin: 1. The duke recovered all his territories and Pignerol itself, though much curtailed. 2. His daughter was espoused to the eldest grandson of Louis, the Duc de Bourgogne. 3. He promised to effect with Spain and Austria the neutrality of Italy, which was done by the treaty of Vigevano, Oct. 7.

27. Though this separation was of great moment, yet the acknowledging of William III. and the requisitions of Austria, placed great obstacles in the way of a pacification. But it was promoted on the side of France by the projects on the Spanish monarchy, (the preparations for which, possible only in peace, could be no longer

protracted,) and on the other side by distrust among the allies. A congress, which was convened at the castle near Ryswick in Holland, prosecuted the negotiations under Swedish meditation; and Louis attained his object the sooner by creating new divisions among the confederates.

The congress was opened at Ryswick, May 9, 1697. A preliminary agreement was made with the maritime powers; and after the expiration of the period of time asigned to the emperor and empire, peace was concluded between them and Spain, Sept. 20, in which the emperor and empire were soon forced to acquiesce, Oct. 30.

a. Peace between France and England. 1. William III. was acknowledged. 2. Conquests were mutually restored.

b. Peace between France and Holland, on condition of mutual restitution; and a commercial treaty.

c. Peace between France and Spain. All conquests and annexations in Catalonia and the Low Countries were restored, with the exception of some villages as adjusting the boundary.—Without any especial concession, France retained the already occupied part of St. Domingo. (See below.)

d. Peace with the emperor and empire. 1. France retained all the annexations in Alsace; and also Strasburg. 2. All others, except those of Alsace, were restored; (yet according to an inserted clause, the catholic religion was to remain in *statu quo.*) 3. The quarrel respecting the palatine succession was to be decided by arbiters. 4. Full restitution was made to the duke of Lorrain.

The principal ambassadors were: from France, Callières, de Harlay; from England, the earl of Pembroke, lord Lexington, etc.; from Holland, A. Heinsius, J. Boreel, etc.; from the emperor, count Kaunitz, Stratman, von Sailern; from Spain, don Quiros; from Sweden, as mediators, count Bonde, von Lilienroth.

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Actes, mémoires et négociations de la paix de Ryswic, par AD. MOETJENS. T. i.—v. á la Haye, 1707.

Mémoires politiques pour servir á la parfaite intelligence de la paix de Ryswic, par DU MONT. 1699, T. i.—iv. contain a diplomatic history of the disputes of the states since the Westphalian peace, but go only to 1676.

28. Although by this tedious war, the wish of the allies, to restore things to the standing of the peace of Nimwegen, or if possible of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, was by no means perfectly satisfied, yet the principal object was attained; the mutual freedom and independence of the states was maintained and secured. The wars prosecuted for this end, and terminated by three such treaties of peace, had made the importance of the political balance of power to be so strongly felt, that there was no danger of its being soon lost in practice.

29. In close connection with this, as a result of the war, stood the adjustment of the British continental policy in its leading forms. It proceeded from the rivalship with France, which, originating in the commercial jealousy existing between the nations, was permanently rooted by William III. Too weak to resist France on land, it attached itself to Austria, the second power of the continent, and very naturally to the house of Hapsburg, so long as it ruled in Spain. The close connection with the Netherlands was a consequence of William III.'s accession to the throne; in Italy it had just learned

to appreciate the importance of the duke of Savoy, and in the German empire it could hardly want single allies.

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30. But while those wars shook the west of Europe, storms no less violent raged in the east. The danger from the Turks was never so threatening to Germany as during this period, when it seemed inevitable that the fate of Vienna would decide that of the empire. The contests respecting Transylvania, and the tyranny of the Austrians in Hungary, did not leave the Turks without adherents; and though in regular battles they had to bend to German tactics, there were found some leaders who understood what might be effected by great masses of light troops, animated by national pride and religious hatred. Those wars had no small influence on the contests of western Europe. Louis XIV., in policy as in private life, never untrue to decorum, was not indeed the formal coadjutor of the enemy of Christendom; on the contrary, he sent an auxiliary force against it; but his ambassadors were not for this reason the less active in Constantinople, or his diplomatists in Hungary.

War was already, 1661-1664, stirred up in Transylvania, by the contested election between prince Kemeny, supported by Austria, and Michael Abaffi, who was favoured by the Porte. The fortress of Grosswardein was taken 1661, and Neuhasel 1662. Imminent danger finally induced the empire, and even France, to afford assistance to the emperor. Montecuculi obtained a victory over Achmet Kiuprili, at St.

Public contests in Europe. 1661-1700.

Gotthard on the Raab, July 22, 1664; but in the truce of twenty years, Aug. 22, the Turks remained in possession of Neuhausel and Grosswardein.

31. The second war was much more lasting and important, which began under French influence, before the lapse of the truce, and was terminated at the close of the century by the peace of Carlowitz. How much were the contemporary undertakings of Louis XIV. favoured by it! But though at its commencement, the siege of Vienna menaced the freedom of Germany, yet as the dominion of Austria was established by it in Hungary, Germany was in future secured from the attacks of the Turks. By the participation of Poland and Russia, the war was extended to the north of Europe. (See below.)

The truce of twenty years was broken by the assistance afforded to count Tekeli in Hungary, 1682. Austria was invaded, and Vienna invested, July 22, 1683. The city was relieved by the combined German and Polish army, under the duke Charles of Lorrain, and John Sobiesky, Sept. 12. The German princes subsequently took a more decided part, and Venice acceded, 1684. Hungary continued to be the theatre of the war. Neuhausel was conquered, Aug. 19, 1685, and Ofen by the Germans, Aug. 2, 1686. The Turks were defeated at Mohacz, Aug. 7, and Slavonia was lost, 1687. Venice makes conquests in Dalmatia, the Morea, and Attica. The vizier Kiuprili Mustapha, (since 1690,) shortly after demonstrated, what may be effected in a barbarous nation by quickening the national spirit. Nissa was conquered, and Belgrade, (Oct.); but in the battle of Salankemen, Aug. 19, 1691, the hero fell without finding a worthy successor. In the field the contest began to languish, while the contest of French and

British diplomacy at Constantinople, was proportionably active. But the latter impeded the peace; and when Mustapha II. placed himself, 1695, at the head of affairs, the war revived. When, however, prince Eugene acquired the chief command, 1697, the war was decided by the battle at Zeutha, (Sept. 11.) Peace was concluded at Carlowitz, Jan 26, 1699. 1. With Austria, which retained Transylvania, the Porte retaining Temeswar. 2. With Venice, which retained the Morea, besides the islands St. Mauro and Egina. 3. With Poland and Russia (see below). Public contests in Europe. 1661-1700.

DE LA CROIX, *Guerres des Turcs avec la Polonge, la Moscovie et la Hongrie.* á la Haye, 1698, 8vo.

II. *Cursory view of the principal contemporary changes in each of the leading States of the West of Europe, and of their results.*

I. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

1. These two kingdoms, now separated, continued to exist without the renewed independence of Portugal being sufficient to give a new impulse to the national spirit. But the state of this country was better than that of Spain, where all the germs of internal corruption were so fully developed, (see p. 210,) that it is difficult to explain even the continuance of its political existence. But a great state can go a long way in the career of error, before it is overtaken by political death. Contemporary changes. 1661-1700.

II. FRANCE.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. France.

2. A reign so splendid as that of Louis XIV. harmonised too well with the character of the nation, to allow discontent, in spite of all oppression, to find a central point of resistance. The moderate aggrandisements that were made, were purchased at so high a price that they could scarcely be regarded as a gain. French influence, however, increased in a far greater degree than French power; and even the expulsion of the Huguenots, while at the same time this outrage upon humanity was compensated, in some measure, by the diffusion of French capital and industry, powerfully contributed thereto, by a corresponding diffusion of the French language and manners.

3. Yet in the midst of this period of royal unlimited power, religious controversy produced a germ, of slow growth indeed, but the less easier on that account to be exterminated, and which subsequently became of multiplied fruitfulness. Jansenism, as opposed to Jesuitism, was necessarily allied to freedom of thought and a spirit of enquiry; and thus afforded some amends for the immeasurable injury that France suffered in this respect from the expulsion of the Huguenots. The political influence of the jesuits gave it, inevitably, though gradually, a

political character, and was able to make it, afterwards, the vehicle of opposition to the government.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. France.

Jansenism had its origin in the controversy with the jesuits respecting the book of Jansen, bishop of Ypres, († 1640,) *Augustinus s. de gratia*. By the condemnation of the five positions of pope Alexander VII., 1656, and the form of the oath required, the contest became of practical importance among the clergy, as early as 1665. It did not, however, acquire any political importance till the following period.

III. ENGLAND.

4. No state experienced internal changes of such moment as England. They fully determined its future character as a state; and its part as a member of the European political system. The revolution which raised William III. to the throne, that had been vacated by his father-in-law, restored harmony between the nation and the government; and was, therefore, productive of incalculable benefit for the future. The supremacy of the protestant religion and constitutional freedom were the desire of the people; both were secured to them by the present revolution; and formally ratified by the Bill of Rights.

England. 1688.

5. But it was not the giving greater stability to forms, (generally the ancient ones,) that gave to the British constitution its subsequent life. This proceeded from the nation itself, from the

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. England.

long struggle of the lower house against the projects of the Stuarts, and from the national spirit, which was thereby brought into action; even the survival of the parties of whigs and tories, (for how could all parties have disappeared on a sudden?) was only another symptom of life.

6. The great advantages of this constitution by no means consisted in an equilibrium of powers, effected by artificial forms; on the contrary, they lay in the increased practical authority of parliament, especially of the lower house, and of the unrestrained intercourse of the monarch with it, by means of his organs, the ministers. As mediators between king and parliament, their weight was necessarily increased; but after the secret was disclosed, that a breach could never occur between the two houses, the maintenance of a majority in parliament was the condition of their efficiency. The public opposition secured them from secret cabals; though unity among themselves was naturally requisite; and for this, provision was made, in the manner of forming the ministry.

7. There could not therefore be, in any of the leading states of Europe, so much political life in the nation itself as in this country; and certainly not without reason was Great Britain, for a century, the object of admiration as the model of a constitutional monarchy; though men sought in forms for what lay much deeper. The constitution, however, unavoidably contained

within itself the seeds of corruption. These lay in the imperfect state of representation; yet not so much in that alone, as in the subsequent abuses of the elective franchise, by which the ministers endeavoured to secure a majority in parliament.—Foreign powers had ample cause to use circumspection in their relations with England; for a change of ministers implied a change of political maxims, and the successors deemed themselves but slightly bound by the engagements of their predecessors.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. England.

† DE LOLME *sur la Constitution d'Angleterre.* Genève, 1771, 8vo.

SCHMALZ, *Staatsverfassung von Gross Britannien.* 1806, 8vo.—Both very valuable works; but neither have exhausted the subject.

IV. THE UNITED NETHERLANDS.

8. The making of the office of stadtholder hereditary in five provinces, a work of necessity, and ultimately the means of preservation, (see p. 219,) would probably have been attended with results of great consequence to the interior, had the new stadtholder possessed heirs. But while his activity was turned almost exclusively to foreign policy, it was limited at home principally to bringing men of his own principles into the states, and placing them in the offices of government. More of a statesman than a soldier, (though he was justly admired as a general in

1672-1702.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. United Netherlands

misfortune,) William III. formed rather a political than a military school; and as his spirit survived in Heinsius, Fagels, etc., his peculiar maxims of policy, which were opposition to France and union with England, continued in operation after his death.

V. THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

German Empire.

9. After the settlement of contested political relations by the peace of Westphalia, we might indeed have expected internal quiet as the result; but the elements of diplomacy, and even of quarrel, could not be wanting in a body politic, whose internal relations were not only so infinitely involved of themselves, but also became even more complicated, owing to the distrust of religious parties, which produced the formation
1653. of the *Corpus Evangelicorum*. But such disputes could hardly be called evils; and while they
1663. gave rise to the perpetual diet, the whole acquired a greater degree of solidity. The form of the ancient diet had its advantages in its time; but after the court manners had changed, it necessarily grew antiquated. A perpetual congress therefore arose, simply because it was needed; it was scarcely known how! But for that very reason scarcely any one troubled himself to enquire how it might be most suitably organised.

10. Great changes were produced in the life

of the German princes by the influence of the French court; but similar changes were also produced in their power, civil and military. As Louis XIV. found it conformable to his interest to treat the several princes as such, they felt themselves to be petty powers. An elector of Brandenburg threw an important weight into the scale of general politics, and the erection of the new electorate for Hanover seemed an occurrence of no less universal interest. The individual members of the German body, politic acquired an increased importance, and through them the whole, though not in an equal proportion.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. German Empire.

11. Consequently this state, though assaulted on two sides by powerful conquerors, contrived to maintain itself entire, with but few exceptions. The formidable Turkish wars, the school of courage for the Germans, rendered the sons of the princes generals, and likewise created a common point of union for the emperor and the states. Even the wars with France contributed to the same end; for notwithstanding the influence of French policy during peace, yet in war attachment to the common country was, on the whole, the predominant feeling.

VI. AUSTRIA AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE EAST.

12. Great changes were to have been effected in the interior of the Austrian monarchy. Po-

Austria.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. Austria.

litical unity, especially in the principal country, Hungary, was to have been enforced; for this was regarded as the sole method of establishing power. The consequence was an almost perpetual revolutionary state of affairs, which, joined with the formidable wars in the east and west, might have become highly dangerous to the monarchy. But there was not much cause for apprehension on the side of France, powerful as it was, so long as the empire, undivided, served as a bulwark.

Hungary.

13. Of much greater danger were the disturbances in Hungary, which were excited by the persecutions of the protestants, and had for their aim the establishment of hereditary and, if possible, of absolute power; and were prosecuted with a cruelty which drove even patriots to insurrection. Hungary became an hereditary monarchy; but the people preserved, on the whole, the rest of their constitution, and with it their nationality. This would have been a great gain, notwithstanding the defects of the constitution, had not the disposition for making the necessary reforms been crushed at the same time.

Great disturbances were created during the truce of twenty years, 1664, (see p. 234,) by the palatine Wesseleng († 1670); executions took place and a tribunal of terror was erected at Eperies.—The government at length appeared willing to adopt milder measures, but Tekeli, who had fled, transformed the disturbances into a Turkish war, of the victorious termination of which Austria availed itself for establishing the hereditary

kingdom, Oct. 1687.—But this did not put an end to further plans in Vienna.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700.

14. One very essential advantage, however, which Austria derived from the disturbances, was the union of Transylvania with Hungary; the last prince Michael Abaffi II. having been made a pensioner. This was important, not merely on account of the country itself, but because the most dangerous source of Turkish wars was thereby closed.

Hungary.

The prince Michael Abaffi II. abdicated, in 1699, in consequence of the peace of Carlowitz.—Tranquillity, however, was again interrupted by the rebellion of the younger Rakotzi, 1703, and his complete subjugation was not accomplished till 1711.

15. The Turkish empire was, during this period, for the last time the terror of Germany; for even in time of war Hungary was ever after a firm bulwark. That empire was usually in a state of anarchy; but even in such a state, experience has repeatedly shown, how difficult it is to overcome a people, when animated by national pride and religious fanaticism.

Turkish Empire.

16. The changes which practical politics in general underwent, may be gathered from the history itself. They now began to be actuated by another and a different spirit. Religious interest ceased to be the mainspring of general policy; it no longer exercised much influence on the mutual relations of states. But it did not, there-

General remarks.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. General remarks.

fore, lose its influence on internal affairs, partly in consequence of the arts of the jesuits, and partly because it was the basis of the several constitutions. If the protestants were persecuted in France and Hungary, the catholics were no less so in Ireland.

17. The commercial and monied interest, which, being introduced by Colbert, was substituted in its place, soon disclosed its influence on the governments and people, by producing envy, altercation, and public feuds. After it was confidently believed, that the secret of the balance of trade was discovered, (the climax of folly!) an inexhaustible source of national hatred and envy was opened.

The investigations into the balance of trade, (or the loss and gain of specie, in international commerce,) had their origin in England under Charles II. They flowed immediately from the error, that specie is the criterion of national wealth, and occasioned all those measures, teeming with misfortune, intended to guide it by commercial restraint. The faith, however, of practical men is not to be shaken by the opposition of theory, or even of experience.

Among the authors of that time, consult:

†*Discourses on Trade*, by Sr. Jos. Child. London, 1670.

18. The forms of civil administration were more strictly determined. As there was no longer any prime minister in France, a division was naturally formed into certain departments, at the head of which ministers were placed. This example was more or less followed by other states, though in most of them this separation of

the branches of the administration and the organisation of the cabinet formed upon it, were far from being made on fixed principles. It was seen in France how much depended upon the choice of men; but the number of great ministers remained, nevertheless, much smaller even in these times, than the number of great generals. But has it not always been so?

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700.

General remarks.

19. Political economy reached in this period a much higher degree of perfection than in the preceding. It was not mere necessity that effected this; the subject stood in too close a connection with the whole spirit of the new policy, not to engross general attention. Was not the wealth of the governments the ultimate object of the wealth of the nations, which it was attempted to promote by commerce, industry, and colonies? Here too Colbert's example led the way; but if he never found a worthy successor in France, how could this be expected in foreign countries?

How does Colbert compare with Sully, as a financier? Both indeed were great reformers, but Colbert was also a creator. He merited this latter appellation, partly on account of the relation in which he placed an increased and varied national activity (though in accordance with the narrow views of his age,) to the finances; and partly by his system of loans founded on safe credit. The great difficulties that he had to surmount, consisted, not so much in the greater sums which he had to procure, as in the repeated interruptions from expensive wars, while Sully was able to act undisturbed. The fabrics of both fell with their authors, because they had no support in the constitution.

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700. General remarks.

20. It was entirely different with the British financial system, which arose about the end of this period, by funding the interest of the loans, without entering into any obligation to pay back the capital, which was transferable to any one. Who at its origin had any conception of its importance and future extent? But it immediately found a support in the constitution by the guarantee of parliament, and its gradual extension in the wealth of the nation, which had been on the increase for a century. It was not, therefore, the work of one man, but a fruit of the whole social condition, as it was formed by means of, and subsequent to, the British revolution.

The funding system had its origin in the establishment of the Bank, 1694, when it lent its capital to the government, at a lower rate of interest than was ever done before, in consequence of the existing war. The extension of this system of loans was possible, therefore, only in case of the continual increase of the national wealth of Britain. It is true, indeed, that no right at home or abroad was thus violated; but even what is good may be abused.

21. In other states the necessity was soon felt, of resorting to new resources for paying the public debt, and sinking funds were established by a reduction of interest; this measure, however, for want of being prosecuted with earnestness, was not so productive as it should have been. But the idea was suggested and continued to exist.

The first sinking fund was established in Holland, 1655;

this example was followed by pope Innocent XI., 1685. In Holland, the reduction was from five to four, in the states of the church, from four to three per cent. Contemporary changes. 1661-1700.

22. Not only the art of war, but all the affairs of war, acquired in these times an altered aspect; since in France great armies were maintained even in peace, trained for battle as for parade. Other powers, great and small, (among which was Austria in particular, on account of the Hungarian disturbances,) followed more or less the example of France; but England and Holland, where fears were entertained for the national freedom, followed the most slowly, and not without perpetual resistance from the parliament and the states. The reformation and perfection of the art of war in all its parts, necessarily proceeded from the new system. General remarks.

If the new art of war was carried to perfection by Turenne and others, the authors and improvers of the new military system in general, were Le Tellier, and his son and successor, Louvois. Instead of the fourteen thousand men under Henry IV., Louis XIV. maintained since the peace of Nimwegen, one hundred and forty thousand men. What changes in the whole condition of society does the mere possibility of effecting such a measure imply!

Recherches sur la force de l'armée Françoise depuis Henri IV. jusqu' en 1805. à Paris, 1806.

23. In an equal degree with the land forces increased the marine, as a natural consequence of the formation of a mercantile system. In the course of a few years France assumed a station among the first maritime powers, and would per-

Contemporary changes. 1661-1700.

haps have become the first, had she not been prevented by the coalition of two others after the defeat at La Hogue. At no period has the 1692. French navy become again, what it was at that time. But the political influence of the maritime powers, as such, was so firmly settled, that it was impossible for it subsequently to decay.

III. *History of Colonial affairs, from* 1661 *to* 1700.

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700. France.

1. THE principal change that the colonial affairs of Europe endured in this period, was caused by the participation of France, which likewise determined in a great degree the character of their successive development. It was the period when the French government first began to think seriously of planting colonies. Those of the British were now strongly attached to the mother country, (an illustrious example for others!) with regard to navigation and trade, by means of the renewed Navigation Act, (see p. 183,) and prospered remarkably well; whereas those of other nations remained most of them in their former state.

2. The colonies that France has attempted to found, are in general of three sorts, commercial, agricultural, and for planting; but with very different success! The character of the government, desirous of forcing every thing by regulations, was but little calculated to form commer-

cial colonies; while on the other hand the character of the nation itself, impatient as it was of long continued and quiet exertion, was equally unsuited to the purpose of establishing agricultural colonies. The case is different with regard to the plantations, where the planter alone constitutes the overseer, and labour is soon rewarded by ample gain. Colonies of this kind only have prospered in the hands of the French.

3. In point of commercial compulsion, the maxims of French colonial policy coincided with those of other nations; in other respects they were more liberal. No one, not even strangers, were obstructed in visiting the colonies and settling in them. In France they stood under no especial board, but under the minister of the marine; and in their interior, their military and civil administration was divided between the governor and the intendant, who consulted in common on affairs of moment.

4. But while Colbert did homage to the prevailing spirit of his time by the foundation of colonies, he did so no less by the forms which he gave to commerce. It was committed to chartered companies. But great as were the privileges conferred upon them, no one of the companies subsisted long; commerce flourished only when it was left to itself.

5. Establishment of the French colonial system in the West Indies. French settlements had already been made on several of the islands

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700. France.

there, (see p. 184,) but they were the property of private individuals. Colbert made them by purchase the property of the government. Not till this time, therefore, could a fixed administration be introduced.

The islands of Martinique, Guadaloupe, St. Lucia, Grenada, and the Grenadillas, the small islands of Mariegalante, St. Martin, St. Christopher, St. Bartholomew, St. Croix, and Tortola, were purchased of their original cultivators by individuals, the last five by the Maltese. In 1664, Colbert bought them of the last mentioned, on the part of the government, for nearly a million of livres.—New colonists were sent out to Cayenne, in 1664, by a company; but with the same want of success.

RAYNAL, *Histoire philosophique et politique des isles Françaises dans les Indes occidentales.* Lausanne, 1784.—An abridgment of the great work mentioned p. 35.

6. But the portion of St. Domingo, acquired during this period, was to become of more importance to France than all these possessions put together. This, as well as the first settling of the other islands in general, was occasioned by the tyranny of the Spaniards, who, by treating all strangers as enemies, organised a perpetual war in the West Indies, and thus obliged foreign settlers to become corsairs and warriors. Thus arose the pirate state of the buccaniers, from which proceeded the French settlements on the western portion of St Domingo. These settlements were retained by France after the peace of Ryswick, without any express contract, a Bourbon having soon after ascended the Spanish

throne. Who then anticipated their future importance!

France.

The expulsion of the French and English from St. Christopher gave rise to the buccaniers and pirates, after 1630.—They founded a piratical state on Tortuga, and made settlements on the western coasts of St. Domingo, being recognised and assisted by France, after the year 1664.

The history of the Buccaniers of America, by OEXMELIN. London, 1742, 2 vols.—For a more general view consult:

VON ARCHENHOLZ, *Geschichte der Flibustiers.* 1803. The sources for the history of their deeds and cruelties require to be more closely examined, as they may very likely have been disfigured by the Spanish writers. See BRYAN EDWARDS' *History of St. Domingo*, p. 128, note.

7. A privileged West Indian company was established. But it had to be abolished ten years after, being unable to support itself, on account of the smuggling trade. Such restrictions were imposed upon the trade, even after it had been made free to all the French, that it was of little benefit. So long, moreover, as the West Indian produce was not as afterwards diffused through Europe, the colonies necessarily thrived slowly. Sugar and cotton, before the introduction of the coffee tree, were the chief produce of the islands. 1664.

The West Indian company, established by Colbert in 1664, comprehended not only all the American possessions from Canada to the river Amazon, but also the coasts of Africa from Cape Verd to the Cape of Good Hope, on account of the slave trade.—The company was abolished, in 1674. The high duties on West Indian produce, and the restriction of the commerce

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700.

France.

to a few harbours, concurred to keep the colonies in a feeble state.—The African trade still remained in the hands of chartered companies. The Senegal company was established in 1679, at first for all the western coast from Cape Blanca to the Cape of Good Hope; although subsequently obliged to share it with the Guinea company, which was erected in 1685, and privileged to trade from Sierra Leone to the Cape.

J. B. LABAT, *nouveau voyage aux isles d'Amerique*. Paris, 1692, 8 vols. The leading work for acquiring a knowledge of the state of the French West Indies at that time.

8. Canada, augmented by Acadia, belongs to the class of agricultural colonies; but the cultivation of the soil, limited then to Lower Canada, continued to make but small progress; since the traffic in peltry and the fisheries of Newfoundland were more and more regarded as the principal object, (see p. 141). The settlement, attempted in Louisiana, after exploring the Mississippi, was wholly unsuccessful.

After long contention with England respecting Acadia, and frequent changes, France eventually remained in quiet possession of it, by the peace of Breda, 1667.—Plaisance was established on Newfoundland, but the fisheries were subsequently the occasion of perpetual quarrels with England.—La Salle sailed up the Mississippi in 1680, and made an unsuccessful attempt at a settlement.

Description de la Louisiane, par HENNEQUIN. Paris, 1685. The author was a missionary.

9. The participation of France in the East Indian trade must have been attended with still greater obstacles, as she had to encounter more powerful rivals, and possessed as yet no settlements. An East Indian commercial company

was, nevertheless, chartered by Colbert; but it remained in such a languishing situation, that at the end of this period it was near its dissolution. Colonial affairs. 1661-1700. France.

The French East Indian company was established in 1664, with the exclusive right of trading for fifteen years, of being the proprietors of their conquests (invested, therefore, with the right of war!) and a fund of fifteen millions. The first experiment at conquests and settlements was made at Madagascar, under the active Carron, 1665. It was to become a second Java. A commercial colony, where there was nothing to buy or sell!—A factory was erected at Surat on the coast of Malabar, in 1675.—In 1679, Pondicherry was founded on the Coromandel coast, and was afterwards the principal place. But wars in Europe, which excited a lust of conquest even in the Indies, together with the measures of the government, especially after Colbert's death, reduced it to so low an ebb, that it could not maintain its monopoly. How could it have been otherwise? The mercantile system was at war with itself. In order to support domestic manufactures the importation of Indian fabrics was prohibited. The company was, therefore, only to carry on a coasting trade.

10. The increase of the British colonies, attached more firmly to the mother country by means of the renewed Navigation Act, was more certain, because it depended less on the government than on the nation. The continual political and religious ferment under Charles II. and James II. was favourable for them. To what extent did not commerce and wealth even then increase? The peaceful relations, and even compacts with Spain, favoured the possessions in America; and the West Indies, on account of the progressive culture of Jamaica, began to England.

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700. England.

be more important to the British. The advancement of these colonies was incontestably promoted by their free constitution, being placed under a governor and his council, assisted by an assembly of deputies from the several parishes. Commerce to them was free; the slave trade alone remained in the hands of a privileged company.

A compact was made with Spain, 1670; the sovereignty of Britain over its possessions in that quarter was expressly acknowledged; and the foundation of permanent harmony was laid.—In 1674, the fourth African company was established (the former ones of Elizabeth and Charles II. had fallen to decay); but this was unable long to maintain the monopoly. Forts were founded on the Gambia (St. James), and Sierra Leone.

11. Far more flourishing than the possessions of the British in the West Indies were those in North America. The circumstances of the times exerted a peculiarly happy influence upon them; not only by means of increased emigration, but also by the political revolutions in the parent land. The first obstacles in the way of colonisation were mostly surmounted by the perseverance of the cultivators; England acquired the sole possession of the whole line of coast from Canada to Georgia; New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Carolina, were formed into distinct provinces; others, as Connecticut and Rhode Island, obtained important privileges and improved constitutions.

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700. England.

The political alterations in the northern provinces, were especially caused by the expulsion of the Dutch, in 1664, from the regions near the Delaware, (New Belgium, New Holland); these possessions being retained by England in the peace of Breda. (See p. 217.) This gave rise to the provinces of Delaware, (afterwards united with Pennsylvania, 1682—1704); New York and New Jersey, 1665; and New Hampshire, which was separated from Massachusetts, in 1691, and had a governor of its own.—The Carolinas had their origin, in 1663, in the grant, by Charles II., to eight lords, of the country between 31° and 36° N. lat. Thus separated from Virginia, (see p. 139,) it became an independent state (divided, first in 1729, into North and South Carolina), to which Locke gave a constitution, (the worst of all his works).—The colonies in Pennsylvania were founded by the quaker, William Penn, son of the admiral, 1682. He received the country on the Delaware, between 40° and 42° N. lat. from the king, in payment for a debt, as proprietor and hereditary governor. A contract was peaceably made with the Indians. He introduced perfect religious liberty, for which there was no room in Europe; and Philadelphia and Germantown were founded. A glorious idea was for the first time realised by Penn in a remote corner of the earth; and the example has not remained fruitless!

C. D. EBELING, *Erdbeschreibung und Geschichte von Nord-Amerika.* Th. i.—vii. 1793—1803. This classical work comprises the ten northern provinces, to which is added of the southern, Virginia. For their domestic history, the leading sources are the collections of laws and statutes of several of them, such as New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and N. Carolina.

12. To the north of the colonies, not only the fisheries of Newfoundland remained of great importance, but England appropriated to itself all the regions on Hudson's Bay, and with them the trade in peltry, which has since been prosecuted

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700.

by a chartered company, without ever having been very lucrative.

England.

The Hudson's Bay company was established in 1669, with a common fund.—Some geographical discoveries were made; but disputes always existed with the French in Canada.

13. The East India trade of the British remained in the hands of the chartered company, which underwent, however, several changes, and finally had to see a second company spring up by its side. Their possessions were somewhat augmented, but their trade was not so in an equal proportion; the Dutch were too powerful competitors. An essential change was produced in Indian commerce, by the great quantity of Indian muslins and silks imported into England after 1670. The clamour excited by it, contributed, not a little, towards increasing the general hatred against the company.

The patent of the East India company was renewed by Charles II. 1661, with political privileges, extended to the erection of forts.—Possession was taken of the island of St. Helena, deserted by the Dutch after the settlement of the Cape colony. This island, so important as a resting place for ships returning from the Indies, was granted to the company by a royal patent, April 3, 1661. Bombay was acquired in 1661, by the marriage of the king; and was shortly after, in 1668, conferred on the company by the crown. Bombay increased in importance as a secure harbour and a commercial place, while Surat sunk lower and lower, owing to the oppressions of the Great mogul, as sovereign, the rise of pirates, like Sevagi, together with the influx of smugglers and French, and the decline of Persian commerce. For this cause, the government was at last formally transferred from Surat to Bombay;

which, as well as Madras, was declared a presidency in 1687, independent of Mogul-dominion.—After the natives had been expelled from Bantam, by the aid of the Dutch, 1683, a factory and fort were erected at Bencoolen on Sumatra, 1687, for the pepper trade. Factories were established at Hoogly and Calcutta; and when hostilities commenced between the Great Mogul and the nabob of Bengal, 1687, exertions were made to maintain a fortress there also. The district of Calcutta was purchased and Fort William built, 1699, it having been declared a presidency.—A great outcry was raised against the company upon the introduction of cotton and silk goods, partly by the manufacturers, partly by the Levant association. Here too the mercantile system was at a loss.—Complaints were made against it in parliament, 1692. It purchased, however, a renewal of its patent, Oct 7, 1693. A second company was finally formed, called the English East India Company, which obtained its privileges by the advance of two million pounds sterling to the government, Sept. 5. It was not, however, till the following period, that the intended union of the companies was accomplished. Colonial affairs. 1661-1700.

F. RUSSEL, *Collection of Statutes, concerning the incorporation, trade, and commerce of the East India Company, with the statutes of piracy, lists of duties, etc., and an abridgment of the Company's charters.* Lond. 1786, fol. This indispensable collection contains, in full, all the acts respecting the company, from 1660 till 1786, as also all the charters abridged. Its utility is increased yet more by an excellent index.

BRUCE, *Annals, etc.* vol. ii. (see p. 139.)

14. Thus the Dutch still remained in possession of the Indian trade, and their company received the renewal of its charter; though De Wit was superior to the common views of his age. They were now in exclusive possession of the spice islands. Continued hostilities with the Portuguese, gave them an opportunity to obtain a Holland.

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700. Holland.

permanent footing on both coasts of the peninsula, by the conquests of Cochin and Negapatam, (see p. 177); but they continued to be the masters of the islands, and grocery wares and spices were the principal objects of commerce; essentially different from those of the British and French, which consisted more in manufactures and raw materials.

A compact was made with Portugal, 1669, by which each party retained in the two Indies, its existing possessions.—In the spice islands also, the company enlarged its territory by the war of three years, and by making a firm settlement in Celebes, 1669; and by the subjugation of Bantam, 1683. The Dutch resisted with decided success the attempts of the French company on Ceylon, in the war of 1672.

15. In the West Indies too, the Dutch enlarged their jurisdiction by the possession of Surinam. Time, and Dutch perseverance, were able to form of this unhealthy country one of the most flourishing of colonies.

The colony of Surinam was first founded in 1642, by Portuguese, especially jews, who fled from the inquisition. The English soon after settled there; but the Dutch reconquered it in 1667, and retained it in the peace of Breda.—It was sold to the West India company in 1679, and Paramaribo was founded. The plantations of Essequibo and Berbice also remained in the hands of the Dutch.

Spain.

16. The Spanish colonies, now more quiet on account of the connection of the mother country with the maritime powers, underwent no important changes either in point of extent or of regulation. Though the missions of the jesuits on

the banks of the Paraguay and the Maragnon penetrated farther and farther, who heard any thing of it in Europe? The internal decay of the mother country seems to have had little influence upon them; of what consequence indeed was it who manufactured the commodities, with which they were supplied? They constituted a world in themselves, but then, it was a Spanish world; protected from conquests by its immense extent. The maritime cities, however, frequently suffered severely from the attacks of the buccaniers.

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700. Spain.

The missions of the jesuits on the Paraguay were commenced in 1609, and had already made considerable progress in the present period.

17. Since the recovery of her independence, Portugal. Portugal had saved only a few fragments of her East Indian dominion, (see p. 184); in Brazil she was more fortunate. The treaty with Holland, in the beginning of this period, ensured to her the quiet possession of it. What might not Brazil have become, had the government so willed it? But the promotion of the smuggling trade, and the aggrandisement of territory as far as the river La Plata, by founding St. Sacrament, 1681. were regarded as more important than the promotion of colonisation. But this too was an advantage; and it was in all probability fortunate for Portugal, that the mines of gold were not discovered till the end of this period. In the interior the missions of the jesuits advanced along

Colonial affairs. 1661-1700.

the Maragnon, till they at last came in contact with those of the Spanish.

Portugal.

Almost all the northern coast was conquered by the Dutch, between 1630—1640, in the possession of which they remained, agreeably to the truce of June 23, 1641, till their expulsion by Juan de Viera, 1654, (see p. 179). The definitive treaty with Holland, 1660, secured to the Portuguese, in consideration of a sum of money, their second country.—The great gold mines were discovered, first in Minas Geraes, at Villa Ricca, 1696. It was the work of the Paulists, a people collected under Spanish dominion in St. Paul, who, forming a state of freebooters and soldiers, turned from the slave trade to the seeking of gold, and for that purpose penetrated into the interior.

Denmark.

18. Even one of the northern states, Denmark, took a stand among the colonial powers, and by the possession of Tranquebar, sought to gain a share, however small, in the East Indian trade.

The Danish East India company was founded as early as 1618, under Christian IV. First attempts were made to create a commerce, and Tranquebar was obtained from the rajah of Tanjore. But the company was dissolved in 1634 A second was nevertheless founded in 1670, which survived, though in a state of weakness, till 1729.

19. Thus the colonial system of the Europeans in the two Indies, while it became greater in extent, became also more and more complicate in geographical situation. Already in this period, the wars of the Europeans reached their colonies; but the time was to come, when contests in the colonies would excite wars in Europe.

FIRST PERIOD.

From 1661 *to* 1700.

PART THE SECOND.

HISTORY OF THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN STATES-SYSTEM.

J. J. Schmauss, *Einleitung zu der Staatswissenschaft*, etc. 2 Th. (see p. 185.)

Northern states. 1661-1700.

1. As the political relations of the south, fixed by the treaties of peace at Munster, Aix-la-Chapelle, Nimwegen, and Ryswick, rested on these treaties, so the relations of the north were based on the pacifications of Oliva, Roeschild, Copenhagen, and Cardis, (see p. 198). In the mutual relations of the states, therefore, there seemed to remain little matter for quarrels, provided the general quiet were not interrupted by any foreign influence, or Turkish wars, against which no policy could guard.

Poland.

2. But the internal relations of the individual states were unhappily so replete with the elements of disorder, that the preservation of peace in the north was almost hopeless. Since Poland had become an elective kingdom, and unanimity of votes was requisite in the diets, how was a peaceful election to be expected, when it was so

1652.

Northern states. 1661-1700.

easy for strangers to interfere? When foreign policy went so far as even to attempt to appoint a successor in the lifetime of the king, a confusion was produced in the interior, which in such a state, might at any time have produced a civil war.

Poland.

A Polish royal election was henceforth nothing more than a double auction of the throne, partly in public, for the benefit of the state, partly in secret, for the benefit of the voters. Polish power was, nevertheless, maintained, so long as the rude vigour of the Sarmatians was not enervated by foreign manners, and their art of war was not surpassed by that of their neighbours. In the field and in the cabinet, characters like the Roman were not rare; but a mistaken national pride allowed no correct political intelligence to become prevalent.

Polens Staatsveränderungen und letzte Verfassung, von FR. JOH. JEKEL. Wein, 1803, 3 Th. Very valuable for obtaining a knowledge of the interior of this state.

Sweden.

3. Sweden, possessing provinces almost surrounding the Baltic, still shone as the first power of the north. But these provinces, which occasioned a participation in the wars of the east and west, were an advantage of very doubtful character; and in the interior, during the minority of Charles XI. a condition, not much better than that of Poland, seemed on the point of obtaining, had not the king, at the decisive juncture, vindicated his rights and his revenues. But the regal power thus became almost absolute; and the time was to come, when Sweden would have to deplore the pernicious consequences.

1680.

4. Prussia, though now a sovereign state, remained, nevertheless, a province of Brandenburg, because the latter was the residence of the court. What difference would there have been, had it been removed to Königsberg? This state partook, therefore, much more in the public contests of the south than in those of the north, except in so far as the latter were caused by the former. Prussia.

Already under the elector Frederic William, Prussia became independent in her foreign policy, as far as was compatible with the duties of a state of the empire; and the autocracy was established in the interior by arbitrary taxes, a consequence of the wars. But the great institutions, which constitute the character of the Prussian state, are of later origin.

5. The participation of Russia in the affairs of the north was at first very far from decisive; for this country needed a radically new internal organisation, before it could exert any external influence; and this difficulty was still more aggravated by the family relations of the reigning dynasty. But the conquest of Azoph and the settlement in the Ukraine, showed what was to be expected in future. Russia.

Under the reign both of czar Alexis († 1676) and his son Feodor († 1682), the influence of Russia on Poland was limited to taking a part in the contests of the neighbouring countries. Some connections were, nevertheless, contracted with remoter kingdoms, by means of embassies, as with France, in 1687; those with England originated in commercial relations.—The endeavours of Sophia, in the name of her incompetent brother Ivan, to usurp the government by the insurrection of the *Strelzi*, (the imperial life guards,) 1682, caused a

Northern states. 1661-1700.

dissension with her half-brother Peter, which terminated, in 1689, with her downfal, and made Peter the ruler of Russia, Ivan († 1696) retaining nothing but the empty title.

Denmark.

6. Denmark, possessing greater stability in itself after the introduction of the autocracy, was subjected to an internal evil, the consequences of which were far more extended than was probably foreseen. The dispute that prevailed between the two lines of the reigning dynasty, the royal and ducal houses of Holstein-Gottorp, gradually affected the relations of the whole north, and at last contributed materially to produce the great war, which in the following period involved the whole of the north in its flames.

The house of Holstein-Gottorp was derived from Adolph, the younger son of king Frederic I.; by a division of the inheritance, in 1544, the ducal line of Gottorp received the half of Sleswic and Holstein, the former as a fief of Denmark, the latter as a fief of the German empire. The cause of the quarrel (subsequent to 1654) was the abrogation of the feudal allegiance of Sleswic, demanded by duke Frederic II. at the peace of Roeschild (see p. 197) through his son-in-law Charles Gustavus, and confirmed by the peace of Copenhagen, 1660. But obliged by artifice, a restoration of the feudal allegiance was made by king Christian V. by the contract of Rendsburg, July 10, 1675; and Sleswic was subdued after the flight and remonstrance of the duke. A restoration was made, under French mediation, at the peace of Fontainbleau, 1679. But the relations with France being altered, Sleswic was again taken away, 1684, until after much discussion it was again restored to the duke, under the mediation of the emperor, Brandenburg, and Saxony, in the contract at Altona, June 20, 1689. But what enmity is more difficult to be appeased, than family enmity? A closer connection was formed with Sweden,

by means of the marriage of the young duke Frederic IV. with Hedwig Sophia, eldest sister of Charles XII., since 1698. We shall have occasion to examine the consequences of this marriage hereafter.

7. Such being the situation of the northern states, there was hardly any interest that could constitute a common centre of politics, had not the disturbances of the Cossacks in some degree supplied it. These contests were both of importance in themselves, since they decided respecting the dominion of the Ukraine and its warlike inhabitants; and were also very comprehensive, as the situation of this country rendered the participation of all the contiguous nations, of the Russians, the Poles, the Tartars, standing under Turkish protection, and of the Turks themselves, almost inevitable.—The war, caused by them between Poland and Russia, (see p. 197,) having been prosecuted, generally without success, by Poland, was terminated by the truce at Andrussov, by which the Cossacks were divided between Russia and Poland.

The Cossacks, sprung from an intermixture of free Russians, Poles, and Tartars, in Podolia, and Volhynia (Ukraine), on both banks of the Dneiper, had been under the protection of the Poles since the fifteenth century. Stephen Bathori, made them, by a military organisation, 1576, an excellent bulwark against the Turks and Tartars. But the oppression of the Polish nobles, strengthened by religious hatred, urged them to rebellion under their Hetman Chmelnizki, in 1648, which, although quelled for a time, was however renewed in 1651, and in the end obliged them to submit to Russia, June 6, 1654.

Northern states. 1651-1700.

Poland was in consequence plunged into a war with Russia, while that with Sweden (see p. 197) still continued; and there was also some danger of a war with the Turks, as a portion of the Cossacks submitted to the Porte. Poland thus saw itself forced to acquiesce in the truce of Andrussov for fifteen years, Jan. 30, 1667, (afterwards repeatedly renewed, and finally confirmed for ever by the peace at Moscow, April 14, 1686.) By this truce, 1. The Cossacks on the eastern and western bank of the Dneiper were divided between Russia and Poland. 2. Russia remained in possession of the palatinates of Kiev and Smolensk, and the regions on the eastern side of the Dneiper, Severia, and Tsernikov.—Thus these wars deprived Poland of its best conquests; but they were the school where heroes and generals were formed, like John Sobieski and his compeers.

VON MÜLLER, *von dem Ursprunge der Cossacken;* in *Sammlung Russischer Geschichten.* B. iv.

8. During these occurrences, a continual ferment existed in Poland, which was kept up by the endeavours of France to effect the appointment of a French prince as successor of John Casimir. But when the latter, fatigued with the cares of government, finally abdicated, the attempts of foreigners in the new election were unsuccessful, and the throne was bestowed on Michael Wisnowiecki, a Pole, who was himself conscious how little he was adapted for such a station. An unhappy Turkish war, occasioned by the Cossack disputes, and terminated by an ignominious peace, again disturbed the quiet of Poland and the north, when the death of Michael occurred opportunely enough to save him from being deposed.

John Casimir, brought into the French interest by his wife, Louisa Maria, of the house of Nevers, was desirous to elevate the house of Condé to the Polish throne, 1660. This gave rise to internal disturbances under Lubomirski, which led to a civil war, 1665. After the death of the queen, 1667, the king abdicated, Sept. 17, 1668. Six foreigners came forward as candidates for the throne, which was, however, destined for a Polish noble, in the person of Michael. The Cossacks rebelled again under Doroscensko, who joined the Turks, 1672. This gave the Turks a pretence for a war, which was carried on most unhappily for the Poles, though in alliance with Russia. Kamieniec was lost, and the Turks penetrated into the heart of Poland, favoured by internal commotions; till Michael in the peace of Oct. 18, 1672, consented to the emancipation of the Cossacks and a tribute. The nation was unable to tolerate such a peace; the war was therefore renewed, 1673; and a victory gained at Chozim under John Sobieski, Nov. 11. The king himself died Nov. 10.

May 19, 1674.

9. The election of John Sobieski seemed to be necessarily of great moment, not merely for Poland, but for the whole north. Hardened, however, at an early age, into a soldier and general, he never ripened into a ruler. He wiped away the ignominy of the last peace; but thorough internal improvements entered not into the political horizon of a Polish noble; and largely as Poland participated in the contests of the north, it was all transitory, because it was purely personal.

The Turkish war was terminated by a separate peace at Zurawno, Oct. 16, 1676, by which, 1. The tribute was abolished. 2. Kamieniec and a third part of Ukraine were kept by the Turks.—But even this was wrested from them by the Russians, to whom it was secured by the truce of Radzyn, 1680.

Northern states. 1661-1700.

† *Histoire de Jean Sobiesky, roi de Pologne*, par M. L'ABBÉ COYER. à Warsowie, 1771, 3 vols. As faithful as a very spirited narrative can be.

Sweden.

10. While the Cossack disputes thus occupied Poland and Russia, Sweden had allowed itself to be inveigled by France into the war between Holland and Germany, and encouraged to make
1675. a diversion against Brandenburg, by which it became entangled in a war with Denmark and the German empire. It not only lost its provinces, but also, what was of no less value, its military
June 28. renown, at Fehrbellin. The former it recovered by the instrumentality of France in the peace of St. Germain and Fontainbleau, (see p. 222): but to restore the latter, there was first need of a king, who like Charles XII. was a soldier.

The foreign policy was ever determined principally by subsidies, which it drew sometimes from Spain, sometimes from France. How could that government have a fixed policy, which offered its assistance to the highest bidder?

11. A new war having broken out with the Turks, Poland, and soon after Russia also, formed a union with Austria. The relief of Vienna (see p. 234) was in truth the most glorious day in the life of Sobieski; but fortune seems subsequently to have favoured him less, and he had to purchase the participation of Russia by changing the truce of Andrussov into a permanent peace. Sobieski did not live to see the end of the war; and Russia, far more than Poland, reaped the fruits of the long contest.

An unsuccessful attempt was made to conquer Kamieniec and Moldavia, 1684—1687. Russia engaged in the war, 1686. Conquests were made by the Austrians, in Hungary, as well as by the Russians of the Ukraine against the Tartars, 1688; but the internal relations of Russia impeded the progress of the war, till Peter I. became sole ruler. Azoph was besieged and taken, 1695 and 1696. In the truce, Dec. 25, 1698, (confirmed for thirty years, 1700,) Russia retained Azoph, as a fortified place, with its dependencies, with free trade on the Black sea. Poland, by the peace at Carlowitz, (see p. 235,) recovers Kamieniec and Podolia, which had before been ceded.

12. Thus ended these wars, without indeed absolutely deciding the fate of the north, but not without preparing the way for it. The change of rulers in all the northern kingdoms about this time, by raising two of the most extraordinary men to the throne, produced in the ensuing period far greater revolutions than all the Cossack wars could have effected.

SECOND PERIOD.

From 1700 *to* 1740.

PART THE FIRST.

HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN STATES-SYSTEM.

Preliminary remarks. 1700-1740.

1. THREE great wars had been carried on against Louis XIV. for the maintenance of the balance of power, and this period opens with a fourth, still more protracted, and undertaken principally for the same purpose; while the north was suffering under a contest no less obstinate, but which was entirely distinct from that of the west. When this was finally suspended by the treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt, the claims of all parties were by no means adjusted; and Europe afterwards remained in a fluctuating condition, from which proceeded a new conflagration; and, after this was allayed, there followed a series of negotiations, of alliances and counter-alliances, that characterise in a striking manner the increasing intricacy of the relations of the European political system. But notwithstanding all imperfections, the principal object was attained; and this must always be the first question of the intelligent observer.

Preliminary remarks. 1700-1740.

2. But in such a disposition of things, the mercantile system lost none of its influence. This was a natural consequence of the ever increasing importance of colonies, from the time that their productions, especially coffee, sugar, and tea, began to come into more general use in Europe. The great influence which these commodities have had, not only on politics, but also on the reformation of social life, is not easily calculated. Apart from the vast gains resulting to the nations at large from commerce, and to the governments from duties,—what influence have not coffee-houses exercised in the capitals of Europe, as central points of political, mercantile, and literary transactions? In a word, without those productions, would the states in the west of Europe have acquired their present character?

3. The previous great wars had already plunged most of the states into debt, which was accumulated by new wars, and in general by increased wants. Men were thus led to use paper money on a large scale; but from ignorance of its nature, sometimes too confidently, by making the wants of the government, and not of the circulation, the measure of its abundance; sometimes too timidly, by regarding the mass of specie, as the pledge for its redemption, often to the great detriment of the state. But the resources of the government were still always temporarily increased by it; and without it would

Preliminary remarks. 1700-1740.

never have been capable of any great and continued exertion; and happily it was not immediately discovered how far public credit and the system of loans might be carried.

The expression paper money is frequently used in a more comprehensive sense, (improperly however,) of all papers which the state issues on its own credit, in as far as they may be transferred to a third person, (as bonds, especially stocks, etc.). In a narrower sense, paper money can denote that paper only which serves as a substitute for specie, i. e. which is destined immediately and solely for general circulation, as a general medium of payment. This is either issued directly by the government, (in the shape of assignats, treasury notes, etc.,) or by associations, chartered for the purpose, called banks, (bank-notes or bills,) the relations of which to the government may be very different, (as free banks, or government banks). All paper money, issued either directly or indirectly by the government, must be insecure, because governments cannot always be masters of their wants; the paper money of free banks can lose its credit only by their own fault; as no external causes oblige them to suffer its accumulation.

I. *History of the public Contests in Europe.*

Collections of state papers. Besides the general works (see p. 3):

Rousset *recueil d'actes, négociations, etc. depuis la paix d'Utrecht.* Tom. i.—xxi. 8vo. à Amsterdam, 1728, etc. It comprises the period of 1713—1748.

The historical works are:—

Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du XVIII. siècle, contenant les négociations, traités, etc. concernant les affaires d'état, par M. De Lamberty. à la Haye, 1724, tom. i.—xiv. 4to. The leading work for the period 1700—1718. A full and impartial narration, with the documents inserted. The author,

having passed a long time in a diplomatic situation, wrote this work during his old age, in retirement. Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740.

Mémoires de M. de Torcy, pour servir à l'histoire des négociations depuis le traité de Ryswick, jusqu' à la paix d' Utrecht. Tom. i.—iii. 12mo. Paris, 1756. The author was a French minister and ambassador.

Mémoires et négociations secrètes de diverses cours de l' Europe, par M. DE LA TORRE. à la Haye, 1726, tom. i.—v. 8vo. They go from 1698 to 1714.

The political journals of the day, moreover, now become sources of history; but having been naturally written in the spirit of the country where they appeared, they must be estimated accordingly. The most important are:—

Mercure historique et politique de la Haye. From 1686—1782, vol. 1—187.

Die Europäische Fama. Th. 1—360. (from 1702—1734). *Die neue Europäische Fama* (from 1735—1756.) Th. 1—197. Strongly Antigallic.

As a sketch:

F. G. HÄBERLIN, *voltständiger Entwurf der politischen Histoire des XVIII. Jahrhunderts.* Th. i. 1748. It extends from 1700 to 1740. A simple chronological narration of the occurrences, with an index to the authorities.

4. The great question which engrossed the attention of the cabinets of the west since the peace of Ryswick, and which gave rise not only to a tedious war, but also to most of the public contests of this period, was that respecting the Spanish succession, the Spanish line of the house of Hapsburg promising to become extinct with Charles II. This subject, at all events of the highest importance to Europe, was viewed partly as a question of right, and partly as a measure of political expediency. But the whole was an affair of the cabinets; the nation itself,

Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740.

though possessed of a legitimate claim to a voice in the discussion, was not consulted.

5. On the side of right, three great competitors came into consideration, laying claim to the whole monarchy; Louis XIV., as husband of Maria Theresa, the elder daughter of Charles II. for the Dauphin; Leopold I. as husband of the younger sister Margaret Theresa, and by right of the will of Philip IV., for one of his sons by his last marriage; and the elector of Bavaria, in behalf of his minor son Joseph Ferdinand, as grandson of Margaret Theresa. The right of birth was in favour of the Dauphin; but he was opposed by the most solemn renunciations of his mother to all hereditary claims upon Spain. After him, the elector of Bavaria was the next male heir; but it was in the power of Leopold to have anticipated both, had he known how to improve the moment. The duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II., demanded only a part.

Conclusions of right in favour of Austria may be found in THUCELII *Reichs-Staats-Acten.* T. i, ii.

La défense du droit de Marie Thérese Reine de France à la succession d'Espagne, par M. D'ANBUSSON. Paris, 1699.

6. The political point from which the cabinets, especially the maritime powers, viewed so important a question, was the maintenance of the balance of power. Could it be otherwise in an age when this had become the basis of politics? Could it be indifferent to them, what was to become of Spain, and particularly the Spanish Ne-

therlands? It was regarded as an axiom, that the union of the whole Spanish monarchy with Austria or France, especially with the latter, would destroy the equilibrium; and particularly if the two crowns should be united in the person of one monarch. To prevent this, Louis XIV. had already promulgated his intention of transferring the claims of the Dauphin to his younger son, Philip, duke of Anjou; while Leopold I. declared himself ready to transfer his to the archduke Charles, his younger son by his last marriage. Public contests in Europe. 1661-1700.

7. At Madrid, during the lifetime of the king, the marquis of Harcourt, the French ambassador, soon acquired an ascendancy over the count Harrach from the imperial court. But Louis XIV. knew very well, that the consent of the maritime powers was necessary; and the first treaty of partition concerted with them, which assigned to the elector, Spain itself with the colonies, and to the other two candidates, the provinces in Italy and the Netherlands, seemed to accord with the interest of each party and the whole political system of Europe, when the electoral prince was unhappily carried off by a premature death. Oct. 11, 1698. Feb. 6, 1699.

Besides the above: *Mémoires et négociations secrètes du Comte de Harrach*, par M. DE LA TORRE. à la Haye, 1720, 2 vols. 8vo. go from 1695 to the first treaty of partition.

8. Notwithstanding a second treaty of partition, signed by France and the maritime powers, March 25, 1700.

Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740.

little hope could remain of a peaceful compromise; for Austria not only refused to acquiesce in it, but in Spain itself the idea was prevalent, both with the king and the nation, that any division would be a misfortune for the monarchy. The cession of the provinces in Europe was regarded as a loss of political strength as well as of commerce. And yet without this division, a compromise was hardly possible. How much blood and money would have been spared by the exercise of a little reason?

9. The approach of death and the cardinal Portocarrero finally induced Charles II. to make a will, in which he bequeathed the whole Spanish monarchy, undivided, to Philip of Anjou, and in case of his refusal, to the archduke Charles. The death of the king, which occurred soon after, left Louis XIV. nothing but the alternative of accepting the whole testament, or of observing the treaty of partition. Not without serious reflection—for how gladly would he have avoided war—did he resolve on the former.

Oct. 2, 1700.

Nov. 1, 1702.

10. Philip V. was acknowledged both in Spain and in all the colonies and provinces; even peace with the maritime powers seemed of possible continuance. But Leopold II. felt himself the more deeply wounded, in proportion as he was obliged to admit that he had lost the Spanish monarchy solely by his own fault.

11. Preparations commenced on both sides, and exertions were made before the commence-

ment of the war to secure allies. France having gained the duke of Savoy by marriage, and the duke of Mantua by money, acquired beforehand a strong hold in Italy. In the Spanish Netherlands, the French availed themselves of the first moment for garrisoning the fortresses with their troops; and the disorders that broke out again in Hungary, under Rakotzi, were very much in their favour. But in Germany, the acquisition of Maximilian II. elector of Bavaria, who was joined by his brother, the elector of Cologne, seemed likely to be of the most important consequence. For thus one of the leading German princes, on the very frontiers of Austria, might easily be converted into a formidable antagonist of the latter.

Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740.

1702.

12. But all these preparations were as unable to prevent the rise of a powerful alliance on the other side, as France was to maintain the predominance. In Germany, Austria immediately found allies in the new king of Prussia, in several other states, and soon afterwards in the whole empire; and the maritime powers, already irritated by the occupation of the Spanish Netherlands, were likewise summoned to war, when Louis XIV. in violation of the treaty of Ryswick, after the death of James II., acknowledged his son as king. And although the British throne, and the dignity of hereditary stadtholder, were at the same time vacated by the death of William III., yet the system followed by his succes-

Sept. 16, 1701. March 8, 1702.

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sor Anne, and in the Netherlands, continued the same, and a closer connection of all was the consequence.

A grand alliance was concluded at the Hague, Sept. 7, 1701, between the emperor, England, and Holland, having for its object the conquest of the Spanish provinces and colonies. The alliance was subsequently strengthened by the accession of the king of Prussia, Jan. 20, 1702; of the German empire, after the previous associations of the circles, Sept. 28, 1702; of Portugal in consideration of subsidies and promised aggrandisement, at the expense of Spain and the colonies, May 16, 1703; and finally of the dissatisfied duke of Savoy, Oct. 25, 1703.

13. Considered in itself, the new alliance could hardly appear a durable one, because the projects of the maritime powers, which aimed at a partition, did but ill agree with the demands of Austria, which desired the whole. It acquired, however, an unexampled degree of consistency, when men of high minds and rare talents, bound together alike by principle and interest, were raised to its head. A triumvirate, like that of Eugene, Marlborough, and Heinsius is rarely found to occur in history; but not merely their greatness, their very weaknesses contributed to make the alliance indissoluble. Would it have been so without the avarice and ambition of Marlborough, without the obstinate narrowness of Heinsius? The noble Eugene alone is without a blemish.

The personal situation of these men rendered their sphere of action extensive; of Eugene as a general, and since 1703

president of the council of war; of Heinsius, as grand pensionary, without a stadtholder; of Marlborough, at once as a general, a statesman, and the head of a party. He ruled in the cabinet as well as in the field, as long as the party of the whigs was at the helm; a crafty, uncertain, fascinating hero. Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740.

Mémoires du Prince Eugène de Savoye, écrits par lui-même. Weimar, 1810, 8vo. Remarkable both in a military and a psychological point of view; they were not however written by himself, but by the late prince of Ligne.

14. Though the war, therefore, in its origin, was a war between Austria and France, the flame could not fail soon to spread over all the west of Europe. The country, however, the possession of which was, in fact, the subject of dispute, remained a secondary scene; Italy, the Netherlands, and above all Germany, again had the melancholy lot of becoming the principal theatres.

The war was begun on the side of Austria, by Eugene's invasion of Italy, July 1701, and occupation of Lombardy. It was not till after the capture of Villeroy, Feb. 1, 1702, that he found in Vendome, a cynic with the eye of a general, a more worthy foe. An engagement took place, with doubtful issue, at Luzzara, Aug. 16. The war commenced on the upper Rhine, by the conquest of Landau, Sept. 10, and in the Netherlands, 1702, where Marlborough first entered the field. But in 1703 the war first became general, both in Germany by the formal alliance of Bavaria with France, and the invasion, though ultimately unsuccessful, of Tyrol by the elector, June—Sept.; in Italy by the defection of the duke of Savoy to the interest of the allies, severely as he was at first punished for it by France; and in Spain itself, as it was possible after the accession of Portugal to the grand alliance to

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transfer the war to this country, by sending thither the archduke Charles. The campaign of 1704 was the first decisive one for Germany. A great victory was obtained by the allies at Hochstädt or Blenheim, Aug. 13. Bavaria was conquered and Germany delivered. Such a day Louis XIV. had never witnessed.—The war was begun in Spain between Charles and Philip; it was not however decisive, but for that reason, the more destructive as a civil war, Charles being chiefly supported in Catalonia, Philip in Castile.—The operations, which commenced about the same time at sea, especially on the Mediterranean, made the English masters of Gibraltar, Aug. 4.—After the death of Leopold I. May 5, 1705, the war was kept up with equal spirit under Joseph I. A vain attempt was made by Marlborough and Louis, prince of Baden, to penetrate into the interior of France. But the campaign of 1706, put the allies in possession of the Netherlands, after Marlborough's victory at Ramillies, May 23, (over Villeroy,) and of Lombardy also, by the relief of Turin, Sept. 7, as soon as Eugene had no Vendome to encounter.—The consequences were, the entire evacuation of Lombardy by the French, agreeably to the terms of a convention at Milan, March 13, 1707; the conquest of Naples, almost without resistance (in May), and even an attempt, of no avail however, against Toulon (July and August). Great exertions were made by Louis XIV. for reconquering the Netherlands, 1708, which were frustrated by the defeat at Oudenarde, July 11, which in its turn was followed by the siege and taking of the French fortified place Lille, Oct. 23. Even Vendome and Boufflers were not sufficient to meet the combined abilities of Marlborough and Eugene.

15. Such defeats, united with internal misfortunes, reduced France to a situation which Louis XIV. had never before experienced. But he has the reputation of having borne calamity better than his enemies did their success. Ready to resign all that he seemed unable to

maintain, he showed himself inflexible in every thing that would have involved a moral degradation. The negotiations of the Hague and Gertruydenberg are the most instructive school for princes in misfortune. Perseverance here met with its reward; the allies slighted the opportunity, because they did not desire peace; and a few years after, Loius concluded one on terms, which he would previously have deemed impossible.

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The negotiations were commenced March, 1709, between the president Rouillé and the Dutch delegates Büys and Van der Düssen, first at Moerdyck and afterwards at Woerden; till Torcy himself, the minister of foreign affairs, being sent to the Hague, (in May,) appeared in the ante-chamber of the grand pensionary.—The demands of the allies were, in general, the entire cession of the whole Spanish monarchy in favour of Austria: in particular, of the Dutch,—the erection of barriers (i. e. garrisoning the boundary fortresses) in the Spanish Netherlands, and the restoration of the tariff of 1664; of the English,—the acknowledgment of the protestant succession, and aggrandisement in the colonies; of the emperor and empire,—the restoration of things to the footing of the peace of Munster.—All this was conceded; (preliminaries, framed in forty articles, May 28;) and was more needed for the indemnification of the confederates? or for the security of Europe? But Louis XIV. could not, without dishonouring himself, subscribe to the deposition of Philip of Spain by his own instrumentality (Art. 4. 37). The negotiations for peace were in consequence broken off.

16. The war proceeded, still unfavourably for France; and yet even after the victory at Malplaquet, the allies were unable to resolve on peace; though they were as little able to pene-

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trate into the interior. While Vendome was victorious in Spain, Villars and Boufflers defended with spirit the frontiers of the kingdom; and the results of the victories in the field were confined to the taking of some places.

A great battle was fought at Malplaquet, Sept. 11, 1709, in which, scarcely less honour accrued to Villars and Boufflers from the defeat, than Marlborough and Eugene acquired by their victory. Mons was taken Oct. 20; Douai and some other places, 1710. Before the end of the year, the advantages obtained by the archduke Charles in Spain were frustrated by Vendome, even after the conquest of Madrid, 1710, and French generals made amends to Philip V. for the losses he sustained from French women and ambassadors. But his antagonist Charles, found neither a Vendome nor a Berwick. —The negotiations of peace were renewed to no purpose by d'Huxelles and Polignac with the Dutch, March—July. Louis consented even to furnish subsidies against his grandson. But the allies demanded that he himself, and he only, should depose him.

17. But the great question was not, after all, to be determined by the sword. An alteration was produced in the political relations of all parties by the fall of the whig ministry in England, which soon involved the fall of Marlborough; and by the death of the emperor Joseph I. The tories had insisted for a long time on the termination of a war, which England was prosecuting at a vast expense without any immediate gain. As soon, therefore, as they succeeded to the administration of affairs, the way seemed open for a separate peace. And when, after the death of Joseph I., his brother and

successor Charles VI. became the only support of the house of Hapsburg, it could hardly appear politic for the maritime powers to unite in one person the imperial crown, with that of Hungary, Bohemia, and Spain.

The fall of the whig ministry was accomplished by the dismissal of Sunderland and Godolphin, Aug. 10. A new ministry of the tories was formed under Harley, the earl of Oxford, and St. John, viscount Bolingbroke. Secret negotiations were soon entered into with France by Gauthier, and afterwards by Prior. Carefully as the semblance of a separate peace was avoided, there was an end to the confidence of the confederates; and after Marlborough's removal, Jan. 1712, (who was followed by that of Ormond, merely for appearance sake,) and Villar's victory at Denain, July 24, the fortune of war turned in favour of France. The preliminaries of peace between France and England Oct. 8, 1711, were communicated to the allies as a mere project, though the war, however, ceased from that moment.

† *Memoirs of John Duke of Marlborough*, by W. COXE. 1820, 6 vols. 8vo. From original papers. A leading work for this period.

18. This separation of the alliance led, of course, to a peace, but one far different from that which might have been obtained a short time before; and as Holland was still regarded as the centre of politics, Utrecht was selected as the place for the meeting of the congress. The nature of things now rendered it necessary, that instead of a general peace, a series of treaties should be concluded, partly between Spain, and partly between France and each of the allies, in all of which treaties each party deter-

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mined its own claims. But neither respecting these, nor respecting the principal question, the fate of the Spanish monarchy, were the allies agreed among themselves. While Austria selfishly persisted in its own demands, England, and even the rest, were not averse to leaving the Spanish throne to the house of Anjou, (with the exception of its European provinces,) provided there should be no union of the crowns of France and Spain on one head. Distrust arose, moreover, between England and Holland themselves, because each was jealous of the commercial privileges that the other wished to reserve for itself. Could France commence a negotiation under more promising auspices?

The congress opened at Utrecht, Jan. 29, 1712, at first between the plenipotentiaries of France, England, and Savoy only; those of the other allies arrived in February. The dissolution of the alliance was already decided by the determination, that each of the confederates should submit his claims singly.—The contests between the allies increased, while the negotiations were almost entirely in the hands of the English, and were carried on in secret directly between the cabinets of St. James and Versailles. The final results were, separate treaties of peace concluded between the other allies, leaving Austria and the empire to themselves. Preliminary contracts: 1. Mutual renunciation of France by the house of Anjou, and of Spain by the French princes, June 22, 1712. 2. A compact between Austria and France respecting the evacuation of Catalonia and the neutrality of Italy, March 14, 1713, at the instigation of England. These were followed, April 11, by the following treaties of peace with France.

1. *Peace between France and England.* *a.* Acknowledgment of the protestant succession in England, in favour of the house of Hanover, and the removal of the pretender from France. *b.* Permanent separation of the crowns of Spain and France. *c.* Dismantling of the harbour of Dunkirk. *d.* The cession to England of Newfoundland; (with the reservation of Cape Breton and a participation in the fisheries;) of Acadia, according to its ancient boundaries; of Hudson's bay and the contiguous regions, and the French portion of St. Christopher. *e.* That France should carry on no further trade to the Spanish colonies than she did under Charles II., and should possess no particular privileges there.—A more advantageous treaty of commerce was made for England. *a.* The ancient prohibitions were repealed. *b.* Perfect reciprocity was established, and treatment on the footing of the most favoured nations. *c.* The fundamental principle was recognised, that, with the exception of contraband articles, restricted merely to the necessaries of war, free ships make free goods.

2. *Peace between France and the Netherlands.* *a.* A barrier was established against France. The Spanish Netherlands were therefore relinquished to the republic, that she might resign them to Austria after the formation of a barrier treaty. *b.* France was restored to the possession of Lille, and the other frontier places which she had lost.—A commercial treaty, advantageous for the republic, was made at the same time. The rate of duties was diminished, and the free introduction of herrings permitted.

3. *Peace between France and Savoy.* *a.* The boundaries were established favourably for Savoy. *b.* Savoy received the island of Sicily as a kingdom, and *c.* reserved its claims to Spain in case of the extinction of the house of Anjou.

4. *Peace between France and Portugal.* The boundaries were fixed in South America, by which Portugal retained the territory between the rivers Maragnon and the Oyapok.

5. *Peace between France and Prussia.* *a.* France recognised the Prussian royal title. *b.* Relinquished to Prussia, in the name of the king of Spain, the upper quarter of Guel-

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derland. *c.* Recognised the king of Prussia as sovereign of Neufchatel. *d.* Prussia resigned to France its inherited rights to the principality of Orange.

Spain concluded peace at Utrecht with England and Savoy, July 13, 1713.

1. *Peace between Spain and England.* *a.* Spain relinquished to England, Gibraltar and the island of Minorca. *b.* Spain grants to England (conformably to the *assiento* or contract signed in Madrid on the 29th of March) the right, which France had before possessed, of importing for thirty years 4800 negroes into America; and permission to despatch every year a ship of 500 tons to Porto Bello. *c.* It was not to confer either on France, or any other power, commercial liberties of trading to the Indies, nor was it to alienate any of its possessions.

2. *Peace between Spain and Savoy.* *a.* Cession of Sicily. *b.* Repetition of the terms contracted with France. So afterwards in the treaties of peace with Holland and Portugal, June 26, 1714.

The most important plenipotentiaries at Utrecht were: from France, the marshal d'Huxelles, Abbé (afterwards cardinal) Polignac, and M. Menager. From England, the earl of Stafford. From the Netherlands, Van Buys and Van der Düssen. From the emperor, count Sinzendorf. From Spain, count Maffei, etc.

Actes, mémoires et autres pièces authentiques concernant la paix d'Utrecht. 1714. T. i.—vi. 12mo. The most complete collection of state papers.

Letters and correspondence of the R. H. Lord Visc. Bolingbroke, by GIBB. PARKE. Lond. 1798, vol. i.—iv. 8vo. containing the political correspondence of the minister during his administration from 1710—1714.

Histoire du congrès de la paix d'Utrecht, comme aussi de celle de Rastadt et Bade. Utrecht, 1716. 12mo.

19. Thus the emperor and empire were left to themselves, in concluding the peace. Though

most of the provinces of Spain were reserved for the former, the latter on the contrary was offered only the fundamental articles of the peace of Ryswick, and a limit of time was peremptorily set to both, which was not accepted. The war still continued, especially on the Rhine, with little success for Austria. The consequence was a renewal of the negotiations between the two, the next winter, at Rastadt, which led to a peace, that was afterwards changed into a peace of the empire at Baden. Austria obtained its share; the empire on the contrary—no longer at unity with itself, owing to the separate treaties of peace—went away empty; and the pleasing dream of a complete restoration to the footing of the peace of Munster vanished at once.

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The war continued on the Rhine 1713; Landau was taken, Aug. 20, and Freiburg, Nov. 16, by Villars. Negotiations were commenced between him and Eugene at Rastadt, Nov. and lasted till March 1714. The peace was finally concluded March 6, under the name of preliminaries, which were afterwards offered to the empire for acceptance. Principal conditions: *a.* That Austria should take possession of the Spanish Netherlands, after having agreed upon a barrier for Holland. *b.* That she should continue in possession of her territories in Italy, viz. Naples, Sardinia, Milan, and the *Stati degli presidi.* *c.* That restitution should be made of the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, who had been put under the ban of the empire, in consideration of the acknowledgment of the electorate of Hanover. *d.* The empire received only a restoration of the state of things that existed before the war, conformably to the provisions of the peace of Munster, Nimwegen, and Ryswick.—The preliminaries proffered to the empire were accepted and ratified at Baden, in Switzerland, Sept. 7.

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20. The decision of the contest was, therefore, as far as respected the principal object, effected by the separation of the provinces in Europe, which would have been willingly relinquished even before the war. But the contest unhappily was not wholly decided; though the war ceased for the present. Between the two leading competitors, Spain and Austria, no formal peace subsisted, because neither would resign its pretensions. The fluctuating condition in which the European system remained for ten years, was thence inevitable, and the maintenance of the peace of Utrecht was one of the most difficult problems of policy.

21. The consequences, which this war and the treaties of peace by which it was terminated brought upon Europe, were alike various and important. As the Spanish monarchy belonged to a branch of the house of Bourbon, it put an end to the ancient rivalry between France and Spain, for which Europe had suffered so severely. But it soon became evident, that bonds of consanguinity are by no means strengthened by being made subservient to motives of policy. The consequences apprehended for the equilibrium of Europe, did not indeed ensue; though France was, in fact, so utterly exhausted, that the closest connection with Spain could excite but little apprehension.

22. The separation of the Spanish provinces from the mother country was particularly im-

portant to the states of Europe, inasmuch as the Netherlands thereby came into the possession of Austria. Always the immediate object of French conquest, it was one of the prevalent maxims of policy, that their maintenance was the interest of all, and the condition of the pre- preservation of the balance of power. Did not in fact the fate of the republic, of the German empire, and with it that of Austria itself, materially depend thereon?

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23. One of the most important consequences of these wars, was the enlarged influence of England. Its system of loans (see p. 245) enabled it to give to its subsidiary treaties an unparalleled extension; and the part it had already begun to resume in continental politics was enlarged and strengthened. The acquisition of the Low Countries by Austria, seemed to render its connection with that country inseparable; the republic was blindly devoted to it; while Savoy and the single states of the empire were to be had in exchange for subsidies. The peace of Utrecht was concluded under its direction, and happily, therefore, the maintenance of this peace appeared its natural policy. Ought we to be astonished then, that the management of the affairs of Europe were for a long time in its hands?

24. Though the war did not possess much of the character of a naval war, nevertheless, in the ensuing peace, the mercantile system began to

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manifest itself in all its strength. Grants of commercial privileges of the highest importance were made the conditions of peace with the maritime powers, and even territorial concessions were made partly on account of commerce. The foundation of the great commercial preponderance of England was in reality laid by the peace of Utrecht, and with it, the germ of two future mighty wars; but these consequences necessarily had a gradual development, and the republic still remained for a considerable period the first commercial state of this quarter of the globe.

25. The situation of the single states was altered, not merely by the war, but partially also by the change of governments. In Spain, a new dynasty ascended the throne; but Philip V. was not the prince to raise up a fallen kingdom. For this purpose his wife, Elizabeth of Parma, would have been the fitter person, had she not been swayed, more by the interest of her family, than by the interest of the state. But nothing was too dear to her, when the question related to providing for her sons; and without gaining any thing for itself, Spain acquired by her means a greater influence—unhappily, however, a pernicious influence—on the system of Europe, than it had had under the last of the house of Hapsburg.

26. Portugal, bound to England during the
1703. war by the ties of policy, was upon its ter-

mination still more closely connected with it by the ties of commerce. But though the treaty of Methuen was injurious to industry, did the fault lie in the treaty, or in the nation and government? If the woollen manufactures no longer found support, were there no other? Was there no soil to be cultivated? As long as Portugal, however, continued to find in England a market for its wines, the bonds of political union were strengthened at the same time with the mercantile, and in fact rendered almost indissoluble.

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27. The greatest change, however, occurred in France. Louis XIV. outlived the war but a short time, and in his great grandson Louis XV. left a weak and minor child for his successor. His authority died with him, and, contrary to his will, his nephew Philip of Orleans obtained the regency, with all the plenitude of power. Though without morals, or even any sense of shame, he was yet looked upon as a greater profligate than he really was; and the long continued anxiety respecting the life of the young king, who was, moreover, weakly, had a strong influence on the politics of the time, and especially on the relations with the Spanish line. Who, in such event, was to succeed, Philip of Spain, or the duke of Orleans? The mistrust between the two was therefore as natural as it was momentous; since it could not but determine the character of foreign connections.

Sept. 1, 1715, till 1723.

Changes took place in the administration of foreign affairs.

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A *Conseil* was established under Marshal d'Huxelles as president. The patriotic and honest Torcy resigned, 1716, after nineteen years of service, (see p. 224.) After the abolition of the *Conseil*, the infamous Dubois was appointed secretary of state, 1718, and at last prime minister, 1722.

ST. SIMON, *Mémoires secrèts de la regence*, (*Œuvres*, vols. vii, viii.) See p. 212.

28. In England, also, after the death of Anne, by the most wonderful course of Providence, the house of Hanover succeeded that of the Stuarts. Protestantism gave them the throne, and it was protestantism that was to preserve it to them. No new maxims, no new system of continental policy, (for this was not determined for the first time by the possession of Hanover,) could therefore become prevalent; it was the ancient policy of William III. modified according to the circumstances of the times. Thus harmony was established between the nation and the government; and, fortunately for the new dynasty, there was for a long time yet a pretender, who did not permit these maxims to be forgotten.

Aug. 12, 1714.

The natural consequence of this policy was the fall of the tory ministry, which had made itself more than suspected by its conduct towards the pretender, 1714, and the restoration of the superiority of the whigs.

29. In this war the republic, from being powerful by sea, had become almost equally powerful by land. It had increased the burden of her debts to three hundred and fifty millions of guilders; so dear was the purchase of the barrier treaty, in which she saw the security of her ex-

istence. She derived, moreover, an important lesson from her experience in this war, that she had little to gain from participation in the contests of the greater powers; and from this time it was the fundamental axiom of her policy to keep as free from them as possible. For a power that had taken its station amongst the first, was not such a retiring more dangerous than participation? By lulling into slumber her military energies, especially in a country which possessed no stadtholder and captain-general since William III.; a decline in the opinion of the other powers was a consequence, which, though gradual, was inevitable and of the last importance. A state passes for the value it sets upon itself.

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A barrier treaty with Austria was signed at Antwerp, under the mediation of England, Nov. 15, 1715; in which the republic, by relinquishing the Low Countries to the emperor, acquired in exchange the exclusive right of holding garrisons in Namur, Dornik, Menin, Warneton, Ypres, and Fort Knocke, and, in common with Austria, in Ruremonde.—But what are fortresses without soldiers?

30. The Austrian monarchy was aggrandised by the possession of certain provinces, of Naples, Sardinia, Milan, and the Low Countries. Whether this aggrandisement was to be a gain or a loss, depended on the spirit of the administration. Adapted for serving, in connection with the empire, as a bulwark to the main body of the monarchy, they would, nevertheless, if weakly defended, only offer so many points of attack to

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an enemy; and under an administration like that of Charles VI. the truth of this was soon experieneed.

The possession of Transylvania was secured, in 1711, by the suppression of the disturbances caused by Francis Rakotzi.

31. The German empire, internally distracted by the policy of Bavaria, was reunited again by the peace, as far as it could be so. The example, however, once given, was not without its consequences. But the times approached, when entirely different schisms were to arise.

32. Two new regal thrones were erected, the one for the house of Brandenburg in Prussia, (see below,) the other for the house of Savoy in Sicily, which it soon after had to exchange for Sardinia. Both were then states of secondary rank, but differed in this important particular, that the former was yet to have its greatest rulers, the other had already enjoyed them. This fundamental difference afterwards afforded the criterion of their influence on the states-system of Europe.

33. The great point on which the politics of the west of Europe were now to turn, (in the east the Turkish wars, that soon ensued, formed an exception,) was the preservation of the peace of Utrecht, which was in a most tottering condition; and the diplomacy of the cabinets almost universally aimed at this, either directly or indirectly;

because on it depended almost every other great political interest.

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34. Those powers were of course most interested in the preservation of the peace, who were the greatest gainers by it. At the head of these was England, under whose direction it had been concluded. Its flourishing commerce with all parts of the world was in several essential particulars founded on the conditions of this peace; and the protestant succession was no less confirmed by it. France had an equal interest from other causes; for with this peace was involved the renunciation of the French throne by the house of Anjou, to which Philip of Orleans was indebted for the regency. Austria had to seek in the peace of Utrecht for the secure possession of the conceded provinces; and even the republic, indifferent, as she soon showed herself, in the Italian contests, could enjoy her new privileges only in time of peace. Such an interest occasioned closer relations between those powers; and even the ancient rivalship between France and England expired, so long as personal interest outweighed the interest of the state.

An alliance was formed between England and Austria, May 25, 1716, and with France and the republic, Jan. 4, 1717, both for the preservation of peace.

35. Entirely different purposes were cherished by Spain. The loss of the provinces, especially of those in Italy, was not forgotten. And though Philip V. would never have disquieted

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himself on the subject, he was, on the other hand, under the dominion of persons who were interested in the renewal of the war. Elizabeth his queen, already mother of two sons, began even while they were in their cradle to meditate a provision for them. Through her instrumentality, the abbate Alberoni, her countryman, had made his way to the elevation of cardinal and prime minister; not without the talents of a great statesman, had he merely known how to distinguish between a statesman and a political projector. But while the whole character of foreign policy was changed, together with the internal administration, he entered upon such broad projects, that the boldest hopes could hardly cherish an idea of their feasibility.

Projects of Alberoni in respect to foreign policy and their connection. While the reconquest of the Italian provinces was the immediate object, he not only entertained at the same time the project of securing the regency to his king, by the downfal of the regent, (to have been effected by Cellamare's conspiracy, Dec. 1781,) but also of reinstating the pretender in England, for which purpose he contracted a new alliance with Sweden.

ST. SIMON, *Mémoires de la regence*, vol. i, L. 4. contains a caustic sketch of the Spanish court at that time; and of Alberoni in particular.

Histoire du cardinal Alberoni et de son ministère, par M. J. R. à la Haye, 1720.

SCHMAUSS, *geheime Geschichte des Spanischen Hofes*. 1720. Translation of some writings respecting Alberoni.

36. These plans of conquest, directed immediately against Austria, became more alluring in

consequence of the Turkish war in which Austria was implicated at this time for the preservation of the peace of Carlowitz (see p. 235); and which, successful as was its issue, employed nevertheless the greater part of its army on the other side of Europe.

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The war with the Turks began with Venice, and an easy conquest was made of the Morea, Cerigo, etc., alike badly administered and defended, July, 1715. Corfu alone was maintained. Austria engaged in the war, 1716. Against Eugene's name and tactics, Turkish valour was of no avail. A splendid victory was gained at Peterwardein, Aug. 5. Bannat was subdued, together with a part of Servia and Wallachia, Oct.; Belgrade was besieged, June, 1717,, The grand vizier was defeated, Aug. 16, and the fortifications were taken, as also Orsowa, Semendria, etc. At the opening of the new campaign in 1718, a truce was agreed upon, and a peace for twenty years, under the mediation of the naval powers, according to the state of possession at the time, at Passarowitz) July 21, conformably to which, 1. Austria obtained Belgrade, Temeswar, Bannat, and a part of Servia and Wallachia, as far as the Aluta. 2. Venice retained the conquered places in Dalmatia; but resigned to the Porte, Morea, Cerigo, etc. The commercial treaty, concluded at the same time, opened to Austria all the Turkish states.—Who would not have expected from such concessions the rapid prosperity of Austria to have ensued, had it not been more difficult to improve advantages, than to effect conquests?

37. During this war attempts were made by Alberoni to execute his schemes; at first by a sudden invasion and the conquest of Sardinia, which was followed the next year by the conquest of Sicily; while more remote undertakings against the continent of Italy were in agitation.

Aug. 1717. July, 1718.

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38. But the connections already formed, made it easy for England to accomplish an alliance against Spain, for the preservation of the peace of Utrecht, known under the name of the quadruple alliance, though at first it was a combination of France and England only, in order to induce or compel the powers interested to accept the concerted preliminaries; to this it was assumed, that the republic would accede; and Austria actually joined.

A quadruple alliance was concluded between England, France, and Austria, Aug. 2, 1718, in the hope of the accession of the republic. Conditions: 1. Mutual renunciation of Spain and India by the emperor, and of Italy and the Netherlands by the king of Spain. 2. For Don Carlos, the son of Elizabeth, the reversion of Tuscany, Parma, and Piacenza, as fiefs of the empire, to be occupied, for security, till the opening, with neutral troops. 3. Austria was to exchange Sicily for Sardinia.—Three months were left to the kings of Spain and Sicily to declare their intentions.—A British fleet was sent to the Mediterranean for the protection of Sicily, and a naval battle was fought at Cape Passaro, Aug. 22, 1718.

39. Resistance was made by Alberoni to these conditions, which Savoy accepted, though unwillingly, and received the crown of Sardinia instead of that of Sicily. When the intentions of the minister against the regent and England were disclosed, the consequence was a formal declaration of war by both against Spain, while the Dutch still acted as mediators. Peace, however, was out of the question, as long as the hated Alberoni remained in power; and Elizabeth

Nov. 8, 1718.

Jan. 9, 1718.

Dec. 5.

was soon gained, when a prospect of the French throne was opened to her daughter, now a child only three years old. Alberoni fell, and the conditions of the quadruple alliance were immediately accepted by Spain. The fire of war was thus extinguished; but many of the contested points were not to be adjusted till the great congress at Cambrais. Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740. Jan. 26, 1720.

40. While England thus obtained peace with an armed hand, it became more deeply than ever entangled in the policy of the continent. It must needs have been, therefore, of high importance to Europe, that the minister, who was there placed at the helm, and managed it for twenty one years under two kings, honestly desired the preservation of peace. Sir Robert Walpole, without the restless activity which is so often miscalled greatness, was a statesman well worthy of our respect. He introduced uprightness of principle into politics, at a time, when they were disgraced by the profligacy of Dubois, and the falsehood of Alberoni. But his maxim, to be on good terms with all, entangled him in a web of negotiations and political relations, from which none but an island state, like England, could have disengaged itself. 1721-1742.

† *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, by WILLIAM COXE. 3 vols. 4to. 1798.

Memoirs of Horace Walpole. 1802, 4to.—Two of the most important collections of materials, from the best sources, for the history of the times.—Horace was his younger brother,

and frequently employed in embassies, especially at Paris and at the Hague.

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41. About this time, a double interest was created by the proceedings of Austria, which had a frequent and powerful influence on general politics. The anxiety of Charles VI. at leaving behind nothing but daughters, led him to frame, thus early, an order of succession, under the name of the *Pragmatic Sanction*, which, if possible, was to be accepted and guaranteed by all the powers. It was the ground of negotiations and concessions, of which foreign cabinets well knew how to make an excellent use.

The Pragmatic Sanction was planned in 1713, and was accepted by the hereditary states from the year 1720. It was afterwards almost always a standing article in all foreign negotiations.

42. But commotions still more violent were occasioned by Charles VI.'s project to give his Netherlands a share in the Indian trade, from the port of Ostend. The establishment of his commercial company there, was regarded by the maritime powers as an encroachment on their rights, contrary to the peace of Westphalia. They, who had formerly maintained the freedom of the ocean against Spain, now wished to exclude others, as they themselves had been once excluded by the Spanish.

The Ostend company was chartered for trade to the East and West Indies 19th of December, 1722.—The remon-

strances of the Dutch were founded on the conditions of the peace of Munster with Spain, that the trade to the Indies should remain within its limits at that time. Did this bind the present possessors of the Netherlands? Still more inconsistent were the arguments of the English!

43. It was these, and many other important and unimportant points, which brought about the congress of Cambrais, through the mediation of France and England. Austria, Spain, Sardinia, and Parma, all gave in their claims. But by wishing to accomplish every thing, nothing was actually done. The many petty interests roused as many petty passions; and as the congress, after long discussions, and interrupted by other intermediate events, at length separated without coming to any agreement, there wanted but little to produce a general war.

After long delays, the congress finally opened, April 1724, the mutual renunciations of Austria and Spain, Sept. 27, 1721, being previously guaranteed by England and France. Besides the above chief points, disputes were occasioned by the feudal relations of Parma and Piacenza to the German empire, the right of conferring the Order of the Golden Fleece, etc. What could be expected of a congregation of men, who did but start difficulties, without a single leader to direct them?

44. During these negotiations, the change of a project of marriage caused an unexpected revolution in politics; and by becoming the source of animosity between Spain and France, led to

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a reconciliation and alliance between Spain and Austria,

The Spanish Infanta, yet in her minority, was sent back from Paris, April 5, 1724, because the duke of Bourbon, the new minister, wished to marry the young king at once. Louis XV. espoused Maria, the daughter of the Polish ex-king Stanislaus Lescinsky, Aug. 16, 1725. The queen-mother was in consequence exasperated; and the negotiations, already (Nov. 1724) commenced by the baron and adventurer Riperda at Vienna, were speedily concluded. A peace and alliance were made between Austria and Spain, April 30, 1725. Conditions: 1. Ratification of the peace of Utrecht, and a mutual guarantee of all possessions as they then were. 2. Acknowledgment of the mutual order of succession. 3. Mutual succour in case of an attack, (as a secret article). In the commercial treaty, signed May 1, Spain recognised the Ostend company.—The congress at Cambrais was dissolved after the recall of the Spanish ambassador, June 1725.

45. The less this compromise was expected, though it could have little difficulty in itself, the greater was the commotion it created in the several cabinets; and particularly as a part of the conditions were without reason made a secret. The ruling powers of England and Fance, felt not a little annoyed that such an agreement had been concluded without their co-operation; and it was at one time deemed to augur an attack, at another, an union by marriage, of the Spanish and Austrian monarchies. The natural measure of a counter-alliance was therefore resorted to, which was concluded at Herrnhausen, between England, France, and Prussia; and like that of Vienna,

soon extended to the north of Europe, Denmark and Sweden being involved in it, as Russia was in that of Vienna. Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740.

The league of Herrnhausen was signed, Sept. 3, 1725, from which Prussia, however, soon retired and joined the imperial party by a secret treaty at Wusterhausen, Oct. 12, 1726. On the other hand, the league was strengthened by the accession of the United Netherlands, on account of the Ostend company, though with much circumspection, Aug. 9, of Denmark and Sweden, in consideration of subsidies, March 25, 1727, as also of Hesse Cassel and Wolfenbüttel. On the other hand, the emperor gained not only Russia, Aug. 6, 1726, but also several German states, besides Prussia.

46. Thus the countries of Europe, they scarcely knew wherefore, not only stood opposed in arms to each other, but the fitting out of British squadrons, and the attack of Spain on Gibraltar brought matters to the brink of an explosion, when, just as the flames of war were on the point of bursting forth, they were again fortunately extinguished. Where there was no good reason for war, this was not, in itself considered, so difficult; but what is more difficult than to still the tumult of petty angry passions? Happily, however, for Europe, a minister was placed at the head of the administration of France, who, already an aged man, was no less an upright friend of peace, than Sir Robert Walpole. If the seventeen years' administration of Cardinal Fleury was not free from faults in the interior, it was nevertheless, generally beneficial to Europe. Without him, the various Jan. 1726 to Jan. 1743.

Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740.

compacts would hardly have been formed, which now restored peace, and its longer duration appeared to be warranted by his amicable relations with Walpole, springing from similar principles, and sustained by Horace Walpole, as ambassador. Even a change of rulers in England, consequent upon George II. succeeding his father, made no alteration, because Walpole still remained at the head of affairs.

June 11, 1727.

Preliminaries were signed at Paris between Austria and the allies of Herrnhausen, May 31, 1727. The principal obstacle was removed by the suspension of the Ostend company for seven years. It was joined by Spain, June 13, and peace with England was restored by the treaty at Pardo, March 6, 1728. The other points of contest were to be adjusted at the congress of Soissons, June 1728. But the restless ambition of the Spanish queen Elizabeth, who, by a treaty concluded at Seville, Nov. 9, 1729, between England and France, had carried her point, that, in order to secure the succession of her son in Tuscany and Parma, these countries should now be occupied by Spanish troops, not only dissolved the congress at Soissons, but even drove offended Austria to arms. The guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction was the talisman, by which Charles VI. was always to be gained over. Thence originated a treaty with England and the republic at Vienna, March 16, 1731, the emperor, in return for that guarantee, acquiescing in the occupation of the Italian countries and in the abolition of the Ostend company. To this treaty, Spain acceded June 6, and the empire July 14.

47. In this way, by singular good fortune, notwithstanding the destruction of the fundamental relations of the political system of Europe, peace was maintained, and even seemed

likely to be permanent. France and Spain were reconciled; Austria, in harmony with Spain, saw its Pragmatic Sanction universally acknowledged and even guaranteed; England was in amity with all. The ancient moving principle of politics, the rivalship of powerful states, appeared to have grown obsolete; but the lust of aggrandisement, ever the prevailing malady of cabinets, was as active as ever, and nothing was wanted but an opportunity, which should promise satisfaction. This occurred not long after, upon the death of Frederic Augustus, king of Poland, when the choice of a successor produced a war in the north, (see below). Russia and Austria declared in favour of Saxony, while France, by defending the pretensions of Stanislaus Lescinsky, considered it a favourable moment for aggrandising itself at the expense of the empire, and Spain and Sardinia at the expense of the emperor. A short war now made greater changes in the state of possessions, than the previous long ones; and not merely the republic, as she effected the neutrality of the Spanish Netherlands, but even England itself, in spite of its guarantee and treaty, looked on quietly, while its ally, Austria, was deprived of its most important acquisitions.

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Feb. 1, 1733.

France entered into an alliance with Spain, Oct. 25, and Sardinia, Sept. 26, 1733, principally brought about by the intriguing Chauvelin, who under Fleury had the management of foreign affairs till 1737. The French, under Berwick,

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made an attack on the empire. Kehl was reduced, and Lorrain invaded, war having been declared by the empire, March 13, 1734; the combined French and Sardinian troops under Villars took Milan, and the Spaniards Naples, 1733, whence they proceeded to Sicily, May, 1734. The aged Eugene no longer held victory in chains.—All the Austrian possessions in Italy were taken.—Preliminaries of peace were quickly signed at Vienna after a direct negotiation between France and Austria, Oct. 3, 1735, to which Sardinia acceded May 1, 1736, and Spain, Nov. 15. Conditions: *a.* Austria surrendered to Spain, as a secundogeniture, (stipulating, however, that they should never be united with it,) Naples and the Sicilies, the island of Elba, and the Stati degli Presidi, in favour of Don Carlos. *b.* France obtained the reversion of Lorrain and Bar, which were given to Stanislaus Lescinsky, after his renunciation of the crown of Poland, (who immediately resigned it to France). *c.* Francis Stephen, duke of Lorrain, obtained the reversion of Tuscany, into possession of which he came, July 9, 1737. *d.* The emperor obtained as an indemnification, Parma and Piacenza. *e.* Sardinia obtained some districts of Milan. *f.* France guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction.—It was not, however, till Nov. 18, 1738, that the preliminaries were changed into a definitive peace.

48. In consequence of this war, Alberoni's formerly unsuccessful plans on Italy, were for the most part carried into execution. But if Spain only drew from it the advantage of placing one of its princes on the now independent throne of the two Sicilies, France on the contrary as a power, enjoyed the much more substantial advantage—in as far as conquests can be called such—of obtaining in Lorrain, a province, the loss of which must have been, both in political and geographical respects, very sensibly felt by

the German empire. Though this war was both carried on, and moreover terminated, without the participation of the maritime powers, yet, after the restoration of peace, Europe returned to its former relations, which were not altered even by the participation of Austria in the Turkish wars. But these, however, being prosecuted in common with Russia, belong rather to the north, (see below.)

Public contests in Europe. 1700-1740.

II. *A Cursory View of the Changes in the single leading States of the West of Europe*, 1700—1740.

1. THE changes that took place during this period in the interior of the states of the west of Europe, were rarely of the kind to have any lasting influence. They were mostly the development of germs, that were previously formed; in some the change was of growth, but in others of gradual decay.

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2. We have already noticed (see p. 290), how far the reign of the new dynasty was the commencement of a fresh epoch for Spain. The great share it took in the public contests of Europe, did not proceed from the restored energy of the nation, but was the fruit of personal ambition among the rulers. Even the successful efforts of its arms, gave no new impulse; what could it have gained by conquest?

3. Though a change was produced in the external relations of France by its attachment to

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England, so little essential alteration was made in the character of its policy, that the seeds of future wars were disseminated during these amicable relations of the governments by the increasing commercial jealousy of the two nations. But in the interior, the accepting of the bull *Unigenitus* by Louis XIV. towards the close of his reign, created a ferment, which did not remain a mere contest between Jesuits and Jansenists, (see p. 236,) but necessarily constituted an opposition to the government, which, soon finding defenders even in parliament, was the more dangerous to the state, inasmuch as it called to mind the suppression of the ancient national liberty.

The Bull *Unigenitus* was promulgated by pope Clement XI., Sept. 8, 1713; and adopted in France, Feb. 14, 1714. The schism among the clergy immediately followed. The great political importance of this dispute, however, dates from the following period.

C. M. PFAFFII *Acta publica constitutionis Unigenitus.* Tübing. 1725.

Anecdotes, ou Mémoires secrèts sur la constitution Unigenitus. à Utrecht, 1732, 3 vols.

4. But the abortive attempt that France made, to pay off the burden of its debts by means of the paper bank of Law, and the Mississippi company connected with it, were of no small consequence to its future destinies, and its general influence on the European political system. The ruin of thousands of families might be repaired in time, but it was the arbitrary

money operations of the government, that reduced its credit to irrevocable ruin. From this time no paper money could be issued in France under the old constitution; and the French financial system was ever afterwards in an unsettled state. Changes in the west of Europe. 1700-1740.

A paper bank was established by Law, a native of Scotland, May 1716, on very reasonable principles; but it was driven so far by the government, which purchased it, Jan. 1719, that it became a terror to the government itself. A depreciation was made in the value of bank notes by the edict of May 21, 1720; and the bank itself was utterly ruined.

Histoire du système des Finances sous la minorité de Louis XV. 1719 *et* 1720. à la Haye, 1736, 6 vols. 12mo. But the most lucid exposition of this complicated subject is given in: + J. STEWART, *Inquiry into the principles of Political Economy*. Lond. 1767.

5. Hardly any other power enjoyed so high respect in the European system, as England, which was rendered yet stronger by its union with Scotland. This respect was founded not merely on its power, but also on its policy, so beneficial for the continent. The path, which the rulers of the new house were to pursue, was most clearly marked out for them; and where could they have pursued it more faithfully and more conscientiously? 1707.

6. But the pressure of increased debt, gave rise to various projects in England also, which were followed by consequences no less extravagant than they had been in France. Here too, it was believed possible speedily to per-

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form by art, what can be the result only of continued exertion, the liquidation of the public debt; but the projects of the South sea company foundered, like those of the Mississippi company in France. But as the English government allowed itself no despotic steps, its credit was preserved entire; and it found itself able, by a diminution of interest, to establish a sinking fund which only needed a better administration to effect its object.

The ancient sinking fund consisted in a free diminution of interest from six to five per cent. 1717, and again from five to four per cent. 1727.

7. The republic of the United Netherlands underwent, in this period, no important internal changes, after the death of William III. But when the title of Prince of Orange passed by right of inheritance to his cousin, William Friso; and after his death to his son William, governor of Friesland and Groningen, the Orange party
1711. continued to exist in the republic; and the restoration of the dignity of hereditary stadtholder might be expected, should an opportunity offer. The further relations of this younger house of Orange were determined beforehand, by its closer connection with the British, through the
1734. marriage of the prince with Anne, daughter of George II.

8. The Austrian monarchy changed its policy and provinces, without suffering any internal revolution, other than that of a gradual decline,

The emperor Charles VI., more occupied with the future than the present, had already obtained the guarantee of his Pragmatic Sanction from all the European powers—at least on paper. Providence, indeed, had given him an Eugene; but he was unable to prevent even the decay of the army, much less that of the finances, and the whole internal organisation.

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9. The German empire attached to Austria, partook of all the wars of this country, however foreign they were to itself. And how would neutrality have benefitted it? But four of its first princes, Brandenburg, Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse Cassel, had acquired, in this period, foreign regal crowns; and it was impossible to say what degree of influence this might have upon their German territories. Thus much appeared at all events certain; that the solidity of the federation of the empire, otherwise so weak, could not be much increased by it. Would it be always possible to separate the interest of their regal, from those of their princely dignities? And even if they themselves wished it, would their enemies be equally willing? In what disputes with the rest of Europe, must not at least some German states be involved? And how easily in that case the whole?

10. Politics in general,—altogether in the hands of a few ministers and their confidants—obtained, during this period, in all respects, the character of cabinet politics. Never had there

Changes in the west of Europe. 1700-1740.

been so much diplomacy in Europe, and never were such ideas entertained of its efficiency. Its greater or less morality depended, of course, to a certain extent, on the morals of the ministers. So long as it was built on certain principles, so long as no one dared to violate directly the sanctity of legitimate possession, it must have exhibited, at least, the semblance of morality. Even the regent and the abandoned Dubois, did not appear so odious in their public as in their private life.

11. Political economy, based on no more enlarged theory than the mere acquisition of ready money, was conformable in its maxims to that principle; and the mercantile system continued to bear, with increasing truth, the name of a system. Foreign commerce remained the prime source of wealth; and happy the merchant, whose accounts showed a balance in his favour. The sudden accumulation of paper money, occasioned by attempts to pay off the public debts, ended in its depreciation; but if it reacted on the extension of internal trade, by increasing the medium of internal circulation, and on the whole condition of society, by raising the price of things,—what financial operations, both good and bad, has it not made possible to governments?

12. The progress of the art of war, which must have been considerable under such great generals as this age produced, can here be the

subject of nothing but a general remark. It must have continued to become an art, in proportion as the system of standing armies was perfected, towards which a second step was taken by Prussia, after the example of France, (see below).

Changes in the west of Europe. 1700-1740.

III. *History of Colonial Affairs, from* 1700 *to* 1740.

1. THE colonies of the states of Europe were neither much enlarged in extent, during this period, nor, with the exception of some cessions made by France to England, did they undergo very great changes of masters. But so much the greater was their internal increase. Colonial productions, especially those of the West Indies, met with a sale in Europe that exceeded all expectation; the motives of cultivation increased in an equal degree; and as they naturally formed a considerable portion of general commerce, more than one state regarded them as the foundation of their commercial, and even of their political, greatness.

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740.

2. The importance of colonies being thus augmented, their influence upon politics was consequently greater. The mother states did not, indeed, on the whole, relinquish their ancient claims to the exclusive trade of their colonies; but they were willing to connive at the contraband trade which their colonies prosecuted with those of other powers, and necessity

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740.

compelled them, to allow greater liberties with respect to exportation.

3. If mutual jealousy was thus kept alive, it was no less promoted by the geographical confusion of the colonies, especially in the narrow West Indies. It was remarkably ordained by Providence, that in this very spot, the states of Europe should lay out their gardens, in which they laboured to raise products that otherwise grew spontaneously far and wide on the face of the earth. Thus as their importance increased, envy and jealousy became more intense; and at the end of this period a war broke out, for the first time, relating to colonial interests.

England.

4. Among the single states, England began, in this period, to take an elevated station in colonial trade. The concessions of the peace of Utrecht had given it, in several respects, the preponderance. The *assiento* treaty with Spain, (see p. 286,) which authorised it for thirty years to supply Spanish America with slaves, and to attend the great fair of Porto Bello, was not, in itself, very advantageous; but it opened the way to such a smuggling trade, that it brought almost the whole commerce of Spanish America into the hands of the English.

The South Sea company was incorporated Aug. 1, 1711, with a monopoly of the trade lying to the south of the Oronoko, along the eastern and the whole of the western coast of America.—It prospered exceedingly after the peace of Utrecht.—The nature of the trade with Spanish America was such, as to enrich the agents rather than the company.

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740. England.

5. The possessions of the British in the West Indies made but small advances in this period, notwithstanding the newly introduced cultivation of coffee, which always remained behind that of the sugar cane. Their rise was obstructed by the smuggling trade of the North American colonies with the French islands, and the great prosperity of the latter. But this very circumstance paved the way for their ultimate prosperity, because parliament was obliged to grant them privileges, by which the oppressive commercial restraints were in some measure alleviated. 1732.

A tax was imposed in North America on the importation of all foreign sugar, 1733.—The immediate exportation of sugar was allowed, provided it were in British vessels, from the British colonies to the countries of Europe, south of Cape Finisterre, 1739.

6. The British colonies on the coasts of North America were in a far more thriving condition, notwithstanding the exclusive trade, which the mother country still attempted as far as possible to reserve for itself. But the extent of coast, the situation and contiguity of the French, and especially the Spanish possessions, would have made it impossible to prevent the prosecution of the lucrative slave traffic, even if the disproportion, that must inevitably exist between the mutual productions and wants of the mother country and the colonies, had not rendered various modifications necessary.

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740. England.

7. Though the increase of those provinces was general, it was, nevertheless, the southern that had particular reason to congratulate themselves on their rising prosperity. The culture of rice, 1702. first introduced into the Carolinas from Madagascar, contributed essentially to this effect; and the new emigrations, increased by the religious persecutions in the south of Germany, gave existence, in Georgia, to the youngest of the thirteen old provinces.

Georgia was separated from south Carolina, 1732, having been granted to a private association, as a distinct province, not without the resistance of the Spaniards, who pretended that it formed a part of Florida. Emigrations were numerous, but it prospered slowly, because the trade in peltry was at first preferred to agriculture, until the year 1752, when the proprietors resigned their privileges to the government.

8. Nova Scotia, ceded to the British by the peace of Utrecht, was then little more than a wilderness; such also was the island of Newfoundland. But the participation in the cod fisheries, secured by the possession of this country, was of so much the greater importance both to the commerce and the navigation of England. Owing to the rights reserved by the French, this too became a new source of jealousy and altercation.

9. The East India trade of the British suffered a material alteration. This was, indeed, by no means the period of great possessions in India,

which were almost solely limited to Bombay, Madras, Fort William in Bengal, and Bencoolen on Sumatra. But the perpetual wrangling between the old and new East India companies, (see p. 257), eventually led to a union of the two, from which proceeded the still existing company of merchants trading to India. From this time, the East India trade continued to increase; especially as the cotton stuffs of the Indies came into universal use; which were, however, actually prohibited on the remonstrances of the native manufacturers.—Meanwhile, the resistance to the monopoly of the company still continued, and became particularly clamorous about the time of the renewal of their charter. It was, nevertheless, confirmed anew in 1733, for thirty-seven years; and the project of a free company without a common fund was abandoned,—who can say, whether fortunately or unfortunately for England?

The ancient disputes of the two companies were nourished by the spirit of political party, (the new one being supported by the whigs, the old by the tories,) and threatened to become dangerous to the public quiet.—The two companies were united, July 22, 1702, under the title of The United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies. Conformably to a preliminary compromise, the fund of the two was made one common fund, amounting to two millions of pounds sterling, with a division of the gains. A complete union under one directory was not effected till seven years after.

The acts of the union may be found in RUSSEL's *Collection*, (see p. 257). Appendix, p. xxiii. The most copious history in BRUCE's *Annals*, etc. T. iii., (see p. 139.)

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740.

England.

10. Notwithstanding this continued monopoly, the commercial policy of the British government, especially under the house of Hanover, was altered essentially in favour of the colonies. All other monopolies by degrees disappeared; and with them, excepting a few prohibitions, almost all direct interference of the government in private activity and national economy ceased also. Without renouncing the principles of the mercantile system, or formally substituting any other in its stead, it was soon felt that the blessing of a free constitution flowed from the free application of private energy; and that the chief wisdom of the government consisted far more in not oppressing any branch of industry, than in attempting to encourage new branches. The British tariff conformed to this maxim. All this, it would seem, necessarily proceeded from the progressive funding system. Certain it is that the British commercial policy was relatively the most reasonable, though not exactly conformable to the rules of theorists. How much this was calculated to promote the welfare of the nation by means of continually increasing prosperity, was manifested in a striking manner, by the extraordinary improvement of the country towns. Yet let the eternal truth never be forgotten, that in our world a luxuriant growth is never free from noxious weeds.

France.

11. France, once placed by Colbert in the number of colonial states, never forsook it, and

maintained her station during this period not without success. There was yet so much room in the two Indies, that she had to infringe on the rights of no other powers, and whenever single collisions arose, the amicable relation with England, since the death of Louis XIV., concurred to make them less momentous. Colonial affairs. 1700-1740. France.

12. The French West India possessions, especially in Martinique, Guadaloupe, and a part of Domingo, prospered the best of all. The coffee tree, introduced into Martinique from Surinam, 1728. opened a new source of commerce; but the cultivation of the sugar cane, on the whole, maintained the ascendency. The prime causes, however, of the prosperity, and indeed of the superiority which the French islands acquired over the British, consisted partly in the far greater commercial privileges extended to them, partly in the slave traffic with Spanish America, and partly also in the habits of the planters, who devoted their whole time to the plantations, in order that they might return the sooner enriched to their native land.

Great commercial liberties were given to the French islands by the regulation of 1717. The importation of French products was made free of duty, and the duties were very much diminished on colonial produce re-exported from French harbours; and permission was finally given to export directly from the islands of foreign ports.—Martinique was thereby rendered by far the most powerful of those possessions.—Attempts were made to form settlements on the neutral islands, so called, (now belonging to the Caribbees,) of St. Vincent,

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740. France.

Dominica, Tobago, and St. Lucia; a dispute respecting them arose with England, in 1722, which was terminated by the treaty of the 19th of Jan. 1723, for mutual evacuation.

13. In North America the territories of the French were brought within narrower limits by the loss of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; but as long as they possessed Canada and Louisiana, which was then becoming more important, they had no reason to complain. It is not easy to foretell what might otherwise have been the consequences, had the want of some line of separation from the English possessions, not contributed to excite apprehensions for the future. But the attempts, then in their commencement, to establish a communication between these countries by a chain of forts in the rear of the British colonies, kindled a jealousy, which was afterwards to break out into a great war.

14. The East India trade of France underwent various changes during this period. The French remained, indeed, true to the maxim of always committing it to a chartered company; but this chartered company was always a mere instrument in the hands of the ministers, apparently used only to try whether they could make money of it. It might have single moments of prosperity; for these it was indebted to some few great men among its directors in India; but how could it reckon on any stable foundation, while it was subservient to the changing plans and the despotic will of the ministers?

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740.

France.

The old East India company, which had long been in a state of decay, was renovated, May, 1719, by an amalgamation with the Mississippi, (West India,) African, and China company, founded 1717, under the name of the India or Mississippi company; which, united with the bank, undertook, in consideration of the privileges conferred on it, the payment of the debt of the crown, (one thousand six hundred millions); till the bank fell to pieces, in 1721, (see p. 309).—The company was aided by great privileges, especially the monopoly of tobacco, 1723. Such were the pains taken to form an artificial East India trade at the cost of the nation!—But the peaceful relations of France with the other maritime powers promoted the interests of the company, especially as under the ministry of Fleury, the minister Orry gave them a great share of his attention after 1737.

15. While the dominion of France extended no further on the continent of India, where Pondicherry still continued to be their principal station, permanent possessions, however, were gained by the occupation of two small islands, which were alike important to commerce by their productions, and by their situation and character as military stations in war.

The two islands, deserted by the Dutch, were occupied; the Isle of France, about 1690, and the Isle of Bourbon, 1720. Towards the end of this period they began to prosper, under the administration of Labourdonnais, 1736, owing particularly to the cultivation of coffee.

CH. GRANT, VISC. DE VAUX, *History of the Isle of St. Mauritius.* London, 1801, 4to. A rich collection of materials for the history of the two islands.—The father of the author was governor.

Holland.

16. The colonial affairs of the Dutch, in this period, underwent no great ostensible alterations.

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740.

Holland.

Things in the colonies took the same course as they did at home, only with this exception, that they were not always for the better. In the East Indies the Dutch were, without contradiction, the first European commercial nation; as no one attempted to disturb them on the islands they had occupied; and yet from this time dates the period of the gradual decline of their company. In the West Indies, the colony of Surinam began to rise, in consequence of the introduction of the coffee tree from Java, in 1718. which island also it was now first becoming important.

To give a documentary history of the decline of the Dutch East India company—as far as the question respects its causes—would be impossible even from the archives of the company itself. It sank under age, as every human institution must do at last, and above all, a strictly monopolising commercial association, in which the germ of dissolution must be finally, though slowly, developed. Although in the extracts now made public from the books of the company (Saalfeld, II. p. 138,) for the years 1613—1696, we find a receipt of three hundred and forty millions of guilders, with a surplus of forty millions over the expenditure, yet after the year 1697 a gradually increasing deficit commenced, which did not again cease. The solution lies partly in the character of its first officers. Did not perhaps the frequent change of governors in this period,—as many as eleven in less than forty years, (1704—1741,)—contribute its part to the gradual decline?

Vies de gouverneurs généraux, avec l'abrégé de l'histoire des Etablissements Hollandois aux Indes orientales, par J. P. J. Dubois. à la Haye, 1763, 4to. Very meagre in its information respecting the history of the administration.

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740.

17. It might have been expected that the great changes and convulsions, experienced by the Spanish monarchy, would have had a corresponding influence on its colonies. But the storms of the mother country did not reach them. The Spanish war of succession was, by the genius of the generals, prosecuted merely on land; and the colonies were not yet ripe for a revolution; otherwise, would not the *assiento* treaty, which opened an access to strangers, have precipitated it? The new dynasty during this period effected still less for the colonies than it did for Spain itself. A quiet progress must, nevertheless, have been made by them, as is shown by the sketch of their condition at the end of this period.

Spain.

Instead of enjoying greater privileges, the trade with America was laid under additional restrictions, partly by the high tariff of 1720, (which promoted, so much the more, the smuggling trade,) and partly by the incorporation of the Caraccas (or Guipuscoa) company, 1728, which put itself in sole possession of the commerce with that province. The transfer of the trade in Spain from Seville to Cadiz, to facilitate navigation, was not an equivalent for those disadvantages.

DON ULLOA, *Voyage historique dans l'Amerique méridionale.* 1757, 2 vols. 4to. The leading work. The author was employed by the French in measuring a degree.

18. Towards the end of this period, the colonies became for the first time, the direct cause of war between two of the leading powers of Europe. The privileges gained by England, from the *assiento* treaty, of which the great

Colonial affairs. 1700-1740. smuggling trade with the Spanish colonies was the result, led to counteracting regulations; and
1739. the disputes with the Garda-Costas produced a war, before the limit of the treaty of thirty years had elapsed, notwithstanding all the exertions which Walpole made to avoid it.

The real points of contest were: the pretensions of the Spanish to visit British vessels in open sea, as consequent on their old claims to the exclusive dominion of the Indian seas. A compact was made at Madrid, Jan. 15, 1739, which only protracted the decision. The war, demanded by the popular voice in England, broke out again in 1739.—Porto Bello was conquered, and the great fair afterwards ceased to be held there. But an unsuccessful attack was made on Carthagena in South America.—The war was then united with the Austrian war of succession, (see below).

Portugal. 19. For Portugal, Brazil acquired an increased importance during this period, owing to its valuable gold mines, (from which, however, England derived the greatest advantage,) and the
1728. discovery of treasures of diamonds, which required some peculiar regulations, if these commodities were to sustain their price. But how dearly were these treasures purchased, if agriculture was retarded by them? The contrary, however, seems to be proved by the increased exportation of produce, of sugar, cotton, logwood, etc.

Thirst of gold drove the Paulists (who were brought under subordination during this period, partly by severe, and partly by conciliatory measures,) further into the interior; and the provinces of Matto Grosso and Goyas rewarded them with a rich

profit. The cities in the interior prospered rapidly: Villa Ricca, Villa Boa, Villa do Principe, etc. especially after the peace of Utrecht. Above all, Rio Janeiro (notwithstanding it was surprised and burned by Dugué Trouin, 1711,) particularly flourished, it being the emporium of gold, and ultimately the capital. The crown's fifth amounted annually to twenty-five million crusados. Agriculture and commerce flourished; those who had become opulent investing their capital in them. Colonial affairs. 1700-1740.

20. Denmark also maintained its station among the colonial states, having obtained Tranquebar in the East Indies, the value of which was increased by the evangelical missions established there; and it was also able to acquire possessions in the West Indies. In Sweden, too, an East India company was chartered, to take an immediate share in the trade with China, without, however, having any permanent fund, or possessions there. Denmark. 1705. 1731.

The Danes took possession of the small island St. Jean, 1719, and purchased the island St. Croix from France, June 15, 1733. The island of St. Thomas had been occupied by the Danes ever since 1671.

SECOND PERIOD.

From 1700 *to* 1740.

PART THE SECOND.

HISTORY OF THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN STATES-SYSTEM.

Mémoires, etc. DE LAMBERTY, see p. 272.

SCHMAUSS, *Staatswissenschaft, etc.* see p. 183.

The biographies of Peter the Great and Charles XII. The best of them are:

Leben Peter's des Grossen, von G. A. VON HALEM. 1804, 3 vols. 8vo. With an index and critical examination of the other auxiliary sources.

Nordberg Leben von Carl XII. 1745, 3 vols. fol.: together with:

Anmerkungen oder Anecdoten, vertrautern Freunden mitgetheilt. 1758, 8vo.

Histoire de Charles XII., par M. DE VOLTAIRE. 1754, 4to.

G. ALDERFELD, *Histoire militaire de Charles XII.* 1740, 4 vols. 12mo.

Northern states. 1700-1740.

1. No one of the former periods was of such decisive importance to the north of Europe, as the present. It was not a mere renovation of the mutual relations of the states, it was a new world which was then formed. Previous occasions had already evinced great vigour, but rulers were wanting, who knew how to manage it with effect.

2. All the members of the system of the north had changed their rulers about the end of the former period; and the revolutions that the states experienced, had their origin for the most part in the peculiarities of character belonging to the new monarchs. But though all the states of the north were overtaken by the great storm, it was, in reality, Russia and Sweden whose contest gave the decision. In Peter the Great and Charles XII. two princes appeared as adversaries, both of equal energies and equally inflexible purpose; with the important distinction, however, that in the one, this purpose was linked with reason, in the other with passion. And it was this difference which at last necessarily decided the fate of their realms. Though both were capable of colossal projects, Peter never went beyond the capabilities of his empire.

Northern states. 1700-1740.

1. RUSSIA. Under the dominion of Peter I., after 1689, (see p. 263,) this was the greatest of empires in extent, reaching from Archangel to Azoph, (see p. 265,) but as yet excluded from the Baltic. It was inhabited indeed by a barbarous people, but constituting one grand nation. A reformation was already begun in the interior, both of the constitution, which was that of the most complete autocracy, and of the manners; for the nation was to be assimilated to the rest of Europe. But the higher classes were so only in part, for the ruler gave the example; language and religion were still powerful supports of nationality. The military department was re-organised altogether according to the European mode, after the dismissal of the Strelzi; a new army was formed in 1699. Single corps had been previously formed.

2. SWEDEN. Charles XII. came to the throne, when a

Northern states. 1700-1740.

youth of but fifteen years, in 1697. He inherited a well ordered state; then the first in the north, with a full treasury, and an excellent navy and army. But the political greatness of Sweden was inseparably attached to the possession of the provinces, which almost surrounded the Baltic; and a nation of not quite three millions can hardly be destined to rule the world for a length of time, though it may perhaps conquer it.

3. POLAND had been since 1696 under the sway of Augustus II. elector of Saxony. But the ancient anarchy did not end with the election of a new king; new projects excited new distrust; and the new manners introduced into the luxurious court, by enervating the old Sarmatian vigour, sapped the last pillar of the state. The nation carefully guarded against any reform, such as obtained in Russia; and the new king, though not without ambition, was by no means qualified for a reformer. The retaining of his Saxon troops brought upon him the dislike of the nation, and religious controversy soon gave fresh encouragement to the factious and discontented.

4. PRUSSIA, from 1688 to 1713, was under the dominion of Frederic I. elector of Brandenburg, and duke (after 1701, king) of Prussia. The elevation of Prussia to a kingdom, first recognised by the emperor, and gradually by the other powers of Europe, was no immediate accession of strength, but a stimulant to the reigning house to assert its dignity, either by pomp, or economy, or aggrandisement. What measures should be resorted to, depended on the spirit of the regent; but the endeavour to place itself on an equal rank with the other leading powers of Europe, was the fundamental maxim of this state. The rise, in a political states-system, of any power to which aggrandisement is necessary, can never be any thing else than dangerous to the welfare of the whole. What would have been the result, had there not been long united with this love of aggrandisement, a certain moderation, to which it was bound in the west by its character as a state of the empire, and in the east by the superiority of its neighbours?

5. DENMARK. At the very commencement of this period

it obtained in Frederic IV., 1700—1730, a ruler, who with the man ripened into the king. Though immediately overtaken by the storm, it suffered, in the end, least change of any, either in its constitution, or in the character and spirit of the government. The fall of Sweden and the rise of Russia, were for the benefit of Denmark; for Russia, being more remote, was less oppressive than Sweden, which was nearer. But the family dissensions with the house of Gottorp, assumed a more threatening aspect, owing to the marriage of the young duke Frederic IV. with Hedwig Sophia, the sister of Charles XII., (see p. 265); and the personal friendship of the two young princes, even more than their relationship, tended to strengthen the connection between Sweden and Holstein Gottorp.

3. These were the internal relations of the northern states, when with the opening of the century, the fearful twenty years' contest began, which was to give a new form to the north. It could not but be a fearful contest; for men like Peter and Charles do not easily bend; and it would, moreover, necessarily prove a widely extended contest. Whether the superiority of Russia or Sweden was at first, or became afterwards, the particular object in view, the elements of war were so generally scattered, that the flame could not but spread in every direction.

Causes of the northern war. They consisted, 1. In the decided purpose of Peter to extend Russia to the Baltic; an object which was only to be attained at the expense of Sweden. 2. In the attempt of king Augustus the second, encouraged by Patkul, to subject Livonia to Poland. 3. In the quarrel of Denmark with Frederic IV. of Holstein Gottorp; and the exasperation and fear at its connection with Sweden.

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4. A secret league was made between Denmark and the king of Poland, (Augustus II. endeavouring in vain to induce the distrustful nation to join,) against Sweden; this league was soon joined by Peter, while he nevertheless acted as the friend of Sweden, till the truce with the Turks was signed, (see p. 265.) In the same year all three disclosed their plans, Denmark immediately against Holstein-Gottorp, the other two against Livonia. Charles XII. was attacked entirely without his own fault; and how must the consciousness of the justice of his cause, soon crowned by his almost incredible success, have animated and steeled the heart of the northern hero?

Nov. 21, 1699.

1700.

The Danes invaded Sleswick, and besieged Tonningen, April, 1700. Brunswick, England, Holland, etc., joined as guarantees of the peace of Altona, (see p. 264,) in favour of Holstein-Gottorp. Charles XII. disembarked in Zealand, (July,) and extorted a peace at Travendal, Aug. 18. It was stipulated: 1. That the peace of Altona should be ratified. 2. That Denmark should promise to undertake nothing hostile against Sweden.

5. Thus freed from one enemy, Charles hastened to Livonia, to confront the king of Poland and the czar. But if the landing on Zealand had been sufficient to cripple Denmark, the strength of the north was first roused by that at Pernau. Even a battle like that of Narva, could not disarm Russia; and Charles himself caused the Poles to support their king.

Augustus II. invaded Livonia with a Saxon army, and invested Riga without effecting any thing, (Sept.,) while the czar, as the ally of Augustus, declared war on Sweden (Sept. 1) and besieged Narva.—Charles XII. landed and obtained a victory at Narva, Nov. 30, not a little facilitated by the disagreement of the Russian captains, under the forced command of the foreigner, the duc de Croix.—Did Peter wish to be beaten?

6. The liberation of Livonia left Charles XII. free to choose against which of his enemies he would now turn his forces. Whether against the czar, or the king of Poland; a choice, on which the fate of Sweden probably depended. But Charles did not consider which was the most dangerous of his foes; hatred, not prudence, decided; he left the czar, who needed nothing but time, in order to overthrow Augustus II., who had already sued for peace.

A meeting took place and a closer league was formed between the czar and Augustus II. at Birsen, Feb. 1701.—Charles crossed the Duna, and gained a victory over the Saxons at Riga, July 18, leaving behind only two weak corps to resist the Russians.—Possession was taken of Courland.

7. The resolution, now immutably adopted by Charles, emboldened by the spirit of faction in Poland, to dethrone Augustus II. and give the Poles another king, plunged him in a war with the greater part of this nation, which accelerated its downfal no less than the subversion of Swedish greatness. Besides all the other incalculable miseries brought in its train, it kindled in

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Poland the flame of religious contest, which was never extinguished; and robbed Charles of five precious years, for which nothing could afterwards compensate.

A union took place between the party of the Sapiehas and Charles XII.—Poland engaged in the war, and Charles was victorious at Clissow, July 19, 1702, and at Pultusk, May 1, 1703. A new confederation against Charles was concluded at Sendomir, Aug. 22, 1703, and a counter league at Warsaw, under the prince Primas, Jan. 24, 1704. Stanislaus Lescinsky, voivode of Posen, was elected at Charles's suggestion, July 12, with whom, as king of Poland, Charles concluded a treaty and alliance.—The war proceeded in Poland and Lithuania, 1705, but the Saxons were defeated at Fraustadt, Feb. 13, 1706; Charles penetrated into Saxony, and extorted a peace at Altranstadt, Sept. 24. Conditions: 1. Augustus renounced the dignity of king of Poland, as also the compact with the czar. 2. He acknowledged Stanislaus Lescinsky as king of Poland; and 3. Conceded to the Swedish army winter quarters with sustenance and pay, in Saxony.

8. But during these wars Peter had found time to establish his new dominion on the Baltic. Ingria and Karelia, formerly lost to the empire, (see p. 194,) were recovered, and in a country hardly as yet conquered, the foundations of St. Petersburg were already laid. Well might Charles, five years before, have had no suspicion of what was here to take place; but that the advancing erection itself did not open his eyes, shows that Peter deserved to perfect it.

The corps left in Ingria and Livonia by Charles XII. were overcome, 1701 and 1702. Notteburg (Schlüsselberg) was

conquered, Oct. 11, and Ryenschanz, May 1, 1703. St. Petersburg was founded immediately after, May 27.—A strong hold was gained in Livonia, and Narva conquered, Aug. 20, 1704. Northern states. 1700-1740.

9. Charles resolved to attack his yet remaining powerful enemy, in the midst of his own empire. But if Russia had been as easy to subdue as Poland, Peter was certainly not so easy to vanquish as Augustus. To him no measure was too dear, so that it promoted his principal object; and the devastation of his own country was a formidable impediment in the way of the Swedish conqueror. It obstructed his direct route to the capital; and when, deluded by the prospects that the Hetman Mazeppa held out to him, he turned his course to the Ukraine, the issue could scarcely seem dubious. If Charles was to conquer, he must have done it by the direct and shortest path.

The king left Saxony, Sept. 1707. He marched through desolated Poland, while Lewenhaupt received orders to join him.—He crossed the Dnieper, Aug. 11, 1708, and pressed forward to Ukraine. Lewenhaupt was defeated at Liesna, Oct. 8; and the king soon saw most of the promises of Mazeppa frustrated. Pultawa was invested, May 1709, and Peter hastened to relieve it.

10. The battle of Pultawa decided the fate of the north. Much greater battles have been fought, but no one more teeming with consequences. Peter's new creation was at once confirmed; and Sweden's dominion at the same time overthrown. Thus fell a structure, which was July 8, 1709.

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too high for its foundations; and Sweden was to give astonished Europe the first grand example of the uncertainty of artificial greatness.

11. What was this issue but the natural issue? Or was this fall of Sweden in itself any thing more than a return to its natural condition? The continuance of the kingdom was not concerned, but its excess of power; and had a voluntary restriction, to what it must after all be restricted, been possible—in how much better a condition would Sweden have emerged from the contest? But how could such a resignation, which, however strongly reason might have advised it, was scarcely possible for a common man, have entered the breast of Charles XII.?

12. The immediate consequence of the defeat at Pultawa was the dissolution of all the political relations forcibly established by Charles XII. Denmark no longer deemed itself bound by the peace of Travendal, nor Saxony by that of Altranstadt; and while Augustus again ascended the Polish throne, deserted by Stanislaus, his friendship with Peter was re-established by the convention at Thorn. But Peter, as was reasonable, retained Livonia, which in the meanwhile had been conquered by him.

Saxony and Denmark renewed their connection with Russia, Aug. 1709, but the invitation, proffered to Prussia, was refused.—King Augustus returned to Warsaw, and was acknowledged by the nation.—Denmark declared war anew, and invaded Schonen. (November).

13. But while the Swedish-German provinces presented such attractions to the conquerors, after the war was renewed, and the Swedish troops had withdrawn from Poland into Pomerania, it appeared, that the northern war must extend to Germany, and perhaps give new aliment to the Spanish war of succession. The powers, however, who were implicated in such a contingency, procured an acknowledgment of the neutrality of these countries by the treaty of the Hague; but it soon appeared that it was to no purpose. Northern states. 1700-1740.

The treaty of the Hague was concluded, March 31, 1710, mediated by the maritime powers and the emperor, between the senate of Sweden, the allies, and the German empire; under the conditions: 1. of the neutrality of the Swedish-German provinces; and also, 2. of Sleswick and Jutland, under 3. the guarantee of the maritime powers, Prussia, Hanover, etc.—Charles XII. remonstrated Nov. 30.

14. Deprived of his own strength, Charles sought to recover his fortune by foreign aid, and built his hopes on the assistance of the Turks, who had received the defeated hero with that respect, which semi-barbarians are wont to pay to personal greatness. Who, indeed, had greater reasons than the Turks not to allow him to fall? The influence of Charles in the Divan was at last victorious, and war was declared against Russia.

Charles was received in Bender, and resided there from Sept. 1709, to Feb. 10, 1713.—The thirty years' truce was broken (see p. 269), and war declared, Dec. 1710.

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15. Thus the hopes of the Swedish hero revived; though there is but little probability, that even the successful issue of the war would have raised Sweden to its former elevation. But these hopes were to be most bitterly disappointed. In the very moment, when Peter, shut up with his whole army in Moldavia, was on the point of surrendering himself a prisoner, he was saved by the wisdom of a woman and the corruptibility of the grand vizier. The peace of the Pruth inflicted a deeper wound on the king, than had been inflicted even by the battle of Pultawa.

Peter concluded a treaty with Demetrius Cantimer, the prince of Moldavia, April 13, 1711, under the promise, that the dignity of prince should be hereditary in his house, as the protegé of Russia, in consideration of stipulated assistance.—Peter passed the Niester, and joined the prince at Jassy.—Provisions were soon wanting, and he was surrounded on the Pruth.—Negotiations were entered upon, according to Catharine's advice; and the peace was concluded, July 24, 1711, under the conditions: 1. That Azoph with its territory should be restored to the Porte. 2. That the new fortifications on the Samara, especially at Taganrog, should be demolished. 3. That a free return should be given to the Swedish monarch to his kingdom.—Charles, who had hastened from Bender, arrived just in time to see the Russian army march off unmolested.—He did not, however, give up all hopes of annihilating the peace; but no sooner was it broken, Dec. 17, 1711, than it was established anew under the mediation of England and Poland, April 16, 1712; Peter promising, besides the above stipulations, to evacuate Poland.—The king was violently removed from Bender to Demotica, Feb. 10, 1713. The former peace was ratified, July 3, which was followed by the compromise of king Augustus with the Porte, April 2, 1714.

W. THEYLS *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Charles XII. pendant son séjour dans l'empire Ottoman.* à Leyde, 1722, 8vo. The author was Dragoman of the Porte.

16. While the Swedish monarch had, to all purposes, disappeared from Europe, his rejection of the treaty of the Hague had important consequences to the north. The Swedish provinces in Germany now attracted the allies; and the change of rulers, which took place at the same time in Prussia, and raised William I. to the throne, led to a participation in the war. The kings of Denmark and Sweden invaded Pomerania; and the former not only made himself master of Bremen and Verden, but soon found a pretence for occupying Holstein-Gottorp. And though the sequestration of Stettin by Prussia was only designed for the protection of a neutral, it contained the latent cause of a war. 1713.

The Danes and Saxons invaded Pomerania, 1711. Steenbock crossed over, Sept., and obtained a victory over the Danes at Gadebush, Dec. 14.—But soon after the burning of Altona, Jan. 8, 1713, he was shut up in Tonningen, and forced by the Russian troops to surrender, May 16.—A treaty respecting the occupation of Stettin was made June 22, between the governments of Holstein-Gottorp and Prussia, and forcible possession taken, Sept. 29. Prussia concluded a contract with Poland and Russia, respecting the sequestration, Oct. 6.

Mémoires concernant les campagnes de M. le Compte de Steenbok, de 1712 *et* 1713, *avec sa justification*, par M. N**. 1745, 8vo.

17. Of no less moment was the use Denmark made of its conquests, by selling Bremen and

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Verden to Hanover, as the price of its participating in the war against Sweden. The resentment of Charles XII., thus excited against George I., involved not only Hanover, but England also, in the northern war; and the knot became more entangled than ever, when in consequence of the measures adopted in Sweden itself, Charles unexpectedly returned to Stralsund, more like an adventurer than a king, yet indulging the hope of severing this knot with the sword.

The duchies of Bremen and Verden, equally important to England and Hanover, were purchased June 26, 1715.—The participation of England, by despatching a squadron to the Baltic, was produced by the strict edicts of Charles against the navigation of neutrals.—Attempts were made in Sweden to transfer the regency to Ulrica Eleonora, the sister of the king, Dec. 1713, and a diet was convoked.—Charles returned to Stralsund, Nov. 22, 1714.

18. Of all the foreign provinces of the Swedish monarchy, but few remnants were left beside Stralsund; yet even then, Charles was not only resolved to continue the war, but soon saw the number of his enemies increased by Prussia and Hanover, and the Swedish main country exposed to the czar, the new lord of the Baltic. The remainder of the Swedish possessions in Germany were finally lost with Stralsund, and Charles brought back to Sweden nothing but himself.

An alliance was formed between Prussia, Saxony, Denmark, and Hanover, Feb. 1715, and shortly after in Oct. between

Prussia, Hanover, and Russia. What else but war could have resulted from the equivocal conduct of Prussia towards a prince like Charles?—Wismar was besieged in common, and more especially Stralsund, which surrendered immediately after Charles's departure, Dec. 12.

19. While Charles thus seemed to have little else but his hopes left, he found in the baron of Goertz, the minister of Holstein-Gottorp, the friend and counsellor that he needed. Rarely have two men met together who were less alike, and still more rarely, two who had greater need of each other. Charles had been finally forced to understand—but perhaps too late—that every thing is not to be effected with the sword. Goertz taught him the efficiency of policy and the financial art, and met with a docile scholar, because he at the same time yielded to the passions of the king. Entrusted with the management of domestic affairs, notwithstanding the hatred of the Swedish nobles, he gained credit for Sweden, and thence the means of prosecuting the war. But the war was no longer to be carried on without an object. While amity was restored with the more powerful, by ceding to Peter his conquests, the weaker were to pay for the loss. And the project, in all respects adapted to the relations of the times, appeared almost certain of success, because it accorded completely with Peter's purpose, who could derive no benefit from a longer war with Sweden; and because a man like Goertz, whose connec-

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tions extended through all Europe, was at the head of the negotiations.

The other allies, especially England and Denmark, began to entertain a great distrust towards the czar, after the expedition, purposely frustrated, against Schonen, 1716. Goertz joined with Alberoni and the pretender, against George I.— The czar made a useless attempt on his journey, 1717, to gain France against England; although a treaty was concluded Aug. 4, without any particular consequences, yet remarkable as the first participation of Russia in the affairs of the west. Secret negotiations were carried on at Aaland, between Sweden and Russia, May 1718, by Goertz and Gyllenborg on the side of Sweden, and Osterman and Bruce on the part of Russia, and were brought almost to a conclusion. Norway and Hanover were, as was afterwards discovered, to indemnify Sweden, and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and Stanislaus in Poland to be reinstated.

RETTUNG *der Ehre und Unshuld des Freiherrn von Goertz*, 1776, 8vo.

Der Freiherr von Goertz, in WOLTMAN'S *Geschichte und Politik*, B. I. II. 1800.

Dec. 11, 1718. N. S. Feb. 28, 1718.

20. But fate had determined otherwise! Charles XII. fell in the trenches before Friedrichshall; and the enraged aristocrats forthwith dragged his friend and adviser to the scaffold. A radical change in Swedish policy was the consequence. A rupture took place with Russia; but urged by the feeling of their inability to help themselves, the Swedes resorted to an alliance with England. A series of treaties of peace with Hanover, Prussia, Denmark, and

Feb. 1, 1720.

Poland, were now dearly purchased through the mediation of England; when this was accom-

plished, nothing was wanting but a peace with the most dangerous enemy. Northern states. 1700-1740.

After preliminaries and previous truces, Sweden concluded the following formal treaties of peace:

1. With Hanover, Nov. 9, 1719. *a.* Hanover was to retain Bremen and Verden, *b.* and pay to Sweden a million of rix dollars.

2. With Prussia, Feb. 1, 1720. *a.* Prussia was to retain Stettin, besides Pomerania, as far as the Peene; and the islands Wollin and Usedom, *b.* and pay to Sweden two millions of dollars.

3. With Denmark, July 14, 1720. *a.* Denmark was to restore all its conquests to Sweden. *b.* Sweden to renounce its exemption from toll in the Sound, and pay 600,000 dollars. *c.* France and England guaranteed to Denmark the possession of the duchy of Sleswick, and Sweden engaged not to assist the (deserted) duke of Holstein-Gottorp.

4. With Poland, the conditions were those of the truce signed Nov. 7, 1719.

21. But what were these losses compared with the sacrifice, with which peace had to be purchased from the czar, rendered necessary by his dreadful devastations on the coast of Fries- 1720
land, against which the British fleets could afford no protection. The peace of Nystadt completed the work, for which Peter had been labouring the last twenty years.

Peace was signed between Russia and Sweden at Nystadt, Sept. 10, 1721. *a.* Sweden relinquished to Russia, Livonia, Esthlonia, Ingria, and Karelia, part of Wiborg, besides the islands Oesel, Dagoe, and Moen, and all others from the boundaries of Courland to Wyborg. *b.* On the other hand, Finland was restored, and two millions of dollars paid to Swe-

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den. *c.* The czar promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of Sweden. *d.* Poland and England were included in this peace.

22. The history of a war, thus carried on and thus terminated, displays clearly enough the vicissitudes of things in the north. But it was far less the gain or the losses of the war, that were decisive of the future, than the internal relations, which were now unfolded in most of the states of the northern system, in some for good, in others for evil.

23. Russia was now indisputably the first of them. The colossal monarch of that colossal empire had succeeded in giving the European character, not so much to his people, as to his court and his residence. His new creation in Petersburg stood firm; and not without reason did he now adopt the imperial title. Europe
1721. had already felt, that he had drawn nearer; but for the north, the new dominion of the Baltic was the principal thing. After he navigated it victoriously with fleets of his own building, the Swedish power was of itself at an end.

24. Who could say, how far this extorted supremacy of Russia might lead? It depended on the personal character of the ruler. The sphere of Russia's activity remained, nevertheless, for a long time confined to the north; its navy never went beyond the Baltic, and its army was formidable only to its neighbours. Peter himself in his last years wasted his powers

against Persia; and though he had himself chosen his successor, it was soon felt that he was no more. The throne was often afterwards filled by revolutions; but they were revolutions of the court, without disturbing the internal quiet; phenomena of frequent occurrence in similar great empires. But the foundation of Petersburg, and the possession of the other ports on the Baltic, by which a way of exportation was opened to the products of the interior, as well as of importation to those of other countries, created within the empire a change the more sure because it was not sudden.

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25. Sweden stood like a tree stript of its branches; but the wounds inflicted by the war, were neither the only ones, nor the deepest. An end indeed had been put to the abuses of unlimited power after the death of Charles; but the manner in which this was done, occasioned greater evils than the autocracy itself. The aristocrats usurped the sovereignty; the throne was filled by election; the council of the kingdom reigned, and the king possessed little more than the bare title and the representation.

The younger sister of Charles XII., Ulrica Eleonora, was elected Feb. 21, 1719; the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, son of his elder sister, being passed over. A new constitution was framed; the sovereignty was renounced; and the co-equal authority of the council of the kingdom acknowledged. The crown was transferred from the queen to her husband, Frederic of Hesse, May 3, 1720, with yet greater restrictions.

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26. Poland presented a still more melancholy aspect. Devastated by foreign and civil wars, and by famine and the plague, that followed in their train, the peace itself served but to develop new miseries. The Swedish war had, likewise, enflamed religious discord; and the jesuits took good care that the fire should not be extinguished. The dissidents now became, from compulsion, a political party.

The dissidents began to be deprived of their political rights, in the diet of 1717. Their churches were torn down; massacres were perpetrated at Thorn, occasioned by the jesuits, 1724, and which had almost renewed the war with Russia.—The exclusion of the dissidents from the diets, the high offices, and the *Starosties*, was confirmed by the diet of 1733.

27. But while Poland appeared in a state of internal dissolution, the new Prussian monarchy had acquired a high degree of internal perfection. The fall of Sweden had freed it from a very troublesome neighbour, and after Frederic William I. had succeeded his extravagant father, a
1713. new creation came into being here, no less than in Russia; though in a very different way. Peter formed greatness from great materials; here on the contrary, something similar was to be formed from proportionably small means. Thence it followed, that economy was necessarily the basis of Prussian power.

28. But this economy was shaped in a peculiar way in a state, which drew the greater part of its revenues from its domains. The manage-

ment of these constituted, therefore, the most important part of the whole domestic administration; and Frederic William I. laid the foundation of the internal organisation of the monarchy, by erecting the chambers of the domains, after the abolition of hereditary leases, and subjecting them, as well as the management of the lands of the cities, to a general directory. In consequence of this regulation, there was an annual fixed revenue, which rendered it possible to fix the expenditures with equal exactness; while the surplus was applied to the accumulation of a treasure. These regulations determined the whole spirit of the Prussian administration; which was not altered by the opening of sources of revenue, such as the excise, etc., which in their nature are more variable.

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1713. 1723.

29. Thus the favourite principle of unity in the administration, proceeding from the personal character of Frederic, was for the first time made effectual. The Prussian state was like a great household, managed in the most parsimonious manner. But even in private life, we do not always regard the most parsimonious housekeeping as the most perfect. How much less so, when the reason of this strict economy is the gratification of a whim; for with Frederic William—who possessed nothing of the spirit of a great general or conqueror—his military system was not much more. But, notwithstanding, what consequences must not necessarily follow

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the establishment of a monarchy, in which the army was the principal thing?

30. The application that was to be made of this army depended on the genius of the ruler. But it was not by this alone that Prussia operated on the rest of Europe; it was the relative strength, and the internal regulation of this army, soon to serve as a model for others, and in a great measure to determine the future character of standing armies. The principle of maintaining a larger army than the population could supply, led to the system of foreign levies, and all the cruelties connected with it; from which again sprang that odious impressment, which could serve to make the condition of a common soldier neither respected nor desirable.

31. Such was the geographical situation of this country, that it might be doubted whether it belonged to the east or west. It had to see itself involved almost equally in the affairs of both; the disputes of the maritime powers and the Turkish wars alone lay beyond its sphere. The proofs of this were visible under Frederic William. But as yet on good terms with Austria, its hopes would have been limited to the acquisition of some Westphalian provinces, had not the northern war afforded an opportunity of aggrandisement in Pomerania.

32. Denmark, though involved in the northern war, suffered the least change. It received Sleswick as its share of the spoil; but the times

were coming when the offended house of Holstein-Gottorp would be able to excite in it bitter regret for the injury. Northern states. 1700-1740.

33. The last treaties of peace had left no contested point undecided; and the superiority of Russia and the exhaustion of humbled Sweden, were too great to allow the rancour, which still remained here, to produce any immediate consequences. Under the two next reigns after Peter's death, those of Catharine I. and Peter II., foreign policy was not the subject that employed the Russian government; for Menschikow, and after his fall the Dolgorukies, had too much to do for themselves; what did they care about foreign countries? Even the connection with Austria, into which Catharine I. was drawn by the league of Vienna, (see p. 302,) was at first attended with no particular results. 1726.

The reign of Catharine I., wholly under Menschikow's guidance, lasted from Feb. 9, 1725, to May 17, 1727. Under her successor, Peter II., († Jan. 29, 1730,) Menschikow was deposed, Sept. 1727, and the Dolgorukies came into power.

34. But it was altogether different after Anne, the niece of Peter the Great, and the widowed duchess of Courland, ascended the throne. The attempt to restrict the supreme power ruined the native nobles; and a cabinet was now for the first time formed in Russia, consisting mostly of strangers. Very different in their hopes and projects, they all required the external splendour Feb. 1730. to Oct. 1740.

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of the empire; and already initiated in the mysteries of politics, they sought this splendour in foreign relations. But these, however, were men partially moulded in the school of Peter the Great. Where a Münnich and an Ostermann were active, the sport of court intrigue itself led to bold projects; for even the all-powerful favourite Biron, saw in this the only means of exercising his despotism over the nation with impunity.

Mémoires politiques et militaires sur la Russie, depuis l'année 1727, *jusqu' à* 1744, par le général DE MANSTEIN. à Leipsic, 1771.—The leading source for the history of the court and war.

Contributions in: BUSCHING's *Magazin*, B. I. II. III. collected in the empire itself.

35. One inducement to this foreign activity was held out by the duchy of Courland. As a fief of Poland, at the approaching extinction of the ducal house of Kettler, it was to revert to the country, in order to be united with it; but the states had set themselves against this scheme; and Anne improved these relations to procure it for her favourite Biron. From this time Russia appointed to this duchy; but the revolutions in this empire had in almost every case an influence on Courland.

As early as 1726, the states, to prevent the union with Poland, had chosen count Maurice of Saxony to succeed duke Ferdinand, even in his lifetime; but Maurice was unable to maintain himself. After the death of Ferdinand, in 1737, Ernest, duke of Biron, was elected under Russian influence. After his fall, 1741, Courland remained occupied by Russian

troops; and although Charles, prince of Saxony, obtained the investiture from the Poles, in 1759, Ernest of Biron was nevertheless, after his recall from exile, in 1762, by Peter III., again declared duke, and afterwards confirmed by Catharine II.

36. But a more important opportunity was offered when the royal throne of Poland became vacant by the death of Augustus II. The nation desired a native, and, at the suggestion of France, unanimously chose, for the second time, Stanislaus Lescinsky, the father-in-law of Louis XV. But Augustus of Saxony gained Russia, by promising Courland to Biron, and Austria, by acknowledging the Pragmatic Sanction. A Russian army decided for Augustus III.; while only a French corps came to the aid of Stanislaus; and though France and its allies found opportunity to compensate themselves amply in the west, (see p. 306,) it lost for ever the confidence of Poland. 1733.

Stanislaus Lescinsky, who had returned to Poland in secret, was chosen at the impulse of prince Primas, Sept. 9, 1733. But the Russians quickly advanced under Lascy; and a counter choice was made of Augustus III., Oct. 5, by a small number of nobles, Stanislaus retreating to Dantzic. Count Münnich obtained the chief command in order to remove him from the court. Dantzic was invested and reduced, after Stanislaus had escaped in disguise, June 30, 1734. The contest was settled at the *pacification-diet*, July, 1736. It was agreed that for the present the country should be evacuated by the foreign troops.

37. The result of this war, therefore, was, that Augustus III. obtained the Polish crown,

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for which he was indebted to foreign aid. His government seemed merely a continuation of that of his father; and the seed of evils which had germinated under the latter in the interior, could now thrive luxuriantly, because a long period of peace ensued. Nothing, therefore, prevented the nobles from corrupting their morals abroad, to which they were even invited by the fondness of the king for pomp and display. Never was this corruption of the state so fearful as here, where the nobility, and, among the nobility the grandees, constituted the nation; and where morals alone had made the want of a constitution less perceptible. Every thing therefore deteriorated, while it was thought that every thing remained as of old. The time of awakening from this lethargy could not but come; but what a moment was it to be!

38. While Poland was thus situated, and the contest of factions was preparing in Sweden, Russia turned its power against the Turks. The parties of the court deemed it judicious now to execute the old project of Peter, of revenging the peace on the Pruth; and while the dominion of Russia was again extended to the Black Sea, to give employment to Münnich as commander-in-chief. The juncture seemed not ill-chosen; for the Porte was in Asia, combating the conqueror Nadir Shah; but the issue showed that in many points they had miscalculated.

The campaigns of Münnich, from 1735 to 1739, were bril-

liant, but very expensive. Azoph was conquered, and the Crimea was entered, 1736, but could not be maintained. A fixed establishment was made on the mouths of the Dneiper, and the bloody conquest of Otchakov achieved, 1737. But the campaign of the year 1738 was rendered unsuccessful by famine and plague in the deserts of Ukraine. On the other hand, in 1739, a successful expedition was made beyond the Niester; a victory was gained at Stawutschane, Aug. 28; of which the conquest of Choczim and the possession of Moldavia were the consequences. Northern states. 1700-1740.

Lebensbeschriebung des Russ. Kaiserl. Generalfeldmarschalls B. C. Grafen von Münnich, von G. A. VON HALEM. Oldenburg, 1803.

39. But unhappily for Russia, it found in this war an ally in Austria, to whom the treaty of alliance with Catharine I. gave a pretence for participation. But the hope of conquest was much disappointed. The Turks soon observed that Eugene was no more; and the jealousy of the allies facilitated their operations. The losses of Austria brought it to the ignominous peace of Belgrade; which opened the way to a peace with Russia.

In the campaigns of the Austrians, from 1736 to 1738, they were expelled from Servia, Bosnia, and Wallachia. The generals had to bear the faults of the court. The grand vizier advanced before Belgrade, 1739; under the walls of which place, under French mediation, peace was concluded, Sept. 18, 1739; for which Charles himself believed he owed an excuse to Anne. Conditions: *a*. The evacuation and restoration of Belgrade, Orsowa, and Sabacz to the Porte. *b*. The cession of Servia and Austrian Wallachia. *c*. The Bannat, on the other hand, was retained by Austria.—Russia now thought itself obliged to conclude a peace, (Dec. 28,) in which: *a*.

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Azoph, razed however, was retained by Russia. *b*. The boundaries were enlarged in the Ukraine. *c*. All other conquests were to be restored to the Porte.

40. By this peace Austria lost all the fruits of Eugene's victories, and the projects of Russia to acquire a strong hold on the Black Sea, were reserved for accomplishment to a later time. Meanwhile the ignominy of the peace of the Pruth was regarded as avenged; and this belief was not much less than the truth. Whatever the war had cost, the superiority of the Russians was nevertheless decided; the interior organisation of the Russian army was perfected, and not without reason has Münnich been called the Eugene of the north.

END OF VOL. I.

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
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